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Les entrepreneurs de la prise de décision : l'exemple des politiques de sécurité nationale de l'administration G. W. Bush (2001–2004)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2014

Charles-Philippe David*
Affiliation:
Université du Québec à Montréal
Sébastien Barthe*
Affiliation:
Université du Québec à Montréal
*
Charles-Philippe David, département de science politique, Université du Québec à Montréal, Pavillon Hubert-Aquin, Montréal, Qc, H3C 3P8, david.charles-philippe@uqam.ca.
Sébastien Barthe, lecturer, département de science politique, Université du Québec à Montréal, Pavillon Hubert-Aquin, Montréal, Qc, H3C 3P8, barthe.sebastien@uqam.ca.

Abstract

Résumé. Comment expliquer la politique de sécurité nationale américaine, notamment l'évolution de certaines décisions en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité intérieure ? Quels acteurs et quels facteurs rendent compte des résultats pour le moins controversés de celles-ci ? Au-delà des discours, des institutions et des énoncés, les choix de sécurité ont été l'œuvre de ceux que nous surnommons les « entrepreneurs » de la prise de décision. La question à laquelle cet article veut répondre est précisément de savoir qui sont ces « entrepreneurs » et comment ils ont réalisé cet objectif de transformation des politiques de sécurité des États-Unis. Trois prises de décision de la première administration Bush sont abordées : la guerre préventive en Irak, la redéfinition légale de la notion de torture, et l'institutionnalisation plus grande de la sécurité intérieure.

Abstract. How are we to explain U.S. foreign policy, particularly policymaking on national security and homeland security, under the first administration of G. W. Bush? Who were the actors and what were the factors that produced what were, to say the least, controversial results? Looking beyond the speeches, statements and institutions, the security decisions can be seen as the work of “policy entrepreneurs.” This article considers who those entrepreneurs were and how they achieved their goal of transforming U.S. security policy. Three decisions are discussed: the pre-emptive war in Iraq, the legal redefinition of torture by the Bush administration, and the institutionalization of homeland security, in particular the Patriot Act.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2013 

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