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Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2010

JASON A. MACDONALD
JASON A. MACDONALD*
Affiliation:
West Virginia University
*
Jason A. MacDonald is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, 316 Woodburn Hall, P.O. Box 6317, Morgantown, WV 26506-6317 (Jason.MacDonald@mail.wvu.edu).
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Abstract

Limitation riders, which allow the U.S. Congress to forbid agencies from spending money for specific uses, enable congressional majorities to exert greater influence over bureaucratic policy decisions than is appreciated by research on policy making in the United States. I develop a theory of limitation riders, explaining why they lead to policy outcomes that are preferable to a majority of legislators compared to outcomes that would occur if this tool did not exist. I assess this perspective empirically by analyzing the volume of limitation riders reported in bills from 1993 to 2002 and all limitation riders forbidding regulatory actions from 1989 to 2009. In addition to supporting the conclusion that Congress possesses more leverage over agencies’ decisions than is currently appreciated, the findings have implications for advancing theories of delegation.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 104 , Issue 4 , November 2010 , pp. 766 - 782
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2010

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