Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-c47g7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-20T01:16:53.258Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Multi-use and constraints from original use

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Justin A. Jungé
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155. ddennett@tufts.edujunge@wjh.harvard.eduhttp://www.tufts.edu
Daniel C. Dennett
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155. ddennett@tufts.edujunge@wjh.harvard.eduhttp://www.tufts.edu

Abstract

Anderson's theory is plausible and largely consistent with the data. However, it remains underspecified on several fronts, and we highlight areas for potential improvement. Reuse is described as duplicating a functional component, preserving one function and tinkering to add another function. This is a promising model, but Anderson neglects other reasonable alternatives and we highlight several. Evidence cited in support of reuse fails to uniquely support it among a broader set of multi-use theories. We suggest that a more stringent criterion for direct support of reuse may be satisfied by focusing on previous adaptive functions (original use).

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Carruthers, P. (2006) The architecture of the mind: Massive modularity and the flexibility of thought. Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sperber, D. (1996) Explaining culture. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Sperber, D. (2001) In defense of massive modularity. In Language, brain, and cognitive development: Essays in honor of Jacques Mehler. MIT Press.Google Scholar