Economics and Philosophy - Current Issue

Volume 24 Issue 02

Mon, 30 Jun 2008 23:00:00 GMT

Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02

The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.

WHY ECONOMISTS SHOULD BE UNHAPPY WITH THE ECONOMICS OF HAPPINESS

Research Articles
Pierluigi Barrotta,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 145-165

Abstract
The economics of happiness is an influential research programme, the aim of which is to change welfare economics radically. In this paper I set out to show that its foundations are unreliable. I shall maintain two basic theses: (a) the economics of happiness shows inconsistencies with the first person standpoint, contrary claims on the part of the economists of happiness notwithstanding, and (b) happiness is a dubious concept if it is understood as the goal of welfare policies. These two theses are closely related and lead to a third thesis: (c) happiness should be replaced by autonomy as the fundamental goal of welfare economics. To defend my claims I shall show that a hedonic approach to happiness leads to an awkward trilemma. Furthermore, I shall clarify the meaning of and , along with their conceptual relationships.

AGE-WEIGHTING

Research Articles
Greg Bognar,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 167-189

Abstract
Some empirical findings seem to show that people value health benefits differently depending on the age of the beneficiary. Health economists and philosophers have offered justifications for these preferences on grounds of both efficiency and equity. In this paper, I examine the most prominent examples of both sorts of justification: the defence of age-weighting in the WHO's global burden of disease studies and the fair innings argument. I argue that neither sort of justification has been worked out in satisfactory form: age should not be taken into account in the framework of the burden of disease measure, and on the most promising formulations of the fair innings argument, it turns out to be merely an indicator of some other factor. I conclude by describing the role of age in theories of justice of healthcare resource allocation.

AN ECONOMIC THEORISTS' READING OF SIMONE WEIL

Research Articles
Aviad Heifetz, Enrico Minelli,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 191-204

Abstract
In Economics individuals are defined by their preferences over the consequences of their own actions and the actions carried out by others. In contrast, Simone Weil depicts the individual as continuously re-constituted by the contact that he establishes with reality via his action. Such an action is aimed at achieving an effect in the physical world, but what makes it human is not success per se, but rather the fact that it stems from reasoning and planning. Affliction is caused by effort carried out mechanically like that of a beast of burden, when the individual has no opportunity to exercise reason for choosing how to confront reality's ever-challenging hazards and necessity.

JUDGMENT AGGREGATION AND SUBJECTIVE DECISION-MAKING

Research Articles
Michael K. Miller,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 205-231

Abstract
I present an original model in judgment aggregation theory that demonstrates the general impossibility of consistently describing decision-making purely at the group level. Only a type of unanimity rule can guarantee a group decision is consistent with supporting reasons, and even this possibility is limited to a small class of reasoning methods. The key innovation is that this result holds when individuals can reason in different ways, an allowance not previously considered in the literature. This generalizes judgment aggregation to subjective decision situations, implying that the discursive dilemma persists without individual agreement on the logical constraints. Notably, the model mirrors the typical method of choosing political representatives, and thus suggests that no voting procedure other than unanimity rule can guarantee representation that reflects electorate opinion. Finally, I apply the results to a normative argument for unanimity rule in contract theory and juries, as well as to problems posed for deliberative democratic theory and the concept of representation.

THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE VIOLATES PRIORITY

Research Articles
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, John E. Roemer,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 233-257

Abstract
The veil of ignorance has been used often as a tool for recommending what justice requires with respect to the distribution of wealth. We complete Harsanyi's model of the veil of ignorance by appending information permitting objective comparisons among persons. In order to do so, we introduce the concept of objective empathy. We show that the veil-of-ignorance conception of John Harsanyi, so completed, and Ronald Dworkin's, when modelled formally, recommend wealth allocations in conflict with the prominently espoused view that priority should be given to the less able in wealth allocation. We finally argue that the veil of ignorance should be rejected as a tool for discovering what justice requires.

The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith , Knud Haakonssen (ed). Cambridge University Press, 2006, 409 pages.

Book Reviews
Vivienne Brown,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 259-265

Abstract

Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. Volume 1, Foundations: Volume 2, Applications, Handbooks in Economics , Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds). North Holland, 2006, xxv, xxii + 1588 pages.

Book Reviews
David Collard,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 265-271

Abstract

Equilibrium in Economics. Scope and Limits , Valeria Mosini (ed). Routledge, 2007, xxiii + 284 pages.

Book Reviews
Michel De Vroey,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 271-275

Abstract

Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality , Nils Holtug and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds). Oxford University Press, 2007, xi + 339 pages.

Book Reviews
Karsten Klint Jensen,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 275-282

Abstract

Economics and Social Interaction: Accounting for Interpersonal Relations , Benedetto Gui and Robert Sugden (eds). Cambridge University Press, 2005, xv + 299 pages.

Book Reviews
Luis Miguel Miller,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 283-287

Abstract

Natural Justice , Ken Binmore. Oxford University Press, 2005, xiii + 207 pages.

Book Reviews
Giacomo Sillari,
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 24 Issue 02 , pp 287-295

Abstract