Abstract

This article considers the economic sins of contemporary ir theory—that is, the pervasive errors of analysis that result from the embrace of different forms of economism. Much of structural realism, for example, derives from the misguided adaptation of price theory (that is, microeconomic competition), especially with regard to the implications of oligopoly. The minimalist assumptions of neorealism have also encouraged an all-too-easy reification of a style of analysis, now pervasive across most ir paradigms, that values prediction above explanation. This relates to another great economic sin of contemporary ir theory: the hyperrationalist turn. Most clearly seen in the influential rationalist explanations for war approach, it reflects the uncritical adaptation of a certain type of macroeconomics: rational expectations theory. But the limits to rational expectations were revealed analytically for decades and ultimately exposed by the global financial crisis. Worse, even where that approach adds value to economic theory, it is particularly unsuited for adaptation to ir theory. The rise of structural realism and hyperrationalism represented a turn away from an older, classical realist tradition. Classical realism, with its emphasis on choice, contingency, history, ideology, uncertainty, and unpredictability, was rejected in favor of more purportedly scientific and, in particular, economistic approaches to ir theory. But in each instance, the newer approaches feature the misapplication of economic theories and analogies to the study of ir . Correcting these mistakes invites the renaissance of classical realism.

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