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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 September 2011
Since the publication of Dieter Henrich's classic paper, ‘The proof structure of the transcendental deduction’, in The Review of Metaphysics 22 (1969), the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding has been under focus in Kant studies in a very special way. The B-deduction seems to be a proof in two steps. Consequently, the focus has been on questions like, ‘What is the structure of the deduction?’, and ‘Why is the deduction carried out in two steps?’ No doubt the structure of the deduction has been the most debated exegetical issue in Kant's theoretical philosophy, and the most important too, while the answers mirror one's overall understanding of Kant.
1 For an extensive survey of the contemporary research and references see a series of papers by Baumanns, Peter, Kant-Studien, 82Google Scholar and 83, 1991–2.
2 I have dealt with these problems in a previous study. The Transcendental How; Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Objective Cognition (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), ch. 4. This paper presents a more considered, concise and revised interpretation.
3 Baum, Manfred, Deduktion und Beweis in Kants Transzendental-philosophie (Königstein/Ts.: Athenäum Verlag, 1986), p. 81.Google Scholar
4 By putting ‘proof’ in parenthesis I want to reiterate that the deduction is not a proof in Kant's sense of a transcendental proof. See my The Transcendental How.
5 See my ‘The Transcendental Schemata’, in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Robinson, Hoke, vol.2/1 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995).Google Scholar See also Kant's Refutation of Idealism. Its premiss is ‘the empirically determinate consciousness of my own existence’ (B274).
6 This paper was partly written during the research project ‘Modal Theory’ under the auspices of the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and the Social Sciences (HSFR). I am grateful to Staffan Carlshamre, Marcel Quarfood and an anonymous reader of this journal for valuable comments.
