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Perception versus action: The computations may be the same but the direction of fit differs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2013

Nicholas Shea
Nicholas Shea*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom. nicholas.shea@kcl.ac.ukhttp://www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/philosophy/people/staff/academic/shea/index.aspx
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Abstract

Although predictive coding may offer a computational principle that unifies perception and action, states with different directions of fit are involved (with indicative and imperative contents, respectively). Predictive states are adjusted to fit the world in the course of perception, but in the case of action, the corresponding states act as a fixed target towards which the agent adjusts the world. This well-recognised distinction helps side-step some problems discussed in the target article.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 228 - 229
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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