CJO - Abstract - Inaugurating a new area of comparative cognition research

Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2003), 26 : 358-369 Cambridge University Press

Copyright © 2003 Cambridge University Press

doi:10.1017/S0140525X03430082

Published online by Cambridge University Press 30 Jan 2004

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2003), 26:3:358-369 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © 2003 Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0140525X03430082

Author's Response

Inaugurating a new area of comparative cognition research

J. David Smith ^a1, Wendy E. Shields ^a2 and David A. Washburn ^a3
^a1 Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260 psysmith@acsu.buffalo.edu http://wings.buffalo.edu/psychology/labs/smithlab/
^a2 Department of Psychology, University of Montana, Missoula, MT 59812 wshields@selway.umt.edu http://psychweb.psy.umt.edu/faculty/shields/shields.html
^a3 Department of Psychology and Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303 dwashburn@gsu.edu http://www.gsu.edu/~wwwpsy/faculty/washburn.htm

Abstract

There was a strong consensus in the commentaries that animals' performances in metacognition paradigms indicate high-level decisional processes that cannot be explained associatively. Our response summarizes this consensus and the support for the idea that these performances demonstrate animal metacognition. We amplify the idea that there is an adaptive advantage favoring animals who can – in an immediate moment of difficulty or uncertainty – construct a decisional assemblage that lets them find an appropriate behavioral solution. A working consciousness would serve this function well. This explains why animals may have the functional equivalent of human declarative consciousness. However, like other commentators who were friendly to this equivalence, we approach carefully the stronger claims that animals' metacognitive performances imply full-blown self-awareness or phenomenal consciousness.

We discuss the commentators' interesting ideas for future research, as well as their intriguing ideas about the evolution and development of metacognition and its relation to theory of mind. We also discuss residual confusions about existing research and remaining methodological issues.