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Philosophy (2003), 78 : 5-24 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2003
doi:10.1017/S0031819103000019
Published online by Cambridge University Press 28 Jan 2003
Philosophy (2003), 78:1:5-24 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2003
doi:10.1017/S0031819103000019

Pains and Places


John Hyman a1
a1 The Queen's College, Oxford

Abstract

I argue that itches, tickles, aches and pains—sensations of all sorts—are generally in the places where we say they are. So, for example, if I say that I have an itch in the big toe on my left foot, then, by and large, that is the very place where the itch is. James denied this in the 1890s; Russell and Broad denied it in the 1920s; Wittgenstein and Ryle denied it in the 1940s; Lewis and Armstrong denied it in the 1960s; and since then various kinds of materialists have denied it. But if itches etc. are states of the sensitive parts of bodies, then it is true.



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