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Competence: What's in? What's out? Who knows?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Joshua Alexander
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Siena College, Loudonville, NY 12211. jalexander@siena.eduhttp://www.siena.edu/pages/1855.asp
Ronald Mallon
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112. rmallon@philosophy.utah.eduhttp://www.philosophy.utah.edu/faculty/mallon/
Jonathan M. Weinberg
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-7005. jmweinbe@indiana.eduhttp://www.indiana.edu/~phil/Faculty/Individual%20Pages/Weinberg.html

Abstract

Knobe's argument rests on a way of distinguishing performance errors from the competencies that delimit our cognitive architecture. We argue that other sorts of evidence than those that he appeals to are needed to illuminate the boundaries of our folk capacities in ways that would support his conclusions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Alexander, J., Mallon, R. & Weinberg, J. (2010) Accentuate the negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 1(2):297314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mallon, R. (2007) Reviving Rawls inside and out. In: Moral psychology, vol. 2: The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity, ed. Sinnott-Armstrong, W., pp. 145–55. MIT Press.Google Scholar