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Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2011

Thomas M. Besch*
Affiliation:
University of Sydney

Abstract

ABSTRACT: The paper argues that applications of the principle that “ought” implies “can” (OIC) depend on normative considerations even if the link between “ought” and “can” is logical in nature. Thus, we should reject a common, “factualist” conception of OIC and endorse weak “normativism.” Even if we use OIC as the rule “‘’therefore‘ought not’,” applying OIC is not a mere matter of facts and logic, as factualists claim, but often draws on “proto-ideals” of moral agency.

RESUME: Cet article défend que les applications du principe «“devoir” implique “pouvoir”» (OIC pour l’anglais ‘ought’ implies ‘can’) dépendent de considérations normatives quoique ce lien soit de nature logique. Nous devrions donc rejeter la conception «factuelle» de l’OIC et plutôt défendre un «normativisme» faible. Même en supposant que l’on utilise l’OIC comme étant la règle «“ne pas pouvoir” implique “ne pas devoir”», appliquer l’OIC n’est pas seulement une question de faits et de logique, comme le soutiennent les «factualistes», mais découle souvent de «proto-idéaux» de l’agentivité morale.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2011

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