It is much easier to doubt than it is to believe in the existence of prehistoric hunters on Svalbard. Few researchers categorically deny the possibility of early settlers in this region, yet fewer still advocate the possibility. Since Christiansson and Simonsen (1970) presented artifacts discovered on Svalbard that may date from the Stone Age, no one has undertaken further serious survey work for prehistoric settlements on Svalbard.

In this article the research history of prehistoric archaeology on the archiepelago is reviewed, the artifacts from the Christiansson and Simonsen study are re-examined, and the results of field surveys conducted in Bellsund during the summer of 1997 are presented. The investigation produced a negative result. The test area was one of the richest and most stable contemporary hunting areas on Svalbard, and it is proposed, therefore, that this survey provides a qualified basis for concluding that circumpolar hunting groups did not settle in Svalbard.

In 1957 the well-known Arctic historian Richard Cyriax sent a copy of some of his notes to the Hudson's Bay Company Archives. These notes, which are reproduced here in full, concerned the claim by Thomas Simpson to have discovered the Northwest Passage on an expedition from 1837 to 1839. The reasons for Simpson's belief that he had achieved this long-sought-after accomplishment are investigated, and the conclusion is arrived at that, despite his honest belief to have done so, Simpson did not, in fact, complete the Northwest Passage, as that term is normally understood.

A review of popular writing on the subject of preservation of historic sites in Antarctica, including buildings, graves, and artefacts, has revealed many misconceptions about the existence and cause of deterioration problems. These myths include the belief that the artefacts inside the Ross Dependency huts are in a near perfect state of preservation and that there is no corrosion in Antarctica because of the dry cold. Further examination, however, shows these views to be incorrect. These and other misconceptions are classified into three groups: (1) misunderstanding or denial of deterioration processes in Antarctic conditions; (2) simplistic assumptions about how historic buildings should be conserved in Antarctica; and (3) inappropriate comparisons between dissimilar sites.

There has been considerable debate in Australia and New Zealand about how historic Antarctic buildings should be preserved. Proposed preservation methods have covered a wide range from dismantling and repatriation to a museum, re-cladding with new timber, insertion of vapour barriers inside walls to exclude ice ingress, covering buildings with a dome, and, at the other end of the spectrum of views, minimal intervention. The preservation of artefacts has also been an issue, particularly concerning whether artefacts can be effectively preserved in Antarctica or whether it is necessary to treat and store them at museums outside Antarctica. It is important to encourage consideration of all appropriate means of preservation, but it is particularly important that the causes of deterioration are understood (that is, correct diagnosis) before prescribing treatment.

The highest mountain in North America bears two official names. While most visitors to Denali National Park in Alaska are familiar with the mountain's official name ‘McKinley,’ and with the frequently used Athabaskan name ‘Denali,’ the mountain also has a second official name: Churchill Peaks. This article traces the history and politics of naming Alaska's famous mountain, including the events that led to the addition of Churchill Peaks. Those events began when President Lyndon Johnson was unable to attend Winston Churchill's funeral in January 1965. The resulting controversy surrounding the naming of the great mountain reflects the ambiguous and often troubled relations between the national government and the remote northern periphery of the country.

When the Geographical Society of Berlin officially welcomed Alfred Wegener's expedition back from Greenland in 1931, a memorial address was made in honour of the expedition leader who died on the Greenland icecap in 1930. This address included a report that shed light on the difficulties that had confronted the expediton. Wegener was remembered as a researcher who provided an example of ‘a magnificent conception of his duty as leader’ and who risked his life to rescue his comrades. Wegener's death was blamed on a chain of unfortunate accidents, especially bad weather conditions. Using material that was hidden in the archives, this paper examines several additional aspects of the story, such as the influence of the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Society for German Science), which financed the expedition; the erroneous judgements of the expedition leader as well as some expedition members; and the lack of radio transmission. The conclusion is that no single individual can be blamed for Wegener's death, despite the fact that one expedition member, Johannes Georgi, was made the scapegoat.