On 11 September 2001 commercial passenger jets hijacked by suicide commandos were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York. As the Towers imploded and collapsed, the death of several thousand people was witnessed live on television screens throughout the world. Those attacks, together with that on the Pentagon and the failed attempt that ended in Pennsylvania, aroused profound indignation and led to immediate reactions against the perpetrators or their protectors and sponsors, and more generally against international terrorism.

Article 4 of the Rome Convention determines the law governing a contract in the absence of choice by the parties. Despite its practical importance, and several decisions of the Court of Appeal, the correct construction of Article 4 remains unclear. This article considers the existing approaches and the Commission's proposal for reform, ventures to suggest an alternative, and analyses the recent cases in this light.

During the 1990s many Commonwealth legislatures enacted ‘class action’ or ‘representative proceedings’ legislation.1 The main justification for these initiatives was to increase access to justice for claimants particularly where the injury was widespread but the harm suffered by any particular individual was small. Much of this legislation built on developments in the United States, which had developed a sizable jurisprudence in the area. ‘Mass torts’, those defined as having a large impact engaging multiple claimants, have often formed the cause of action in US class actions. A review of the website ‘Big Class Actions‘,2 which lists over one hundred current suits in the United States, is instructive on how the class action industry has grown in that country.

Family law may not be an area one immediately associates with the European Community but in recent years it has rapidly emerged as an important element of the ever-expanding portfolio of the Justice and Home Affairs Directorate General.1 Facilitating the circulation of family law orders through the harmonization of private international law rules is viewed in Community circles as essential if the free movement of persons is to be guaranteed within the European Union.2 The merits of this policy and the manner in which the transformation of the Brussels II Convention3 into a Council Regulation4 was used to acquire wider competence in respect of family law matters have both previously been considered.5 In the present paper such policy considerations are left aside to allow for a detailed analysis of those rules which deal with divorce and their effect on English and Scottish law.

In 2001 Ireland commenced litigation against the United Kingdom (UK) over the construction and operation of a plant to produce mixed oxide fuels at the Sellafield nuclear complex in north-west England. This litigation, which had been only partially concluded at the time of writing, raises a series of fascinating and often complex issues of both international and EU law. These include the potential for overlapping jurisdiction between different international tribunals; the division of competence between the EC and its Member States in relation to participation in treaties; and the use of litigation as a strategy for settling inter-State disputes. The aim of this article, apart from giving a snapshot of the position that the increasingly tortuous course of this litigation had reached by January 2004, is to explore these issues. The article begins by setting out the background to the litigation and giving a quick overview of its course so far. It then explores in more detail the questions of overlapping jurisdiction of international tribunals and of EC law raised by the litigation, before concluding with a few, rather speculative, thoughts about Ireland's choice of litigation as a strategy.

The right to property was accorded the status of a human right as a result of its incorporation in international human rights instruments in the second part of the twentieth century. The right has acquired special importance as part of the freedom of the individual, his economic autonomy in modern democratic societies and generally as a significant element for the development of the individual's personality.1 Its recognition as a separate human right and its legal protection on an international level was the result of gradual efforts. It is still in the process of further legal elaboration, as regards both its scope and effect, by legal theory and jurisprudence.

The distinction between substance1 and procedure2 is central to conflict of laws methodology. It cannot be determined what law governs a particular issue until, crucially, that issue has been characterized as substantive, on the one hand, or procedural,3 on the other. The distinction is the fulcrum, or axis, of the choice of law process.

The last decade has seen the rise of a potentially significant development in the Asia-Pacific region in regard to human rights—the establishment of National Human Rights Institutions (particularly Human Rights Commissions) in numerous States.2 National Human Rights Commissions (hereafter NHRC) established in compliance with United Nations standards have been established in Australia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.3 In many of these States, however, human rights abuses are still widespread and serious. The establishment of NHRC, which generally do not have the power to make enforceable decisions, could easily be derided as an attempt by governments to create a fac.ade of respect for human rights while failing to take the enforcement of those rights seriously.4 While this criticism has a degree of validity, NHRC have played a constructive, if limited role, in the promotion and protection of human rights in the Asia-Pacific region.

In its judgment of 3 February 2003, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared the application submitted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) for revision of its 1996 judgment concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, inadmissible.1 The Court found that the request for revision was not based on the ‘discovery’ of a ‘fact’ and, therefore, one of the conditions of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court was not satisfied. This commentary will appraise the decision by examining the formal and substantive criteria for revision, a rather neglected and underused process.2

The International Court of Justice is not a human rights court but it does hear human rights cases.1 This is hardly remarkable. As Professor Ian Brownlie has pointed out ‘[h]uman rights problems occur in specific legal contexts. The issues may arise… within the framework of a standard-setting convention, or within general international law.’2 Because human rights treaties normally have their own dispute settlement procedure, the situations in which the International Court of Justice is more likely to have to grapple with human rights issues lie within the realms of general international law or in non-human rights specific treaty provisions, which may, nevertheless, raise such issues. In addition, some human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, contain provisions specifically referring disputes to the International Court of Justice.3 Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Court has been involved in a number of cases involving human rights questions.

In its decision in the Arrest Warrant case,2 the International Court of Justice studiedly refused to address systematically the legality and ambit of a purported exercise in absentia of universal criminal jurisdiction by one State over a government minister of another State. This, coupled with the dicta of certain judges with reservations as to the scope of universal jurisdiction3 and the (at best) lukewarm support for such jurisdiction displayed by certain other judges,4 might be taken as a discouragement to States to engage in similar exercises of jurisdiction. However, the contemporary trend in many developed States in favour of taking measures of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction to apprehend and punish the alleged perpetrators of serious international law crimes, coupled with the entry into force of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, indicates that more such attempts are quite likely to be made. Within a year of its decision in the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ again found itself the forum for a similar dispute. On 9 December 2002 the Republic of the Congo (‘the Congo’) filed an Application instituting proceedings against France5 in circumstances notably resembling those that had prompted the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘the DRC’) to act against Belgium. Again, the Applicant was an African State protesting against an alleged abuse of universal jurisdiction and failure to respect immunities on the part of its European former colonial ruler. Despite the prima facie similarity between the two cases, however, the chances that the eventual decision in the Certain Criminal Proceedings case will go beyond the Arrest Warrant case to elucidate the doctrine of universal jurisdiction are very slight. This note is confined to considering the circumstances behind the Congolese Application and Request for the Indication of a Provisional Measure, and the Court's response thereto in its Order of 17 June 2003.

On 6 November 2003 the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms,1 which involves multiple aspects of international law, most notably the issues of treaty interpretation, use of force, hierarchy of norms and the nature of international judicial competence. The case arose out of forcible action by US naval forces in the Persian Gulf against certain Iranian oil platforms.

1. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro).

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted proceedings against Yugoslavia on 20 March 1993 alleging violations of the 1949 Genocide Convention and requesting an indication of provisional measures which was made in an order of 8 April 1993.1 This was reaffirmed in an order of 13 September 1993,2 following a second request for provisional measures made by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 27 July 1993 and a request made by Yugoslavia on 10 August 1993.3 By an order of 16 April 19934 the following time limits were set for the filing of the written pleadings: Bosnia and Herzegovina, memorial, 15 October 1993; Yugoslavia, counter-memorial, 15 April 1994. By an order of 7 October 19935 these were extended to: Bosnia and Herzegovina, memorial, 15 April 1994; Yugoslavia, counter-memorial, 15 April 1995 and, by order of 21 March 1995,6 the date for the submission of the Yugoslavian counter-memorial was again extended to 30 June 1995. On 26 June 1995 Yugoslavia submitted preliminary objections which were rejected by the Court in its order of 11 July 1996.7 By an order of 23 July 19968 the time limit for filing the Yugoslav counter-memorial was fixed as 23 July 1997. The counter-memorial was filed on 22 July 1997 and contained counterclaims against Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in an order of 17 December 1997,9 the Court held them to be admissible and that they formed a part of the current proceedings. These counter-claims were subsequently withdrawn at the request of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this being noted by the Court in its order of 10 September 2001.10 The order of 17 December 199711 set the following time limits for the written pleadings on the merits: Bosnia and Herzegovina, reply, 23 January,1998; Yugoslavia, rejoinder, 23 July 1998. By an order of 22 January 199812 these were extended to: Bosnia and Herzegovina, reply, 23 April 1998; Yugoslavia, rejoinder, 22 January 1999. By an order of 11 December 199813 the time limit for the submission of the Yugoslav rejoinder was further extended, to 22 February 1999.

1. On 5 August 2003 Liberia presented an Application against Sierra Leone regarding a dispute concerning an international arrest warrant issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone against the President of Liberia. Since the applicant seeks to found the Court's jurisdiction on the consent of the respondent State (which is yet to be given), the application has not been entered into the Court's General List but has been transmitted to the Government of Sierra Leone.66

The texts of two brief judgments by district judges at Bow Street are reproduced below. In each case, an application was made for proceedings against a serving foreign official to answer allegations in England of conduct which constituted crimes against international law which were within the jurisdiction of the English court, even though committed abroad and by non-UK nationals. In each case, the judge decided that the official was protected by the law of State immunity rationae personae against the proceedings and the applications were dismissed.