It is clear, then, that Plato's strictures on Homer ought not to have given any encouragement to allegorical interpretation. The eulogists of Homer ought to have sought other grounds for the defence which he invited them to make; while the allegorizing philosophers, if they persisted in treating interpretation of the poets as an instrument of knowledge, ought to have answered Plato not by multiplying allegories but by producing a defence of the allegorical method. The question with which we are concerned is, of course, not what ought to have been done, but what actually happened. But the foregoing considerations ought to warn us against assuming without evidence that all those who allegorized after Plato did so in order to answer his attack on the poets, and were directly incited by that attack to engage in allegorical interpretation. The fact that the early Stoics were prolific in such interpretations is in itself no proof that they intended in this way to answer Plato's criticism of the myths. Other evidence is required to prove that it was the desire to answer Plato which impelled them to wallow in allegory.

In English, down to the 19th century, the beast which carried Balaam was generally and almost universally, both in speech and in writing, denominated the ass. It is so no longer: the name ass, except in metaphor as a term of contempt or insult, has disappeared from conversation and from most kinds of print, and survives only in serious poetry and in prose of some solemnity. The name donkey, first printed in 1785 in a dictionary of slang, has usurped its place.

Anaxagoras’ theory of matter offers a problem which, in bald outline, may be stated as follows. The theory rests on two propositions which seem flatly to contradict one another. One is the principle of Homoeomereity: A natural substance such as a piece of gold, consists solely of parts which are like the whole and like one another—every one of them gold and nothing else. The other is: ‘There is a portion of everything in everything’, understood to mean that a piece of gold (or any other substance), so far from containing nothing but gold, contains portions of every other substance in the world. Unless Anaxagoras was extremely muddleheaded, he cannot have propounded a theory which simply consists of this contradiction. One or the other proposition must be reinterpreted so as to bring them into harmony. Some critics attack one, some the other; some try to modify both. Mr. C. Bailey has recently published a fresh attempt to reconstruct the theory in a form consistent with itself. But the result, as he admits, is arbitrary and (above all) uneconomical. These defects, like all the contradictions and obscurities found in other accounts of the system, can be traced to the second proposition: ‘There is a portion of everything in everything’, or rather to the construction put upon it. The language is crude, vague, and ambiguous. What does ‘everything’ mean? Has the first ‘everything’ the same sense as the second ? If taken to mean that there is a portion of every material substance in every material substance, the proposition leads to a result for which ‘uneconomical’ is an indulgent epithet.

There are two ways in which the text as it stands has been construed: (1) Cypris came sweet and smiling (i.e. taking ἁδ. καì ἁ K. as=ἁ K. ἁδ. καì); (2) sweet Cypris also came smiling (i.e. taking ἁδ καì K. as=καì ἁ ἁδ. K.). Of these (1) is at least grammatical. The order of words, too, can be paralleled (Hiller cites 10. 34; 11. 58; 15. 79; 17. 93; 22. 25 and 68). But what I think cannot be paralleled is this curious conjunction of adj. and partic. (2) is frankly ungrammatical. Yet Legrand (Étude sur Théocrite, p. 309) adopts it, adding: ‘Il faut reconnaitre une construction incorrecte au moins dans ces quatre passages: 1. 95…; 1. 109 ὠραîος ξὤδωνις (=καì ό ὡραîος Aδωνις); 4. 49 ῥοικον τὸ λαγωβΌλον (=τò ῥοικον); 29. 33 τàν γένυν ἀνδρειαν (= τὰν ἀ. γένυν). Of the last three we can with confidence say that ὡραîος (if the line be genuine) and ἀνδρειαν are to be taken as predicative; in 4. 49 Legrand himself now (in his Budé edition) accepts the emendation τι for τΌ, as he does in the similar 15. 145 passage. There is not, in fact, sufficient, or indeed any, evidence to convict Theocritus of this solecism. Emendation has been rife, but unhappy. ‘Nescio an ipse rem acu tetigerim, legens ᾖνӨέ γε μὰν, ἀνíα δὲ, καì ἁ K. γ.,’ writes Briggs. We think he has not.

This paper is (as will be sufficiently evident) a by-product of two systematic inquiries: one into the Strategia and Strategoi of the fifth century, the other into the military expenditure during the Peloponnesian War. The two inquiries cannot be kept distinct, and both have largely to depend on a minute study of the financial inscriptions.

Testimony, even in the well-worked parts of antiquity, continues to accrue, some from new papyri, some from texts long known but overlooked. In the result the critic is discomfited, honest men come by their own. οιόνδ' ἀπέβη τόδε πρᾶγμα.

This document, which consists of two lives of Homer and the Agon inserted between them, has long been derived from the Μουσεîον of Alcidamas. The conjecture was contested and the survival of Alcidamas denied. The publication of twenty-five lines from a papyrus of s. II.–III. p. C. by Professor J. G. Winter (Transactions of the American Philological Association, 1925, Vol. LVI.), containing a Homeric biography signed αλκι] δαμαντος περι ομηρου put an end to the matter. See on the whole question Mr. Winter's remarks and a paper by Sig. Carlo Gallavotti of Bologna, Rivista di Filologia, 1929, 31.

In Vol. XXIIL, pp. 105–8, Mr. Lockwood criticizes some of the observations which I made in pp. 7–10 of the same volume.

§ 271. I ‘assume’ that τοῦτ' δετι δεινότητα explains ύπόκρισιν καὶ ἀγῶνα and not τὸ διαλελυμένον, (1) because ‘figures of speech in general’ cannot be said to ‘produce’ τὸ διαλελυμένον asyndeton, which is itself one of those figures; (2) because, conversely, τὸ διαλελυμένον is not equivalent to δεινότης but a means of producing δεινότης. τὸ διαλελυμένον must, therefore, be nominative, not accusative, and Professor Rhys Roberts' rendering, ‘lending especially the effect of abruptness, in other words of energy,’ cannot (I speak with all respect) be right. The Professor himself is not happy with it, and adds in a note that ‘a better sense would be obtained by placing μάλιστα τὸ διαλελυμένον before ὑπόκρισιν, i.e. “the figures of speech, and especially asyndeton.”‘ My excision (or, rather, Professor Radermacher's) gives the same sense. Orth, in his translation, omits the words τοῦτ' ἐστι δεινότητα, and interprets as I do.

The starting-point of Plutarch's dialogue de communibus notitiis is a claim made by the Stoics that Providence sent Chrysippus to remove the confusion surrounding the ideas of ἔννοια (conception) and πρόληψισ (preconception) before the subtleties of Carneades were brought into play. Unfortunately our surviving information on the subject is so much less full than could be desired that it has again returned to an obscurity from which there are only two really detailed modern attempts to remove it. The one, by L. Stein (Erkenntnistheorie der Stoa, pp. 228–276), is most unsatisfactory; the other, by A. Bonhöffer (Epiktet und die Stoa, pp. 187–232), though of the greatest value in many ways, is vitiated by the fact that it constructs a system from the use of the words by Epictetus and then attempts to attach this system to the old Stoa in the face of the evidence of the doxographers, which is emended or violently interpreted to suit Epictetus. Even if Epictetus were in general a good authority for the technicalities of Chrysippus—and in the opinion of H. von Arnim he is not— this would not be a sound method of procedure. The only safe way is to take first the statements which can be attached to the Old Stoa, and having obtained our results from these, to see whether Epictetus does in fact agree.

Caper in his section on the preposition ex cited Ennius, Ann. 309:

nauibus explebant sese terrasque replebant,

and declared that Virgil used the verb with this antique sense in Aen. 6, 545:

discedam; explebo numerum reddarque tenebris,

i.e. ‘minuam vestrum numerum.’

This we are told in Servius' note, which begins: Ut diximus supra, explebo est minuam. Thilo gives no reference to any such previous words of Servius, and I have failed to find them. Can it be that Servius has carelessly transcribed a note of Donatus, and that Donatus had discussed ex minuens at Geo. 2, 65, or 4, 145 ? Donatus' note on Terence, Hec. 755, is Explere exinanire Terentianum est; the passage of Terence is:

eas ad mulieres huc intro atque istuc iusiurandum idem

polliceare illis: exple animum îs teque hoc crimine expedi,

i.e., relieve their mind of suspicion against Pamphilus and free yourself from this charge. The phrase recurs in the next Scene (785; 787):

illis modo explete animum.

i atque exple animum îs, coge ut credant.

In the small Teubner edition (p. 2) a warning is given that the alphabetical arrangement of these books may be medieval. Our MSS. of the Compendiosa Doctrina all come from one archetype, which had a misplaced leaf, many gaps, many ‘doctored’ passages, and a large number of scribal errors. And that archetype I believe to have been preserved in some English monastery library.

In view of the fact that another word for ‘mourn,’ namely Gr. ποθέω, is cognate with θέσσασθαι O. Ir. guidiu, Welsh gweddïo, Avest. jaiδyāmi, all meaning ‘beg pray,’ and with Lith. gedéti ‘mourn,’ it will perhaps not seem improbable that Lat. lugeo is cognate with Lett, lūdzu ‘I beg, pray’ (German bitten, flehen, beten, einladen, are the renderings given in Mühlenbach-Endzelin, Lettisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch, where illustrative quotations may be found). The infinitive of the Lettish verb is lūgt, and contains the same stem lūg- as Lat. lūctus (from *lūg-tu-s). The form lūdzu (Ist sing. pres. indic.) comes in the first place from *lūg-yō, but the type of present to which lūdzu (Ist plur. lūdzam) belongs in Lettish results from a fusion (cf. Endzelin, Lett. Gramm., p. 611) of earlier types which have remained distinct in Lithuanian. One of these types is that of Lith. aviù (Ist plur. ãvime, infin. avéti), which, according to Bezzenberger, BB. 26. 169 sqq., and Schulze, Sitzungsber. d. Preuss. A kad., 1904, 1439 sqq., corresponds to the second conjugation in Latin. If that correspondence is accepted it is at least possible that the Lett, form lūdzu corresponds exactly to Lat. lugeo.