Many observers of the American automobile industry have focused on Ford's development of mass production shortly before the First World War; they have then moved to General Motors's success in the 1920s, usually attributing it to a marketing innovation, the introduction of the annual model change. This article argues that the emphasis on GM's marketing strategy is misplaced and that profound changes in the organization of production, exploiting the economies of common parts, were far more fundamental. Rough calculations of the cost structure involved in the rise of the Chevrolet to mass market domination are presented to support this interpretation.

The following article combines an analysis of production techniques in the French automobile industry between the wars and a rich supply of photographs that visually document the course of innovation in the industry. The text and illustrations show that, though production managers at Citroën, Peugeot, and Renault were aware of the methods of Henry Ford and Frederick W. Taylor, they adapted them to specific situations within the French industry and within their own companies. By looking specifically at the work of Ernest Mattern, who held production responsibilities at both Peugeot and Citroën and observed Renault as well, the essay traces the incremental changes in the organization of automobile manufacturing in France before the Second World War.

The purchasing strategies of the dominant U.S. automakers form a topic neglected by both economists and business historians. The following article examines the automakers' changing relations with their suppliers throughout the twentieth century. Using the exit/voice paradigm, it establishes a framework that can account for both current and past strategies, even when they seem to contradict the logic of economic theory.

When Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., assumed the presidency of General Motors, the corporation was little known beyond Wall Street, which recognized GM simply as the holding company that controlled several nearly autonomous automakers and their subsidiaries. The following article describes how Sloan used the imagination and advertising talent of Bruce Barton to create a corporate image for GM, not only in the mind of the public, but among GM's own headquarters staff and division executives as well. Through the metaphor of the corporate “family,” Sloan and Barton finessed a potential public relations liability—the corporation's immense size—into an image of efficient cooperation and internal cohesion.

This article examines the negotiating process between the Brazilian state and transnational auto companies. It argues against dichotomous frameworks that emphasize either economic or political variables in shaping foreign direct investment and in favor of a more complicated bargaining framework that takes into account the strategic objectives of state policy as well as the form and timing of firm investment. Using archival evidence and interviews, the article documents the implantation of the industry; it concludes that the process of firm entry into Brazil must be understood in light of the policies and institutions that made the threat of market closure and the deadlines credible and made it costly for firms not to participate on schedule.