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¹⁵ Esping-Anderson (fn. 14,1990).

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¹⁷ See, for instance, Mitchell, Deborah, Income Transfers in Ten Welfare States (Brookfield, Vt.: Ave-bury, 1991)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ While we do discuss variations in posttax, posttransfer income distribution, as that is the policy outcome of greatest interest, we see it as product of these two distinct stages and thus do not subject it to multivariate analysis. Indeed, pre-tax and transfer inequality and government distribution account for 99.51 percent of the variation in post-tax and transfer inequality.

¹⁹ Korpi (fnn. 3,14); and Stephens (fnn. 3,14).

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²¹ We say subordinate rather than working class because both authors as well as Esping-Andersen (fh. 14,1985) see the development of the welfare state and redistribution as the product of shifting class coalitions. Nonmanual employees are viewed as either a part of the working class or another subordinate class, which is consistent with these authors' operationalization of union strength as including all union members not just manual workers.

²² Sawyer (fn. 16).

²³ Korpi (fn. 3); Stephens (fn. 3).

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³⁸ Moene and Wallerstein (fn. 13) hypothesize the opposite relationship for certain insurance types of social spending, but because such spending is income related, it is less likely to be redistributive. Since our dependent variable is redistribution, we hypothesize a positive relationship between pre-tax and transfer inequality and redistribution.

³⁹ Note that our dependent variable is household income and includes the households of the unemployed. Thus, the inverse relationship between wage dispersion and unemployment noted by Adrian Wood and Gosta Esping-Anderson would not be expected in our data; see Wood, , North-South Trade, Employment, and Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; and Esping-Anderson, , “Postindustrial Cleavage Structures: A Comparison of Evolving Patterns of Social Stratification in Germany, Sweden, and the United States,” in Grusky, David B., ed., Social Stratification in Sociological Perspective, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001)Google Scholar. They explain this inverse relationship with the argument that in countries offering high unemployment benefits, unemployed workers will be more likely to prefer unemployment (with attractive benefits) rather than accept low-paying jobs, while in countries with few benefits workers have no choice but to accept these low-paying jobs.

⁴⁰ Alderson, Arthur S. and Nielsen, François, “Globalization and the Great U-Turn: Income Inequality Trends in Sixteen OECD Countries,” AmericanJournal ofSociology 107 (March 2002)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Wood (fn. 39).

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⁴³ Alderson and Nielsen (fn. 40).

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⁴⁶ Nielsen, François and Alderson, Arthur S., “Income Inequality, Development, and Dualism: Results from an Unbalanced Cross-National Panel,” American Sociological Review 60, no. 5 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁷ See also Alderson and Nielsen (fn. 40).

⁴⁸ We should note that globalization is causally related to the development of the world economy but simply associated with (and not causally related to) rising per capita GDP in individual countries. Thus, for example, in the mid-1990s, economic actors and policymakers in the U.S. and the U.K. faced the same pressures from open financial markets despite quite different levels of per capita GDP. By contrast, since postindustrialization is primarily a property of the domestic economy, there is a stronger causal link between domestic economic development and postindustrialism than between domestic economic development and globalization.

⁴⁹ Alderson and Nielson (fn. 40).

⁵⁰ Katz, Lawrence F. and Murphy, Kevin M., “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963–1987: Supply and Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, no. 1 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁵³ CME is the term Soskice uses to characterize the types of economies that earlier work had referred to as “organized market economies.” In CMEs “there is considerable nonmarket coordination directly and indirectly between companies, with the state playing a framework-setting role; and . . . labor remains ‘incorporated.’” Soskice, David, “Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s,” in Kitschelt, Herbert, Lange, Peter, Marks, Gary, and Stephens, John D., eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Iversen, Torben, and Soskice, David, “Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State,” in Hall, Peter and Soskice, David, eds., Varieties of Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Iversen and Soskice (fn. 12).

⁵⁷ Thurow, Lester C., “A Surge in Inequality,” in Scientific American 256, no. 5 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cancian, Maria, Danziger, Sheldon and Gottschalk, Peter, “Working Wives and Family Income Inequality among Married Couples,” in Danziger, Sheldon and Gottschalk, Peter, eds., Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993)Google Scholar; and Nielsen, François and Alderson, Arthur S., “The Kuznets Curve and the Great U-Turn: Income Inequality in U.S. Counties, 1970 to 1990,” American Sociological Review 62, no. 1 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁵⁹ Alderson and Nielsen (fn. 40).

⁶⁰ Gottschalk and Smeeding (fn. 52), 667. See also Lynn A. Karoly, “Anatomy of the United States Income Distribution: Two Decades of Change” (Manuscript, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif, 1995); and Danziger, Sheldon and Gottschalk, Peter, American Unequal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995)Google Scholar.

⁶¹ For a general introduction to the LIS database and a complete list of countries, years, and variables available in this rich data source, see http://ww.lis.ceps.lu.

⁶² Complete comparability is, of course, not possible. Since LIS collects data in “waves” (corresponding roughly to the same period of time), LIS data are more comparable within waves rather than over time (due to a change in country surveys utilized by LIS, for example). However, given the careful harmonization of surveys by the LIS project, the use of LIS data to study income trends is widely accepted. See OECD, “Income Distribution in OECD Countries: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study,” Social Policy Studies 18 (1995)Google Scholar.

⁶³ OECD (fn. 62).

⁶⁴ Tiina Mäkinen, “Contradictory Findings? The Connection between Structural Factors, Income Transfers and Poverty in OECD Countries,” Series B (Department of Social Policy, University of Turku, Finland, 1998), 19.

⁶⁵ To take one example, Mitchell (fn.17) calculates that taxes and transfers reduce inequality among the population of surveyed Swedes in 1981 by 53 percent, whereas our calculations for the population aged 25–59 show a 34 percent reduction in equality.

⁶⁶ For a discussion of equivalence scales, see OECD (fn. 62).

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⁶⁹ The Alderson and Nielsen (fn. 40) results suggest that we should also include the percentage of the population in agriculture as an independent variable. We did test this hypothesis but it did not have the hypothesized effect in our data, which do not reach as far back in time as their data. The agricultural section is very small in all of our countries by this point in time (mean = 5 percent).

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⁷⁶ Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (fn. 54).

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⁷⁸ These data were made available to us by Torben Iversen.

⁷⁹ In married-couple households with females listed as the head of the household, LIS recoded the data to have married-couple households always headed by a male.

⁸⁰ The grouping in this table is based on the character of the welfare state regime, not on political incumbency. The grouping here has no impact on the regressions, where we measure political incumbency as explained in the text.

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⁸⁷ Wallerstein (fn. 31).

⁸⁸ Huber and Stephens (fn. 7).

⁸⁹ Even a measure of the progressivity of taxes and transfers would not capture the entire redistrib-utive effect of social democratic governments because of limitations in our dependent variable. Our dependent variable measures only income and not the value of free or subsidized public services. Social democratic governments have expanded a variety of public services, from public health care, child care, and elderly care to training and retraining, access to which is either universal and free or to be paid for according to income. With the partial exception of health care, Christian democratic governments have preferred private delivery of such services—to the extent that the state became involved in supporting them at all—and payments according to insurance principles, which has a less redistributive effect.

⁹⁰ Huber and Stephens (fn. 7).

⁹¹ The total effects of Christian democracy and social democracy are very similar to the results one gets if one drops Taxes and Transfers from equation 3 in Table 4. The standardized coefficients for social democracy and Christian democracy are .74 and —.18, respectively. The latter coefficient is not significant.

⁹² Van Kersbergen (fn.28).

⁹³ See also Alderson and Nielsen (fn. 40).

⁹⁴ Huber and Stephens (fn. 7), chap. 5.

⁹⁵ Huber and Stephens (fn. 7); and Swank (fn. 7).

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¹⁰¹ Lenski(fn. 14).

¹⁰² Huber and Stephens (fn. 7).