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Names, Verbs and Sentences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2001

Abstract

Metaphysicians often declare that there are large ontological differences (properties versus individuals, universals versus particulars) correlated with the linguistic distinction between names and verbs. Gaskin argues against all such declarations on the grounds that we may quantify with equal ease over the referents of both types of expression. However, his argument must be wrong, given the massive differences between first- and second-order qualification. Its only grain of truth is that these differences show up only in the logic of relations, and not also in monadic logic.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1998

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