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5. Ibid., pp. 80–164.

6. Ibid., pp. 172–86 and 201–5.

7. Ibid., p. 12.

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10. Ibid., pp. 79–101.

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36. Clearly this approach does nothing to address the important concerns raised in the sociological approach to the agent–structure problem.

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61. See Nye, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” and the references cited therein for an introduction to earlier rounds of this debate.

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