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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
Of the many aspects of the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) that gave rise to controversy, some were unique and can reasonably be chalked up to novelty and inexperience. One, however, is as old as military history itself. This is the matter of political control of a force once it is in the field. Two levels are involved: first, control of the field operations by headquarters; second, control of the military force in the field by the civilian authority—in this case the representative of the Secretary-General.
1 Both the UNEF and ONUC operations provided for their chief administrative officers to control finances and procurement but not exclusively military service functions such as ordnance, spare parts, food, medical supplies, and transport. Suggestions have been made that possibly all service functions might well be placed under the administrative officer.
2 For a detailed analysis of ONUC's logistical problems see Bowman, E. H. and Fanning, J. E., “The Logistics Problems of a UN Military Force,” pp. 355–376Google Scholarabove.
3 But it is clearly essential in future operations that contingents receive inoculations in their home countries and bring water purification and medical supplies to cover fifteen to thirty days.
4 UN Press Release SG/1406, January 3, 1963.
5 Special Report to the Secretary-General by Ralph J. Bunche, UN Document S/5O53/Add.14, annex XXXIV, January 11, 1963.
6 All quotations in ibid.
