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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2009
A recurring objection confronting utilitarianism is that its dictates require information that lies beyond the bounds of human epistemic wherewithal. Utilitarians require reliable knowledge of the social consequences of various policies, and of people's preferences and utilities. Agreeing partly with the sceptics, I concur that the general rules of thumb offered by social science do not provide sufficient justification for the utilitarian legislator to rationally recommend a particular political regime, such as liberalism. Actual data about human preference-structures and utilities is required to bridge this evidentiary gap. I offer two arguments to support the availability of such information. First, I contend that ordinary human beings have a clear method of epistemic access to reliable information about commensurable preference-structures. Second, in an attempt to shift the onus of philosophic argument, I show that the utilitarian legislator's requirements do not differ in kind from those implicitly called upon by the sceptical deontic liberal.
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5 I am using – and will continue to use – the words ‘right’ and ‘rational’ in this artificial decision-theoretic sense because I wish to emphasize that complaints against the utilitarian for not getting it ‘right’ are as ineffectual as claims against an individual non-tuistic agent that their rational action did not turn out to be ‘right’. However, I am sacrificing clarity for consistency here – both ‘rational’ and ‘right’ obviously have other connotations.
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10 The problems here are exactly those which confront individual (as distinct from social/utilitarian) decision theory. There is a burgeoning literature on the use of such utility intervals as are created by this vagueness, e.g. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhayay, ‘In Search of a Pointless Decision Principle’ (paper presented at the PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1994).
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31 Contra Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice, p. 3. Hayek is aware of the problems raised by public goods, though his solution involves a quite clear appeal to preference-knowledge: Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice, p. 6.
32 See, broadly, Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, pp. 20–1. Goodin alludes to the need this avenue has of, at least, some ‘rough and ready’ knowledge of preferences and utilities.
33 Elster, Nuts and Bolts, pp. 169–70.
34 Elster, Nuts and Bolts, p. 170.
35 Some of these points are argued in Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy, ch. 2.
36 Such as Hayek would recommend, regarding free markets and systems of justice: Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice, pp. 4–5.
37 I leave as an open question whether or not it would be correct to characterize Hayek, given his Humean roots, as a very indirect utilitarian attempting precisely such a justification. See Gray, John, Hayek: On Liberty, 3rd edn. (London, 1998), p. 60Google Scholar. Hayek also offered powerful micro-level explanations of why the overall social praxis was likely to be beneficial – which make use of both the first and the third avenues as I have outlined them.
38 This overall methodology, beginning with our own introspected experience and progressing to others, on the basis of ‘the legitimate rules of experimental inquiry’, is essentially that offered in Mill, John Stuart, Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Moral Philosophy, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto, 1865), pp. 190–2Google Scholar.
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40 The analogy is strongest when it goes top-down from similar behaviour and bottom-up from similar causes. Both strategies are effectively employed by Singer for the purpose of justifying animal rights in Singer, Peter, ‘All Animals Are Equal. . .’, Writings on an Ethical Life (London, 2001), p. 37Google Scholar. I focus here on the top-down avenue from behaviour to preferences. An account emphasizing the bottom-up route is outlined in Riley, Jonathan, Liberal Utilitarianism (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 62–6Google Scholar.
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56 This article has benefited from critiques of earlier drafts by Julian Lamont and Gerald Gaus.
