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Virtue Consequentialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2005

BEN BRADLEY
Affiliation:
Syracuse Universitywbradley@syr.edu

Abstract

Virtue consequentialism has been held by many prominent philosophers, but has never been properly formulated. I criticize Julia Driver's formulation of virtue consequentialism and offer an alternative. I maintain that according to the best version of virtue consequentialism, attributions of virtue are really disguised comparisons between two character traits, and the consequences of a trait in non-actual circumstances may affect its actual status as a virtue or vice. Such a view best enables the consequentialist to account for moral luck, unexemplified virtues, and virtues and vices involving the prevention of goodness and badness.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2005

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