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Consciousness should not mean, but be

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1999

Dan Lloyd
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 06106 dan.lloyd@trincoll.edu

Abstract

O'Brien & Opie's vehicle hypothesis is an attractive framework for the study of consciousness. To fully embrace the hypothesis, however, two of the authors' claims should be extended: first, since phenomenal content is entirely dependent on occurrent brain events and only contingently correlated with external events, it is no longer necessary to regard states of consciousness as representations. Second, the authors' insistence that only stable states of a neural network are conscious seems ad hoc.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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