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ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES AND THE FREE WILL DEFENCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 1997

ANDREW ESHLEMAN
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521-0201

Abstract

The free will defence attempts to show that belief in an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God may be rational, despite the existence of evil. At the heart of the free will defence is the claim that it may be impossible, even for an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God, to bring about certain goods without the accompanying inevitability, or at least overwhelming probability, of evil. The good in question is the existence of free agents, in particular, agents who are sometimes free with respect to morally significant actions and who are thereby responsible, at least in part, for those actions and the personal character which is a function of and exhibited in those actions. The free will defender contends that if an agent is to be truly responsible for her actions, then she must be free to bring about both good and evil, and God cannot be blamed if such agents choose to bring about the latter rather than the former.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
1997 Cambridge University Press

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