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Inherence-based views of social categories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Marjorie Rhodes*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003. marjorie.rhodes@nyu.eduhttp://www.psych.nyu.edu/rhodes/

Abstract

Children adopt an inherence-based view of some social categories, viewing certain social categories as reflecting the inherent features of their members. Thinking of social categories in these terms contributes to prejudice and intergroup conflict. Thus, understanding what leads children to apply inherence-based views to particular categories could provide new direction for efforts to reduce these negative social phenomena.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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