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The developmental and evolutionary origins of psychological essentialism lie in sortal object individuation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Hannes Rakoczy  and
Trix Cacchione
Hannes Rakoczy
Affiliation:
Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, D-37073 Göttingen, Germany. hannes.rakoczy@psych.uni-goettingen.dewww.psych.uni-goettingen.de/en/development/team/rakoczy-hannes
Trix Cacchione
Affiliation:
Institute of Psychology, University of Bern, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland. trix.cacchione@psy.unibe.chhttp://www.psy.unibe.ch/entwicklung/content/fvp/team/cacchione/index_eng.html
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Abstract

Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) present promising steps towards understanding the cognitive underpinnings of adult essentialism. However, their approach is less convincing regarding ontogenetic and evolutionary aspects. In contrast to C&S's claim, the so-called inherence heuristic, though perhaps vital in adult reasoning, seems an implausible candidate for the developmental and evolutionary foundations of psychological essentialism. A more plausible candidate is kind-based object individuation that already embodies essentialist modes of thinking and that is present in infants and nonhuman primates.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 5 , October 2014 , pp. 500 - 501
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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