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The perils of a science of intentional change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 August 2014

Muhammad Ali Khalidi
Muhammad Ali Khalidi*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Program, York University, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada. khalidi@yorku.cahttp://www.yorku.ca/khalidi/
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Abstract

The attempt to construct an applied science of social change raises certain concerns, both theoretical and ethical. The theoretical concerns relate to the feasibility of predicting human behavior with sufficient reliability to ground a science that aspires to the management of social processes. The ethical concerns relate to the moral hazards involved in the modification of human social arrangements, given the unreliability of predicting human action.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 4 , August 2014 , pp. 427 - 428
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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