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Ontogeny, phylogeny, and the relational reinterpretation hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2008

Elizabeth V. Hallinan
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, Canada. 5evh@queensu.cavk4@queensu.cawww.infantcognitiongroup.com
Valerie A. Kuhlmeier
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, Canada. 5evh@queensu.cavk4@queensu.cawww.infantcognitiongroup.com

Abstract

If our knowledge of human cognition were based solely on research with participants younger than the age of 2 years, there would be no basis for the relational reinterpretation hypothesis, and Darwin's continuity theory would be safe as houses. Because many of the shortcomings cited apply to human infants, we propose how a consideration of cognitive development would inform the relational reinterpretation hypothesis.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright ©Cambridge University Press 2008

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