Trade negotiators and policy advisors are keen to know the relative contributions of different farm policy instruments to international trade and economic welfare. Nominal rates of assistance or producer support estimates are incomplete indicators, especially when (as in many developing countries) some commodities are taxed and others are subsidized, in which case positive contributions can offset negative contributions. This paper develops and estimates a new set of more-satisfactory partial equilibrium indicators of the relative contribution of different farm policy instruments to reductions in agricultural trade and welfare. It does so by drawing on the trade restrictiveness index literature and a recently compiled database on distortions to agricultural prices for 75 developing and high-income countries over the period 1960 to 2004. Results confirm earlier findings that border taxes are the dominant instrument affecting global trade and welfare, but they also suggest declines in export taxes contributed nearly as much as cuts in import protection to the trade and welfare effects of agricultural policy reforms since the 1980s.

Should consumers' preference for ‘green’ products help justify, from a WTO perspective, emerging regulations such as restrictions on trade in non-sustainable biofuels? Despite the role consumer preferences have played in WTO disputes, in association with the ‘like’ products concept, there has not been enough focused examination of their specific influence, particularly in disputes on ethical public policy issues, such as environmental or health regulations. To this end, this paper examines key GATT Article III disputes, pointing out that they included attempts both to measure, and also to interpret, consumer preferences. The latter approach becomes more tempting when consumer preferences are difficult to measure; import bans or restrictions associated with ethical public policy regulations can bring about such a situation. A hypothetical dispute about EC biofuels sustainability criteria demonstrates this problem. Options to make the concept of consumer preferences more coherent include limitations on how they can be invoked, and an increased commitment to capturing them through measurement.

The article analyses the development of a parliamentary dimension of the WTO from the first informal meetings of parliamentarians in 1996, via the adoption of Rules of Procedure for yearly Parliamentary Conferences on the WTO in 2004, to March 2011 when for the first time the Parliamentary Conference took place on the premises of the WTO. The author presents theoretical contributions that may explain why national parliamentarians engage in an intergovernmental organization such as the WTO. The development of the parliamentary dimension is related to the crumbling borderline between domestic and international affairs. Finally, the article raises a number of questions for further research, and for consideration among parliamentarians as well as in the WTO.

The openness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) towards non-state actors has led to much debate among scholars and practitioners. The objective of this paper is to add empirical knowledge to this ongoing debate. In particular, we examine the effects of allowing interest groups to participate at WTO Ministerial Conferences (MCs) during 1996–2009 by analyzing a novel dataset of 1992 interest organizations that attended seven MCs. The data we present demonstrate that, in contrast to what many expected, the WTO did not attract a more diverse population of interest groups since these organizations were allowed to participate at MCs. Moreover, we observe an increasing overrepresentation of some specific issue-related interests, especially agriculture, and a strong presence of Northern American and European interest organizations attending MCs. Another important observation is that MCs are not particularly dominated by business interests at the expense of NGOs (non-governmental organization), who are also consistently well represented at the WTO meetings. Yet, the high levels of volatility observed at the level of individual organizations suggests that, although it is rather easy to start lobbying at WTO MCs, only a relatively small number of interest organizations keep a long lobbying presence at this level.

Multilateral regulation of free zones is largely based on the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures as amended (Revised Kyoto Convention) and WTO disciplines. The Revised Kyoto Convention treats free zones as an area with some ‘exterritorial’ elements, while WTO law does not accord such treatment to free zones. The regulatory framework under the former is more flexible than that under the latter. As of 1 June 2010, 63 out of the 69 contracting parties to the Revised Kyoto Convention are members of the WTO, so they must live up to their commitments under both legal systems. This article provides an analysis of relevant provisions of the Revised Kyoto Convention and WTO rules and jurisprudence that can be taken into account by national authorities in the conduct of their free-zone policies.

The GATS was concluded among countries with conflicting interests. Although all its parties were interested in this agreement as an instrument for the enhancement of global trade in services, due balance between this interest and other interests, such as the special status of developing countries and of the sovereign right of Members for domestic regulation, formed a pre-condition for countries' adherence to it. Consequently, these interests were explicitly recognized in the agreement. Nevertheless, analyzing two recent GATS/GATT cases, US–Gambling and China–Publications and AV Products, the article suggests that the WTO adjudicating bodies might be keener to legally assist a complaining developing Member than respondents which are developing Members. It further suggests that in these cases the interests of international trade liberalization seem to prevail over domestic policy goals. The article further analyzes the current and future possible adverse implications of this approach on GATS development as the only multilateral instrument for the enhancement of international trade in services.

In this paper, we study the interaction between regionalism and multilateralism by examining the role of national treatment clauses in regional trade agreements (RTAs). We ask whether discriminatory liberalization of internal regulations under RTAs can fulfill the requirements of the GATT Article XXIV defense. In the presence of pre-existing RTAs with RTA national treatment clauses, the GATT Article XXIV defenses for violations of GATT Article I and GATT Article III resulting from preferential liberalization of internal regulations may not succeed because the ‘necessity’ requirement under the Turkey–Textiles Appellate Body test is not likely to be met. The necessity requirement would fail because the RTA party may adopt ‘a reasonable alternative’ of applying the measure non-discriminatorily to all WTO members. RTA national treatment clauses in the pre-existing RTAs may have the effect of binding the RTA parties to liberalize trade-restrictive internal regulations on a non-discriminatory basis.

This paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body Reports on United States–Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 DSU – EC) (WT/DS294/AB/RW, 14 May 2009) and United States–Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 DSU – Japan) (WT/DS322/AB/RW, 18 August 2009). The Appellate Body found that the United States had not brought its anti-dumping measures into compliance with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement as it continued to use zeroing in annual reviews of anti-dumping orders. We argue that this conclusion – based on a complicated discussion of what constitutes a ‘measure taken to comply’ – could have been reached through a much simpler and direct argument. Continued noncompliance by the United States generates costs to traders targeting the United States and the trading system more generally. We argue that from a broader WTO compliance perspective consideration should be given to stronger multilateral surveillance of anti-dumping practice by all WTO members and to more analysis and effective communication by economists regarding the costs of zeroing and anti-dumping practices more generally.

Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures that protect human, animal, and plant health can impede trade and provoke high-profile disputes. This paper argues that the WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) could play an important role in defusing the trade-disrupting potential of SPS regulation. The most promising avenue is to review in greater detail the policy-making procedures that lead to SPS measures. How transparent and independent are countries' risk assessments of health hazards? Which provisions have countries taken to account for trade effects when selecting SPS measures? Do countries give foreign interests adequate possibility to voice their concerns over proposed SPS regulation? If reviews motivate countries to improve their policy-making processes, this will contribute to making SPS regulation less trade-restrictive and more effective in protecting health. To reach this objective, special trade policy reviews dedicated exclusively to SPS regulation might be introduced as a complement to the current reviews of countries' overall trade policies. Such a move could serve as a model for establishing further issue-specific reviews that address technical barriers to trade, trade in services, and other complex regulatory challenges.

The unprecedented enforcement of the mutually agreed solution (MAS) in the WTO Softwood Lumber disputes – but outside the WTO dispute settlement system – and the recent use of MAS to resolve important trade disputes should trigger a hard look at these dispute settlement instruments provided for by the DSU. This article seeks to provide a detailed framework of analysis of MAS under the DSU that allows the WTO dispute settlement system to adjudicate MAS-related disputes. WTO Members should not go outside the system to enforce MAS. The article illustrates that MAS can create binding obligations and that MAS are WTO law, given the explicit reference to them in the DSU, their intimate relation with the WTO-covered agreements and the requirement for compliance with these agreements. In addition, the article offers an interpretation of the DSU that allows panels and the Appellate Body to regard MAS as applicable law. This interpretation is offered in the view that there is no policy reason to sustain that these controversies – always fully related to WTO rights and obligations and framed under the corners of the covered agreements – have to be resolved by an adjudication system other than that of the WTO.

The disciplining of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) by the WTO has been ‘relaxed’ recently as a result of the new context (the Transparency Mechanism) within which notified PTAs are being multilaterally reviewed. This is probably a blessing for a number of reasons, including the success of the multilateral trading system in bringing tariffs down over the years (and the ensuing reduced trade diversion), the fact that modern PTAs deal with many non-trade issues as well (for which no WTO disciplines exist), and the recent empirical literature suggesting overall positive welfare implications for those participating in similar schemes. This paper discusses these and other reasons to support the view that the WTO should rather focus on the multilateral agenda instead of diverting its attention towards disciplining PTAs. In more concrete terms, this paper argues in support of the thesis that the Transparency Mechanism should not be simply a de facto substitute of the previous regime (where outlawing a PTA could not a priori be excluded), but the de jure new forum to discuss PTAs within the multilateral trading system, at least for the time being. A first do-no-harm-policy is one of the rationales for the thesis advocated here.

This is the eighth Appellate Body Report in which some aspect of zeroing was adjudicated. As in the prior cases, the AB again found the US practice inconsistent with several aspects of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The novelty in this dispute was the EC attempt to broaden the concept of what constitutes an appealable measure. The EC challenged whether a WTO decision regarding zeroing could apply to subsequent proceedings that might modify duty levels and asked the AB to decide whether the United States' continued use of zeroing in the context of a given case was consistent with WTO obligations. The AB stated that in its attempt to bring an effective resolution to the zeroing issue, the EC is entitled to frame the subject of its challenge in such a way as to bring the ongoing use of the zeroing methodology in these cases, under the scrutiny of WTO dispute settlement. The AB then cautiously applied the new perspective to US zeroing practice.

Border tax adjustments in the form of carbon taxes on products from countries with lax environmental production standards or in the form of a required participation in an emissions allowances' trading system have become a heavily debated issue under WTO law. Such an adjustment might be permissible if energy taxes as indirect taxes are applied on inputs during the production process. Compliance with the Most Favoured Nation principle has less practical importance than the not-yet settled likeness discussion under the National Treatment principle. Consequently, since the compatibility of carbon-related border tax adjustment measures is partly contested, potential justifications such as the conservation of exhaustible national resources or the protection of health (Art. XX GATT) become relevant. The application of the necessity and proportionality test requires that carbon measures are tailored so as to substantially contribute to the achievement of environmental objectives and do not create any arbitrary or unjustified discrimination.

TRIST is a simple, easy to use, country focused tool to assess the short-term adjustment implications of trade reform. It has been developed to improve the information available to policy makers in developing countries. It has the following key features: projections are based on revenues actually collected at the tariff line level rather than simply applying statutory rates, as in currently available tools; it is transparent, runs in Excel, with formulas and calculation steps visible to the user, and is open-source with users free to change, extend, or improve according to their needs; it has high policy relevance because it projects the impact of tariff reform on total fiscal revenue from imports (including VAT and excise taxes) and results are available at the product level so that sensitive products or sectors can be identified; the tool is flexible and can incorporate tariff liberalization scenarios involving any group of trading partners and any schedule of products. This paper describes the TRIST tool and provides a range of examples that demonstrate the insights that the tool can provide to policy makers on the short-term adjustment impacts of reducing tariffs.

Export restrictions imposed on various food products and natural resources have been subject to extensive public attention. Most recently, China's restrictions of its exports of certain minerals and rare earth metals have led to heated debates. The United States (US), European Union (EU), and Mexico have already filed a WTO dispute case against China on this matter. This paper describes the policy objectives and the global welfare implications of export restrictions. It summarizes the relevant WTO regulation, and offers a detailed analysis of the China–Raw Materials case which is before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). It argues that although export restrictions is arguably an area of ‘under-regulation’ or ‘regulatory deficiency’ in the WTO law, it is strongly biased against the late accession Members, including China. Yet, the way that China institutes its export restrictions raises serious questions about its role in the multilateral trading system, which it relies on for its economic prosperity. Hence, this is an area where China is likely to feel the implications of its so-called ‘WTO-plus’ commitments on its domestic and trade policies.

This paper studies the government procurement of services from foreign suppliers by conducting a statistical analysis of data submitted by Japan and Switzerland to the WTO's Committee on Government Procurement. Using several metrics, the paper examines whether the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) has led to greater market access for foreign suppliers in services procurement. Our results indicate that despite the GPA, the proportions of services contracts awarded to foreigners have declined over time for both countries and that in the absence of this decline, the value of services contracts awarded to foreign firms would have been more than 15 times higher in the case of Japan and nearly 68 times more in the case of Switzerland. We also find that for the same services categories, the Japanese government is not purchasing as much from abroad as its private sector is importing from the rest of the world, a finding that further points to the home-bias in that government's public purchase decisions.

In China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, the Panel addressed three main issues:

1. 1. the relationship between China's censorship laws and its obligations to protect copyright under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS’);

2. 2. China's obligations under TRIPS to ensure that its customs authorities be empowered to dispose properly of confiscated goods that infringe intellectual property rights;

3. 3. whether China's volume and value of goods thresholds for application of criminal procedures and penalties with respect to trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy comply with TRIPS requirements for application of criminal procedures and penalties.