‘Neuroreductionism’ is the tendency to reduce complex mental phenomena to brain states, confusing correlation for physical causation. In this paper, we illustrate the dangers of this popular neuro-fallacy, by looking at an example drawn from the media: a story about ‘hypoactive sexual desire disorder’ in women. We discuss the role of folk dualism in perpetuating such a confusion, and draw some conclusions about the role of ‘brain scans’ in our understanding of romantic love.

The nineteenth century saw frequent appeals to the idea of a redeemer personality, a heroic leader – musings which culminated in the cults devoted to Hitler and Stalin. This article shows that the self-assertion of leaders can stimulate the self-abasement of the followers on whom they depend (and vice versa), and discusses in what circumstances such an interplay becomes dominant in a society, and with what advantages and disadvantages for it.

What is the difference between the changes in your body that you yourself cause personally, such as the movements of your legs when you walk, or your lips when you speak, and the ones you do not cause personally, such as the contraction of your heart, or your foot bobbing up and down when your legs are crossed? Since the seventeenth century, most philosophers have said that will or intention makes the difference. I reject this answer and propose an alternative that doesn't just apply to animals capable of having intentions, but to all agents with functionally differentiated parts.

Reginald Williams in ‘The Case Against Theism’ (Think Autumn 2011) argued that the ‘empirically verifiable’ psychological need ‘to believe that good things exist when in fact they don't’ offers ‘the best reason anyone should expect’ for endorsing atheism over theism. My article outlines six objections to his thesis, questioning how empirically verifiable the evidence he adduces is, and pointing out various logical fallacies such as illicit use of generalizations and begging the question. It concludes that atheism needs defending on stronger grounds.

What is living well? We describe two contrasting lives and ask whether one is better lived than the other. Many philosophers, among them Susan Wolf, Richard Kraut and Stephen Darwall would say so. We criticize their position, which views certain activities as intrinsically more worthy than others. Instead, we conclude that persons are living well if they act morally and find long-term satisfaction, regardless of the pursuits they choose.

This article analyses some familiar arguments both for, and against, same-sex civil marriage. I argue that it is not enough to defend gay marriage by a simple appeal to equality, unless one addresses the view that same-sex marriage would be contrary to the objective nature and purpose of marriage. I illustrate the ways in which a stand-off is reached in discussions of this particular matter. I also suggest that there is a mystery about what the ‘upgrade’ from a faithful relationship to marriage amounts to, but that part of the answer is that marriage embodies a state-recognized social transition. This is underpinned by the interest that society has in marriage, largely owing to its facilitating a stable environment for children. However, I suggest that marriage also properly functions as a way to uphold commitment and love, and conclude that that there is no good reason not to uphold – through marriage – those things in same-sex relationships. But I concede that religious organisations with theological objections to same-sex marriage should not be obliged to conduct gay weddings.

This article responds to Tibor Machan's criticisms of government provision for needy citizens. It argues that although charity may be morally worthy, private charity is inadequate to the task of providing our fellow citizens with the security they deserve; the tremendous social good of secure access to a life of dignity can only be produced by a public social safety net. Moreover, individual rights to property do not stand in the way of providing a public social safety net. Since there are social inputs in wealth creation, reasonable levels of taxation do not violate people's rights to their wealth.

People often say that humans are omnivores in order to justify eating meat as normal and veganism as abnormal. The ‘Omnivore's Argument’ is one of the arguments that vegetarians and vegans encounter when meat-eaters try to defend the moral acceptability of body parts on their plate. When responding to this argument, the position of the vegan is similar to the atheist who time and again is confronted with the same fallacious arguments in support of the existence of god(s). Veganism and atheism are both ethical default positions. Similarly, not killing other people is also a default position.

The problem of evil is that morally gratuitous suffering and destruction is evidence against a benevolent and potent god. Often cases of this evil are restricted to human suffering, but if the moral universe is expanded in the fashion associated with environmental ethics, the scope of morally significant suffering and destruction grows. Consequently, the wider the scope of the moral universe, the problem of evil becomes harder for theists to solve.

It's nearly 10:00 AM on a Thursday morning and the courtroom is filled with more than 100 members of the jury pool. Court officials, state police officers, and defendants line the halls waiting to be called for pre-trial conferences and for jury selection to begin, then the fire alarm sounds. There is no obvious evidence of fire, no smoke, no shouts, and no other warnings. At the same time, no one announces that there is a fire drill in progress, that the alarm is merely being tested, or that the alarm was pulled by accident. Sitting in the court room, what would you do? And, more importantly, why would you do it? What goes through your head when you hear the alarm?

This short paper argues that two attempts in this journal to argue for the moral permissibility of homosexual activity do not succeed.

Humans will not always be the most intelligent agents on Earth, the ones steering the future. What will happen to us when we no longer play that role, and how can we prepare for this transition?

There is an unusual region in Singapore called Hougang, whose residents have collectively rejected lavish, State-funded, urban renewal offers. As they have been doing so for more than two decades, Hougang stands out for its aged flats and amenities in one of the richest countries in the world. This curious situation arose from the Singapore Government's stance that urban renewal of electoral constituencies should depend on political affiliation. This essay looks at the ethics of the situation.

Cyclist Lance Armstrong cheated his way to seven Tour de France ‘victories’. Such cheating is wrong because it harms society. To explain how that harm affects all of us, I use Aristotle's ideas of virtue ethics to argue that Armstrong, despite his charitable work, is not a virtuous person. Virtue is to some extent determined by society, so we need to be clear that Armstrong is not a person to emulate. A society which does not clearly disapprove of vice is less than it might otherwise be because a good society is one that encourages virtue in its citizens.

Retribution enjoys an unwarranted appeal from the public and its politicians. This is because it is impractical and perhaps even incoherent. This does not mean that we should reject the importance of morality for criminal justice nor should we reject the link between desert and proportionality. Nevertheless, we can reject the way retribution has understood these ideas in defense of a more plausible and compelling alternative.

Security cameras have become a ubiquitous part of everyday life in most major cities, yet each new camera seems to come with cries of foul play by defenders of privacy rights. Our long history with these cameras and CCTV networks does not seem to have alleviated our concerns with being watched, and as we feel ourselves losing privacy in other areas the worry generated by security cameras has remained. Our feelings of disquiet, however, are unnecessary as they stem from an erroneous view of the self. The following argues that this view of an autonomous and atomistic self is both detrimental and inaccurate.

In this essay, I argue that we are merely biological organisms. This view (animalism) explains everyday practices like watching ourselves in the mirror. The claim that we are psychological in nature – i.e. wherever our conscious experience goes, we follow – cannot explain something as trivial as watching ourselves in the mirror. Thus, we should accept animalism.