Today constitutional theory is marked by the staying power of originalism, interest in nonjudicial constitutional interpretation, and reconsideration of when judicial review is “countermajoritarian.” Alexander M. Bickel and Robert H. Bork shaped these concerns in the 1960s and early 1970s while they were close friends and Yale faculty colleagues. Both recognized that the Warren Court's liberal activism, when considered in the aftermath of legal realism, demanded a clearer theory of the limits of legitimate judicial power. This article examines their legal and constitutional thought in this period and then briefly surveys how their ideas continue to configure constitutional theory. Current defenders and opponents of originalism are still compelled to wrestle with the imprint of positivism, formalism, and judicial restraint Bork gave the doctrine. Current challenges to the “countermajoritarian difficulty” in favor of nonjudicial interpretation must contend with this influential formulation of Bickel, and they owe more to the Bickel of constitutional “colloquy” than has been appreciated.

Much of the literature on September 11 focuses on bin Laden as a terrorist or on the idea of a clash of civilizations. In criticizing both, this paper instead conceptualizes bin Laden as a “civilizational revolutionary.” As a revolutionary, bin Laden has sought to topple moderate regimes in the Middle East and to reestablish the caliphate. In contrast with most other national or transnational revolutionaries, however, he has emphasized culture—militant Islamism. Nevertheless, as the literature on social revolutions suggests, bin Laden has used the big strategy of most other revolutionaries in “externalizing” regional conflicts with his attacks on the United States. But his tactic of apocalyptic terrorism has made him unique as a revolutionary.

Though they are often overlooked or studied for different reasons, St. Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues have a subtle yet important political dimension. Much of Augustine's conversation with his interlocutors implicitly hinges on matters concerning political philosophy, as does the very dialogue format Augustine chooses. Yet on the other hand, the focal points of the dialogues are essentially nonpolitical, and some of Augustine's statements can be construed as hostile to civic life and to any thoughtful reflection on the best political order. This essay argues that these apparent inconsistencies are not signs of a contradictory attitude but reveal a three-pronged strategy by Augustine to forge a properly Christian attitude towards political life, a strategy that involves (1) debunking patriotic fervor, (2) inflaming the love of truth, and( 3) re-engaging the civitas from a higher perspective.

Despite the Supreme Court's repeated invocations of America's Founding Fathers for First Amendment religion jurisprudence, George Washington's political thought regarding religious freedom has received almost no scholarly attention. This is unfortunate, for Washington's words and actions speak to contemporary Establishment Clause and Free Exercise issues. Washington, moreover, offers an alternative to Jefferson's and Madison's approach to church-state matters. The scholarly exclusion of Washington thus has led to a narrow view of the Founders' thought on religious liberty. This article sets forth Washington's understanding of the right to religious liberty. It pays particular attention to Washington's disagreement with Madison on the propriety of government support of religion. It also draws attention to the limits Washington placed on an individual's right to religious free exercise by focusing on how Washington dealt with Quaker claims for religious exemptions from military service.

Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved. —G. Washington, Letter submitting the proposed constitution to the President of Congress 17 September 1787

Most commentators see Henry David Thoreau's political essays as an endorsement of liberal democracy, but this essay holds that Thoreau's critique of majoritarianism and his model of civil disobedience may intend something much more radical: when his criticisms of representative democracy are articulated in more formal terms of political and moral obligation, it becomes clear that the theory and practice of democracy fundamentally conflict with Thoreau's conviction in moral autonomy and conscientious action. His critical examination of the way in which a democratic state threatens the commitments that facilitate and give meaning to the practice of morality intends to reorient the focus of politics, away from institutions and toward the people such institutions were ostensibly in place to serve. His critique stands as a warning that becoming complacent about democracy will inhibit the search for better (perhaps more liberal) ways to organize political life.

The article considers Machiavelli's terza rima poems on Ingratitude, Ambition, Fortune and Occasion, generally called I Capitoli, in the context of Renaissance hermeticism, cabbala, erotic magic, and astrology. It argues that these poems, taken together and read as a whole, reveal Machiavelli's playful yet subversive cosmology that ousts the old gods by instituting a new theogony. At the same time, I Capitoli, addressed and dedicated to his friends, discloses Machiavelli's own ambitions and desires, delineating the subtle link between Niccolò the poet and Niccolò the prophet and benefactor.

Conventional wisdom pins responsibility for the Vietnam War primarily on Lyndon B. Johnson. This essay presents a revisionist argument, attempting to shift primary responsibility for the war on President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The case rests heavily on John F. Kennedy's challenge to historians: “How the hell” can they evaluate presidential performances unless they know the “real pressures” and the “real alternatives” confronting the occupiers of the Oval Office. In assessing those pressures, this essay concludes that Eisenhower had the unique luxury of a clean break from President Truman's commitments, thanks to the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu, and a clear-cut alternative provided by the Geneva Accords. Unfortunately, Eisenhower chose to ignore the Accords, committed America to South Vietnam, and played a major role, during and after his presidency, in creating the heavy pressures that shaped Johnson's Vietnam decisions.

The charge that the Reformation heralded a triumph of confessional party over religion and fostered a spirit of division, discord, and strife is not an unfamiliar one. The thought of Jean Calvin, in particular, has been found responsible, by Karl Barth among others, for rousing its followers to militancy. As this essay will show, however, Calvin's actual positions point in a rather more irenic direction. Thus the first section of the essay addresses common misconceptions about the role of military metaphor in Calvin's writings. Section II draws attention to the integral importance for Calvin's theology of the Gospel call to unity, concord, and peace not only among Christians but all mankind. Section III examines Calvin's cautious treatment of actual fighting and war, and section IV draws together the argument by reference to Calvin's discussion of political authority and the tasks of the state.

Recent scholarship has yielded a great deal of information on Cicero's De officiis; this essay, however, seeks to move beyond information about the work in favor of an interpretation of Cicero's intention in writing it. To this end, the essay analyzes the genre and intended audience of De officiis, the allegedly Stoic teaching contained in it, and the puzzle presented by its crucial third book. The understanding of Cicero's intention that emerges from these investigations is then briefly compared with Cicero's teaching in De finibus. Theessay ultimately claims that De officiis should be interpreted as advocating a sort of Stoicism for the unphilosophical even while urging the views of the Peripatetics on the more sophisticated.

Francis Bacon's pronouncement that “Man is the Center of the World,” the final cause of all nature, seems to unleash us from all guidance and restraint, providing no grounds for judging any human action to be better or worse than any other. The political implications of such a position—combined with Bacon's efforts to advance technological power—are enormous. There would be little support for natural rights or any other kind of “right” except what is based on force. This famous promoter of scientific power, however, was neither oblivious to the danger, nor politically irresponsible, in his assessment of man's position in the cosmos, and his counsel seems closer to classical political philosophy than is normally acknowledged. This essay provides an examination of and detailed commentary on Bacon's argument, as presented in “Prometheus, or the State of Man.” It reveals that Bacon expects us to deal with the problem in terms of properly ranking humans themselves, discarding the notion that all humans are equal. In light of such a ranking we may come to recognize natural standards for evaluating humans and their actions.

Revelation and reason are pivotal in Strauss's project. Yet nearly three decades after his death, questions remain about the essential meaning of this core dimension of his project. Scholarship of recent years has tended to approach his project by situating its position in relation to revelation and reason—to one or the other or to both. Among those who hold Strauss in high regard and inclusive of his former students, those often called Straussians, the view is far from clear. Was Strauss's allegiance with reason alone, that is, with Athens and classical political philosophy? Did his vocation as a political philosopher and his loyalty to the party of Athens preclude his being open to revelation, that is, open to the possibility that the Bible conveys truth regarding the good life? Or was he beyond a dogmatic attachment whether to reason or to revelation?

The essay addresses the construction of the common good as viewed by one of the most controversial thinkers of the later Middle Ages. Marsiglio of Padua presents an extended argument for the compatibility of the material advantage of individuals with civil association by basing his conception of the community on the benefits that accrue to human beings from realizing their “natural” self-interests. According to Marsiglio, it is in the nature of human beings to seek their own physical well-being, which is best achieved by living communally. Hence, Marsiglian society is ultimately arranged according to the principle of promoting the goal of private advantage, the fulfillment of which is equivalent to the common good. The argument contains distinct elements of some of the main themes of modern economic rationality, yet also builds a bridge to a substantial idea of community.

The study of national communal feeling is often limited by the reluctance many theorists have to consider the manifest, affective meaning which so many discover and embrace through their nations. The writings of Johann Gottfried Herder suggest a way to theorize about that affectivity without treating it as either incidental to the real nature of national communities, or as a threat to the individuals who inhabit them. Herder's approach is based on language, and involves a metaphysical assumption about the aesthetic operation of human thought and collective belonging. Herder's linking of the history and nature of nation-building with a vision of linguistic revelation through one's Volk presents a fairly original take on the question of nationality, one which approaches communal affections with a moral (and ultimately theological) seriousness, but is also flexible enough to recognize (and even anticipate) contemporary critiques of metaphysics which have complicated our traditional assumptions about national identity.

The easy conflation of god(s) and country—what might be called the dual foundations of justice—is challenged and explored in Sophocles′ Philoctetes. Odysseus's consistent appeal to the common good and Philoctetes′ troubled attachment to a divinely sanctioned principle of justice are set at odds in a play where the fate of the entire Greek expedition at Troy hangs in the balance. While most read the play as a celebration of young Neoptolemus as he frees himself from the corrupt influence of Odysseus and, through his encounter with Philoctetes, grows in personal integrity, this essay maintains that Neoptolemus comes under the influence of both antagonists because each has something important to teach him. Rather than offering a simple morality tale, Sophocles′ investigation of justice in this play both reveals the depth of the conflict between the requirements of politics and those of piety, and criticizes the extreme embodiments of these perspectives in the figures of Odysseus and Philoctetes.

According to Rousseau in The Government of Poland, the “love of liberty,” when properly cultivated, engenders the patriotism and virtue of citizens. The citizen's love of liberty, however, is not his enjoyment of liberty; it is his fiery longing or passion for national liberty, which has endured in the hearts of Poles owing to the constant threat posed by Russian imperialism. Unless the Poles continue to believe their liberty is threatened, they will begin to believe they can enjoy the luxury of possessing liberty; and then Poland will start down the familiar path of bourgeois corruption, culminating in despotism. Therefore, Rousseau's proposed “reform” of Polish institutions in fact aims to refine “the advantageous evils” of Poland's weakness and anarchy. His intention is to intensify and to orchestrate the defensiveness of all Polish citizens—against internal as well as external threats to liberty—for Rousseau understands that state of soul to be “the leaven” of the magnificent virtues of the ancients.

Walter Bagehot was Victorian Britain's premier political commentator on and analyst of the operation of governmental institutions and practices. He also wrote prolifically on international affairs, though this aspect of his work has been less remarked on. His attitude of quietism in foreign policy derived from his belief that, although in domestic affairs the age of government by custom and coercion had been succeeded—in certain developed countries, at any rate—by the practice of government through reasoned debate and compromise, in the relations among nations difficulties of communication caused by differences of worldview continued to make international relations the realm of power clashes marked by mutual misunderstandings. His response was to urge his country to have as little as possible to do with this more “primitive” arena of politics; and his warnings remain a classic statement of the dangers of unintended consequences and overly ambitious activity.