The last decade has seen tremendous interest in hybrid pension plans in the United States. These plans combine risk sharing between employers and employees with increased incentives for employees to remain in the labour force. Hybrid plans avert many of the key issues with defined contribution plans, such as participant exposure to financial risk, the consequent need for extensive financial education and high administrative costs. Hybrids also help rectify some of the main drawbacks of traditional final salary plans: lack of portability, high incentives to retire early and redistribution towards those whose wage growth is above average.

This paper shows that shifting the portfolio allocation of a government-run pension fund towards more equity investment, ceteris paribus, tends to reduce the aggregate capital stock as well as the average consumption level of all individuals except the poor retirees who consume more on average but at the cost of increased uncertainty. If a larger capital stock is desired, reducing the supply of publicly supplied goods is the most effective tool. That change also increases the average private consumption of all the young and the wealthy retirees although it does reduce the average consumption and uncertainty of the old non-savers.

Within the global debate regarding the provision and management of retirement pensions, two issues continue to attract the attention of academics and practitioners alike. They are the role of payout annuities in a well-balanced portfolio and the corporate governance of pension plans. We are happy to present the current issue of the JPEF which addresses both of these topics and provides a number of interesting and important conclusions.

Over the past 15 to 20 years, many companies have converted their traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance or pension equity plans. In a cash balance plan, the worker's ‘account’ is based on an annual contribution rate for each year of employment, plus accumulating interest on annual contributions. A pension equity plan defines the benefit as a percentage of final average earnings for each year of service under the plan. Both types of plans specify the benefit as a lump sum payable at termination. In contrast, traditional defined benefit plans specify benefits in terms of an annuity payable at retirement. From the employees' perspective, cash balance and pension equity plans look somewhat like defined contribution plans. However, they are funded, administered, and regulated as defined benefit plans.

Annuities provide insurance against outliving one's wealth. Previous studies have indicated that, for many households, the value of the longevity insurance should outweigh the actuarial unfairness of prices in the voluntary annuity market. Nonetheless, voluntary annuitization rates are extremely low.

Previous research on the value of annuitization has compared an optimal decumulation of unannuitized wealth with the alternative of annuitizing all unannuitized wealth at age 65. We relax these assumptions, allowing households to annuitize any part of their unannuitized wealth at any age and to return to the annuity market as many times as they wish.

Using numerical optimization techniques, assuming the levels of actuarial unfairness of annuities calculated in previous research, and retaining the assumption made in previous research that one half of household wealth is pre-annuitized, we conclude that it is optimal for couples to delay annuitization until they are aged 73–82, and in some cases never to annuitize. It is usually optimal for single men and women to annuitize at substantially younger ages, between 65 and 70. Households that annuitize will generally wish to annuitize only part of their unannuitized wealth.

Using data from the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old and Health and Retirement Study panels, we show that much of the failure of the average currently retired household to annuitize can be attributed to the exceptionally high proportions of the wealth of these cohorts that is pre-annuitized. We expect younger cohorts to have smaller proportions of pre-annuitized wealth and project increasing demand for annuitization as successive cohorts age.

In order to help in designing an accurate pension reform, we determine the resource allocation in an endogenous fertility model that generates an endogenous demographic transition by means of distinguishing between female and male labor. We analyze the problem of the optimal solution and characterize the decentralization of the first best. We show that a pension policy linking pension benefits to the number of children acts as a corrective tax system able to restore both the optimal capital stock and the optimal rate of population growth as a single instrument. We also show that neither a Beveridgean pension scheme nor a Bismarckian one can decentralize the first best.

Many firms that sponsor traditional defined benefit pensions have converted these plans to cash balance plans in the last en years. Cash balance plans in the last ten years combine features of defined benefit and defined contribution plans, and yet their introduction has proven considerably more controversial than has the increasing popularity of defined contribution plans. The goal of this study is to estimate a hierarchy of the influences on the decision of a firm to convert its traditional defined benefit pension plan to a cash balance plan. Our results indicate that cash balance conversions have been undertaken in competitive industries with tight labor markets and thus can be viewed at least in part as a response to better compensate a more mobile labor force. Indeed, many firms appear to increase their pension liabilities through such conversions.

Policymakers seeking to design efficient and smoothly functioning pension systems for their aging workforces are beginning to acknowledge the key importance of administrative expenses when formulating rules for pension plan structure and fee disclosure requirements. This study explores the links between retirement plan offerings and pension expenses for a wide range of private and public sector pension plan types, using an invaluable new data set on two thousand Australian pension funds. Our analysis indicates how pension plan design can strongly influence plan expenses and consequently eventual retirement security.

As members of the Australian workforce approach retirement, they are being presented with increased choice in their superannuation investments. With increased choice has come greater personal responsibility for ensuring adequate retirement savings. This paper explores gender differences in superannuation investment choices through a range of interactions with individual demographics and in doing so a gender effect can be further refined than previous research has identified. The data for this paper comes from a survey of members of the Superannuation Scheme for Australian Universities (SSAU).

A reform process is underway in Italy. Achieving financial sustainability of the social security system has been the first objective characterizing the reforms of 1990s, but these have also introduced rules which aim at a more actuarially fair system. Indeed the social security system prevailing in Italy, financed on a PAYG basis, was, at the end of the 1980s, clearly unsustainable and also extremely unfair to some group of workers, enacting a form of perverse redistribution which is typical of ‘final salary’ defined benefit systems. It was also a system characterized by strong incentives to retire early.

In this paper we briefly describe the different regimes of the Italian pension system in its recent history and focus on some aspects of the reform process taking place during the 1990s. Since economists and policy makers are still struggling to assess the results and the long-term effects of these reforms we provide both a survey of this debate and some fresh evidence on the evaluation of the policy changes. We carry out this analysis with a particular emphasis on two aspects which are relevant in the debate. On the one hand we stress the role of economic incentives and the overall fiscal implications of changing the systems as well as these incentives. On the other hand we emphasize the intergenerational considerations and the political implications of the ageing process of the Italian population. From our description it emerges that the overall design of the Italian reform is probably a good one, and yet some more steps need to be taken to speed up some of the positive effects of the reform process that, due the adverse demographic trends affecting PAYG systems as well as the political arena, could easily evaporate.

Employers are beginning to search for ways to elicit more labor supply from older adults as the population ages, the ability to work in later life increases, and younger workers become relatively scarce. Many employers are turning to hybrid pension plans, such as cash balance plans and pension equity plans. Whereas traditional defined benefit plans often subsidize workers who retire early and penalize those who remain at work beyond the plan's retirement age, most hybrid plans reward work at older ages. This paper documents the impact of population aging on the labor market and changes over time in work capacity at older ages. It then shows how movement toward hybrid pension plans, among other types of private and public retirement plan reforms and redesigns, can be used to increase work incentives for older adults.

The bear market that began in 2000 focused attention on two issues – pensions and profits. The initial pension problem was the big decline in value of individual 401(k) accounts. The profit issue was misconduct and stock options. In fact, there is another compelling issue involving both pensions and profits – the impact of the bear market on defined benefit pension plans.

Plan sponsors have a projected benefit liability, which until recently was covered by the rise in asset values during the extended bull market. When stock values fell by 50 percent, sponsors for the first time in decades had to contribute to their pensions. But even without the decline in the stock market, sponsors of defined benefit plans were going to face increased pension contributions in the coming decade. The reason is a host of regulatory and legislative changes in the late 1980s that slowed or limited pension contributions.

Our analysis suggests that in the absence of the stock market boom and the regulatory and legislative changes that reduced funding, the average firm's contribution to its pension plan would have been 50 percent higher during the 1982–2001 period; corporate profits would have been roughly 5 percent lower.

The deferred contributions are coming due. The decline in the stock market and an ageing population imply that contributions would double from their current level. As the economy emerges from recession and the bear market draws to a close, firms and investors must be prepared to contend with a strong headwind from pension funding obligations that could slow the recover.

The evolution of hybrid conversions has prompted a number of high-profile legal challenges. In response, policymakers have attempted to force companies transitioning from a traditional DB to a hybrid plan to offer all workers the open-ended choice of remaining in the old DB plan, versus switching to the new hybrid plan. This paper evaluates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ under these plan conversions and estimates the cost to plan sponsors of such a mandate. We find that mandating choice could increase plan sponsors' pension expenses above their current cost for traditional defined benefit plans. In the end, rising costs of pensions could endanger plan sponsorship altogether. Policymakers seeking to mandate pension choice should take into account these possible undesirable outcomes of such a law.

Conventional wisdom holds that pension reforms from pay-as-you-go to fully funded systems spur the development of stock markets through a corporate governance channel, i.e. pension funds become large shareholders of publicly traded firms and therefore have the incentives to monitor managers and improve investor protections. This paper reviews the literature on the corporate governance channel associated with pension reforms in developing countries, and asks what we know and need to know about it. We know that pension funds are not yet large shareholders of publicly traded firms in developing countries. However, econometric results suggest that pension reforms lead to stock market development, but do not allow us to identify and separate the corporate governance channel. We know that pension reforms are followed by pro-investor legislation, but there is no convincing evidence that the pro-investor laws are enforced. We need to know more about the effects of pension reform on stock prices and performance of publicly traded firms, and whether pension fund management companies act in the best interest of pensioners. The paper also reviews the political economy explanations of the links between pension fund specific capital controls and the corporate governance channel, and suggests that there is a trade-off between the objectives of pensioners' welfare maximization, and corporate governance reform and stock market development.

Responsible for the welfare of beneficiaries, pension funds have many tasks and functions. Consequently, their governance and regulation are issues of public concern with direct bearing on the interests of stakeholders and ultimately the performance of Anglo-American financial markets. Subject to common law expectations regarding proper trustee behaviour, also important are statutory requirements regarding the equitable treatment of beneficiaries and the management of assets and liabilities. At one level, discretion is an essential attribute of the trust institution – trustees act on behalf of others not so well placed to manage their own long-term welfare because of lack of knowledge and/or ability. At another level, pension funds are presumably regulated by a well-defined purpose – the welfare of beneficiaries. In this paper, I look at the internal governance of pension funds emphasizing codes of practice, the rules and procedures for decision making, and trustee competence and expertise. While it is important to observe codes of conduct like those advocated by the OECD, there may be significant problems with any system of governance that relies upon rules and procedures. Inertia rather than innovation may be the net result. These issues are developed with reference to defined benefit and defined contribution schemes (and their variants). Ultimately, pension fund governance reflects, more often than not, its nineteenth-century antecedents rather than the financial imperatives of the twenty-first century.