While neorealism and world-system theory both claim to be “structural” theories of international relations, they embody very different understandings of system structure and structural explanation. Neorealists conceptualize system structures in individualist terms as constraining the choices of preexisting state agents, whereas world-system theorists conceptualize system structures in structuralist terms as generating state agents themselves. These differences stem from what are, in some respects, fundamentally opposed solutions to the “agent-structure” or “micromacro” problem. This opposition, however, itself reflects a deeper failure of each theory to recognize the mutually constitutive nature of human agents and system structures—a failure which leads to deep-seated inadequacies in their respective explanations of state action. An alternative solution to the agent-structure problem, adapted from “structuration theory” in sociology, can overcome these inadequacies by avoiding both the reduction of system structures to state actors in neorealism and their reification in world-system theory. Structuration theory requires a philosophical basis in scientific realism, arguably the “new orthodoxy” in the philosophy of natural science, but as yet largely unrecognized by political scientists. The scientific realist/structuration approach generates an agenda for “structural-historical” research into the properties and dispositions of both state actors and the system structures in which they are embedded.

Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests. … Because as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off. Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy.

Decolonization in parts of the Third World and particularly Africa has resulted in the emergence of numerous “quasi-states,” which are independent largely by international courtesy. They exist by virtue of an external right of self-determination— negative sovereignty—without yet demonstrating much internal capacity for effective and civil government—positive sovereignty. They therefore disclose a new dual international civil regime in which two standards of statehood now coexist: the traditional empirical standard of the North and a new juridical standard of the South. The biases in the constitutive rules of the sovereignty game today and for the first time in modern international history arguably favor the weak. If international theory is to account for this novel situation it must acknowledge the possibility that morality and legality can, in certain circumstances, be independent of power in international relations. This suggests that contemporary international theory must accommodate not only Machiavellian realism and the sociological discourse of power but also Grotian rationalism and the jurisprudential idiom of law.

Studies of international regimes have sought to describe international collaborative arrangements in more systematic terms than in the past, and to analyze their development in terms of major schools of international relations theory. This article refines the commonly used definition of regimes and elucidates the major hypotheses of one theoretical school, structural realism. The strength and nature of the international commodity trade regime are systematically described, and their development is analyzed in terms of the major hypotheses of structural realism. In large part, these hypotheses are supported by the analysis of what is a relatively weak international regime.

There is not much significant theorizing outside America and, within America, most recent theorizing has tended to become more abstract or else has falsely assumed that the United States is no longer a hegemonic power. But rather than criticize what has been done, I shall outline a different approach, identifying four major global structures—security, production, finance, and knowledge—within which states, corporate enterprises, and others operate. I conclude that America is dominant in all four structures. International studies therefore ought to develop a theory of empire which can be applied by U.S. policymakers, if these studies are to have any basis in reality and any practical use.

Students of comparative politics have long acknowledged the importance of such institutional factors as electoral systems, parliamentary versus presidential rule, and the strength of parties; but they have either regarded the institutions as given or have explained them entirely in domestic terms (associating proportional representation, for example, with the intensity of social cleavages). In economically advanced democracies, however, these institutional aspects can be plausibly linked to dependence on trade: proportional representation, the parliamentary system, strong parties, and large electoral districts have “survival value” for developed democracies exposed to trade. That the recently revived agitation for proportional representation in the United Kingdom has been cast explicitly in terms of economic necessity and dependence on trade adds force to this argument, and suggests the need for further historical research on other cases of institutional adaptation and change.

The concepts of regimes and learning have been developed in the Liberal theory of international relations, but their application has been mostly in the area of international political economy. U.S.–Soviet relations are generally explained solely in terms of Realist theory. The dichotomy is unfortunate because both strands of theory have something to contribute. Although the injunctions of an overall regime do not govern the U.S.–Soviet security relationship, it is possible to identify the injunctions and constraining effects of regimes in subissues of the security relationship. In five areas of the nuclear relationship (destructive power, control problems, proliferation, arms race stability, and deterrent force structure), it is possible to identify different degrees of learning and to see how such learning affects and is affected by the development of regimes. Looking at the U.S.–Soviet security relationship in terms of learning and regimes raises new questions and opens a research agenda which helps us to think more broadly about the processes of political change in this area.

Much has been written about how the United States and the Soviet Union have managed crises since World War II, avoiding dangerous escalation and war; little on how the two superpowers have avoided confrontations. In part scholarly neglect of the question of crisis avoidance reflects the acute suspicion and hostility of the cold war. When U.S.-Soviet rivalry was perceived as a struggle between incompatible ideologies and ways of life, it was unthinkable that the superpowers might have any common interests, much less that they could collaborate, even tacitly, to control the conflict in their relationship.

The key to the success of the oil oligopoly has been the ability of its members to make commitments to each other credible despite great divisiveness and enormous uncertainties. To accomplish this, the oil companies constructed a regime of suprasovereign constraints to control the pursuit of individual self-interest. When these anti-democratic, anti-autonomous institutions functioned effectively, the corporations met challenges far greater than those OPEC subsequently faced; when they began to disintegrate, the companies' ability to hold price above marginal cost deteriorated. OPEC reinvigorated the oligopoly using the ready-made self-denial and surveillance mechanisms built by the companies, then systematically unravelled them in moving towards a “mature” cartel held together by “mere” common interest, promises, and threats. To reconstruct an oligopoly that has the cohesiveness of the corporate era, OPEC will need not only a more moderate price trajectory, but also a binding structure that gives preponderance to the most conservative members, provides prompt and accurate verification of cheating, and automatically imposes penalties in magnified form for competitive behavior (without the need for direct retaliation). Beyond predictions about the future of the oil industry, these findings have important implications for economic approaches to imperfect competition, for anti-trust analyses of collusion, and for organizational theories of hegemonic leadership.

Although the Nordic countries are small, open economies, they were able to benefit considerably from the expansion of the world economy during the “Golden Age” of the 1950s and 1960s. They achieved industrial diversification and consolidated welfare-state reforms. Throughout this period, several economic policy routines were institutionalized. These routines may be analyzed as parts of a specific economic policy model, determined by the economic structure and the pattern of political mobilization. It seems more fruitful to distinguish five such models rather than to use the generalizing notion of a “Scandinavian model.” In the 1970s, the world economic crisis posed new challenges for the Nordic countries. In the first phase of the crisis, economic policies continued to operate in accordance with the established routines. But structural problems, new patterns of political mobilization, and new forms of external pressure forced governments to shift towards austerity policies in the late 1970s. The extent and the specificities of these shifts are compared and the degree to which the economic policy models have changed assessed. Such an analysis is a first step to answer some crucial questions now facing the Nordic countries: Was their flexible adjustment merely the result of favorable conditions during the 1960s—or is it a permanent trait? Are they now trapped between large industrial nations and dynamic newly industrializingcountries? If so, what will be the fate of their advanced welfare sectors?

The concept of a “regime” is frequently used to describe and explain behavior in international political economy. Peter Cowhey and Edward Long, attempting to test theories of surplus capacity and hegemonic decline, advanced a version of a regime governing international trade in automobiles which was fundamentally liberal from 1966 to 1975, but then collapsed into protectionism. Their diagnosis is mistaken, however, because the trade regime for autos was neither as liberal as they assert during the 1950s and 1960s, nor as protectionist as they believe it has become in the 1980s. The discussion focuses on a new definition of the auto trade regime based on four fundamental rules that have persisted since the 1950s. By examining data on auto imports since 1955 on a region-by-region basis, it becomes clear that the trade expansion of the postwar years was not based on a global liberalization of the trade regime, but on carefully managed regional arrangements that favored imports within the region, or extra-regional imports that did not threaten domestic producers. The flurry of restraints on Japanese imports in recent years is not a collapse into protectionism, but a reinforcement of the fundamental regime rules. The auto industry case illustrates the tendency of analysts to underestimate protectionist elements in industry trade regimes and to overestimate the amount of changes that take place in their fundamental rules.

Political scientists researching economic foreign policy have generally taken one of two analytic approaches. The first is based on realpolitik, the traditional application of “high” politics to the “low” politics of economics. This approach considers economics subordinate to politics. The concept of the national interest dominates; the pursuit of power—what enables the state to achieve its goals of security, welfare, and other societal values—is seen to underlie most actions. The study of foreign economic policy is thus an analysis of the distribution of power among states within the international system. By understanding a state's sources of strength and areas of vulnerability in relation to other states, the analyst will better understand the creation of foreign policy. Hans Morgenthau notes that while states may sometimes pursue economic policies for their own sake (in which case they should take little interest in their success), the more important economic policies they will favor are instruments of political power.Stephen Krasner views the state as an autonomously motivated actor, able to guide policy in pursuit of state priorities while resisting interest groups and ideologies. According to this “power theory”, the state tries to increase its economic competitiveness, ensure security of material needs, and promote its broad foreign-policy objectives. Economic policy is for the most part subordinate to and best explained by state priorities and prerogatives. Robert Tucker, Klaus Knorr, Robert Gilpin and others have also adopted this framework.

In April 1977 the United States and four other major Western governments embarked on a unique diplomatic exercise in the hope of negotiating an agreement for the independence of the territory of Namibia, or South West Africa. The “Contact Group” as it became known (or Western Five), consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany, functioned actively from April 1977 until mid-1982 as an ad hoc multilateral mediating and facilitating team in close proximity to but not directly linked with the United Nations. The five countries secured basic agreement in 1978 on a plan calling for UN supervised elections for a constituent assembly in the territory leading to early independence and the appointment of a UN special representative to ensure the necessary conditions for such elections.

Pressure for divestment and mandatory disinvestment sanctions directed against South Africa are an instance of domestic interest groups in one country seeking policy change in another. The link from shareholder divestment to disinvestment by firms is tenuous, however (since South Africa-active firms do not seem to suffer as a consequence of divestment pressure), and legislated sanctions are likely to have unpredictable and sometimes perverse effects on the extent of apartheid practices.

This article reconciles common policy usage with scholarly definition. The system of cooperation on non-proliferation has often been termed an international “regime,” but there has not been any systematic effort to determine if this is actually true. The discussion also attempts to reconcile the formation and maintenance of this system of cooperation with contemporary international relations theory. The central argument is that the system of international cooperation on non-proliferation does constitute a regime, but that such a regime presents a serious anomaly for contemporary theory. The article concludes that power and egoistic self-interest are inadequate to account for the regime's formation and maintenance. The inadequacies of both the hegemonic stability and functional theories point towards another independent variable that needs central consideration in regime analysis: knowledge and learning.

The bargaining power model of HC–MNC (host country–multinational corporation) interaction conceives of economic nationalism in terms of rational self-interest and assumes both inherent conflict and convergent objectives. In extractive industries, there is strong evidence that outcomes are a function of relative bargaining power and that as power shifts to developing HCs over time, the bargain obsolesces. A cross-national study of the bargaining model, using data from 563 subsidiaries of U.S. manufacturing firms in forty-nine developing countries, indicates that while the bargaining framework is an accurate model of MNC–host country relationships, manufacturing is not characterized by the inherent, structurally based, and secular obsolescence that is found in the natural resource industries. Shifts in bargaining power to HCs may take place when technology is mature and global integration limited. In industries characterized by changing technologies and the spread of global integration, the bargain will obsolesce very slowly and the relative power of MNCs may even increase over time.

Why were advanced industrial states able to keep their economies relatively open to foreign trade in the 1970s and the early 1980s, despite declining U.S. hegemony and increasing economic difficulties? This article argues that an international-level change affected domestic trade politics and contributed to the maintenance of a liberal trading system. Examining the United States and France, the argument proceeds in two steps, showing first how domestic trade politics were changed and second how this change affected the policy process. Initially, I argue that aspects of the increased international economic interdependence of the postwar period altered domestic trade politics by creating new, anti-protectionist preferences among certain firms. Firms with extensive international ties through exports, multinational production, and global intra-firm trade have come to oppose protectionism, since it is very costly for them. Evidence for these new preferences was apparent among both American and French industries. Despite different contexts, firms in the two countries reacted similarly to the growth of interdependence. Next, I ask whether firms' preferences affected trade policy outcomes and show how these preferences were integrated into the policy process in both countries. Trade policy structures in neither country prevented firms' preferences from affecting the policies adopted. Even in France, a so-called “strong” state, firms' preferences were a key influence on policy. In the trade policy area then, the French and American states did not appear to differ greatly in their susceptibility to industry influence, even though their policy processes were different.

Sovereign states determine the health and safety regulation of nuclear power facilities almost exclusively. Yet the Soviet nuclear power accident at Chernobyl (April 1986) demonstrated that nuclear power can have significant health and political effects transcending state boundaries. Several meetings have been held at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since the Chernobyl accident, with delegates seeking to find the proper balance between autonomous state decision-making and international or transboundary interests. This article examines the nuclear safety role of IAEA in the past, and comes to conclusions regarding its likely role in the future. I claim that IAEA is unlikely to become a powerful regulatory “watchdog,” but that incremental changes in the agency could, over time, create a significant international presence.