The spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a much less stable place, and such a spread may be difficult to stop. Yet proliferation is not as yet inevitable.

Several viewpoints are implicitly rejected in this collection. One is that nuclear proliferation would actually be desirable for the world. Another is that such weapons spread is inevitable. Other rejected viewpoints are that such spread can be halted only by a crash program, by a brutal exercise of American national power, or by a substantial surrender of such power.

The international system may indeed hamper a nonproliferation effort in various ways—for example, in a drastic worsening of Soviet-American relations or a major disruption of world oil production.

Yet the most important counter to pessimism about containing proliferation comes from the world's awareness of how bad actual proliferation would be. States which pretend to be indifferent or resigned to such nuclear weapons spread will quietly be making contributions to halting it.

The predominant approach to modeling OPEC behavior depends upon the assumption that economic self-interest provides the best predictor of the cartel's price and production strategy. With rational monopoly behavior, the exogenous characteristics of the oil market determine an optimal price path for the group. But OPEC members have diverse economic as well as political goals. And uncertainty about oil market responses provides substantial leeway to argue about what is optimal. An examination of the five key OPEC price decisions since 1973 shows that an operational code of advancing political priorities on Arab-Israeli issues while deflecting security challenges better explains Saudi Arabia's decision-making than the economic optimizing approach. Moreover, no economic formula alone is consistent with Saudi behavior. The balance of internal and external forces of a political or security character on Saudi leadership suggests more of a tilt toward price hawkishness than pure considerations of economic self-interest would indicate. This tilt is reinforced by a systematic weakness on the part of the U.S. government to exercise a sustained countervailing influence on the Kingdom on behalf of moderation.

The past fifteen years have seen two important developments in the international economic system: the rapid industrialization of many less developed countries (LDCs) and their increasing indebtedness to private financial institutions. Massive bank loans have been used to fund industrial growth in many LDCs; international financial markets have replaced multinational corporations as the Third World's most important source of private foreign capital. In four major borrowing countries—Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, and South Korea—the process of indebted industrialization has its roots in the internationalization of finance, the increasing role of the state, and the use of funds raised on the international capital markets to finance industrial development. The results include rapid expansions of LDC industrial production and LDC exports of manufactured products, as well as the formation of an implicit partnership between private financial institutions and state-capitalist elites in the Third World.

Since the Second World War complex and changing sets of norms and rules have governed trade relations among most countries. They have largely originated from a unique and accidental international organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). We have labeled these norms, rules, and decision-making mechanisms the GATT regime or global trade barriers regime. The importance that GATT members have attached to certain norms has shaped the regime's procedural mechanisms, rules, and implementation of rules. Classifying those norms as sovereignty or interdependence norms, we posit that the strength or autonomy of the regime can be established by analyzing the prominence of the interdependence norms in the issue area. We close by exploring some of the functions of the regime in international trade and political relations.

Three-and-a-half decades have passed since the energy of the atom was used in warfare. Yet rather than nuclear doom, the world has seen a surprising nuclear stability thus far. Equally remarkable is the fact that over the same period nuclear technology has spread to more than two score nations, yet only a small fraction have chosen to develop nuclear weaponry. A third notable point has been the development of an international nonproliferation regime—a set of rules, norms, and institutions, which haltingly and albeit imperfectly, has discouraged the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability.

The wrong policies in the 1980s—i.e., policies that put the United States in an overly rigid position on the nuclear fuel cycle or which lower the priority the United States gives to the issue in security terms—could still sacrifice the current modest success in regime maintenance. Unfortunately, there is no simple solution to the political problem of proliferation. But given the difficulty of constructing international institutions in a world of sovereign states, and the risks attendant upon their collapse, political wisdom begins with efforts to maintain the existing regime with its presumption against proliferation.

Third World debt grew very rapidly in the 1970s. Many states, faced with sharply higher costs for energy and manufactured imports, borrowed aggressively in unregulated offshore capital markets. But what constrains sovereign states to repay this debt to commercial banks? Creditors do not turn to their home states to enforce payment; rather, the supervision of sovereign debt is largely a function of commercial banking arrangements, especially lenders' syndicates, and the International Monetary Fund's conditional lending. This political structure, which involves unified private sanctions, has ensured that no state defaults unless it is insolvent or is willing to accept a radical rupture in its international commercial relationships. When the problem is insolvency, creditors routinely convene ad hoc conferences. In conjunction with an IMFapproved stabilization program, creditors can renegotiate debt-service schedules and provide new financing if necessary. These arrangements are distinctive among international economic regimes because they rely on nonstate actors as the primary source of rules, norms, and procedures.

The new politics of modernization in post-Mao China raises a variety of intriguing questions to ask and hypotheses to test in international relations research. This paper examines the normative and policy changes brought about by the impetus of the modernization drive at home and how these changes have affected Chinese foreign policy in general and Chinese global policy in particular. In pursuit of this line of inquiry, the institutional setting of international organizations, especially those concerned with global political, military, developmental, and functional issues, is chosen as a testing ground of Chinese global policy. The scope of the paper is largely limited to the Chinese global policy of the post-Mao period of 1977 - 1980. The paper attempts a normative-behavioral analysis concentrating on global geopolitical, developmental, and functional domains. By way of conclusion, the paper broadly assesses the implications of post-Mao Chinese global policy for the Third World's elusive pursuit of a new world order.

International civil aviation appears to be a pertinent yet largely overlooked issuearea to study in the light of recent discussions about the changing international system. In this article the evolution of the international aviation system from its inception early in this century is analyzed in terms of regime changes. Three different regime periods are delineated, and possible explanations of the observed regime changes are discussed. On the face of it, the development of international aviation seems to conform with the overall global trend toward complex interdependence. Yet it also raises a number of questions concerning interdependence that might be addressed in the study of other issue-areas. These concern the links between politico-economic issue-areas and military security, the degree of harmony or conflict associated with interdependence, and the role of states generally—and the United States in particular—under conditions of complex interdependence.

While nonproliferation is no longer in the focus of international attention in the aftermath of the Afghanistan crisis, the problem of checking the spread of nuclear weapons was the subject of an intense controversy between the United States and Europe throughout the 1970s.

Beginning with the Ford administration policy and continuing with the new Carter nonproliferation policy, a major nuclear controversy opposed the American and European nuclear suppliers.

The first area of controversy was the question of technological transfers to the Third World and the conditions for such transfers (embargoes on sensitive technology, IAEA safeguards). The controversy also spread into the area of the plutonium economy—i.e., breeders and reprocessing. On both of these questions, most of the problems raised in the 1970s are still open despite some rapprochement between European and American positions. Major points of disagreement remain in the aftermath of the INFCE: full scope safeguards, the question of breeder reactors, and plutonium economy. The major uncertainty for the future will be whether nuclear energy as a whole will remain in the present state of depression or whether nuclear programs throughout the world will grow again.

This paper examines the experience of developing countries in the three major regional financial institutions, the Inter-American, Asian, and African Development Banks. In the Inter-American Development Bank, members from developing countries have secured both influence and resources; in the Asian Development Bank they have secured resources but little influence; in the African Development Bank they have influence but limited resources. This variation can be explained by the different issue area power structures within which the banks function. The Inter-American Development Bank has functioned within a hegemonic structure. The dominant power, the United States, pursued long-term political objectives and accepted considerable autonomy for developing countries within the Bank. The Asian Development Bank has functioned within a bipolar structure with Japan playing an increasingly important role. As a normal power, Japan has pursued tangible economic interests and has constrained the behavior of the Asian Development Bank. Until the late 1970s the African Development Bank functioned in a multipolar structure that largely excluded nonregional countries. This exclusion made it impossible to generate substantial resources. Experience in the regional development banks suggests that a hegemonic structure can offer weaker states both resources and influence provided that the milieu goals of the dominant power are not violated.

How have UN human rights goals and priorities evolved in the 1970s? The moderate compromise represented by the International Bill of Rights, as completed by the Covenants in 1966, has been undone in the seventies. A point-by-point examination of the major principles enunciated in General Assembly resolution 32/130 of 16 December 1977, which codified the trends of the decade and stands as the authoritative statement of the UN's strategic goals and priorities in the field of human rights, shows that the earlier moderation has been replaced by a one-sided, politicized, and often cynical approach. This development in UN doctrine merits polemical criticism.

During the last decade dependency theory has emerged as an important, if highly controversial, perspective on contemporary North-South relations. This paper assesses the utility of dependency approaches by examining one concrete North-South relationship over an extended period, that between Commonwealth cane sugar producers and Great Britain. After detailing the origins of the colonial sugar trade and the later impact of British free trade policies, the article follows the evolution of British-Commonwealth sugar relations from the enactment of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in 1951 to the signing in 1975 of the Lome Convention's Sugar Protocol governing sugar imports into the enlarged Community. Two conclusions are drawn from this historical case study regarding the usefulness of dependency theory. First, dependency theorists exaggerate the cohesiveness of the posture of developed market economy countries toward the Third World. Second, dependency theory has too often neglected the need to explore realistic alternatives to dependency available to underdeveloped countries.

Does food aid enhance or diminish the nutritional status of recipient populations in less developed countries? In proposing that the long-term impact is negative, critics have argued that aid depresses local food production, is maldistributed and mismanaged such that it does not reach the needy in sufficient quantities, or, where effective, that aid merely reduces the death rate relative to the birth rate, permitting more people to survive at the margin of existence. This study explores the long-term impact of U.S. Public Law 480 food aid through a crossnational analysis of aggregate data on aid receipts and change in nutritional status over the period from 1962 through 1974. Alternative hypotheses are tested through least squares methods and.mean difference tests in the framework of a nonequivalent control group, quasi-experimental design. This study supports the following generalizations: food aid is significantly related with improved nutritional status; the greater the aid, the greater the improvement in nutrition; higher aid recipients do not have significantly lower rates of growth in domestic food production; higher aid recipients do not have higher rates of population growth; and food aid may lead to greater meat consumption among higher aid recipients. Negative effects, experienced in some countries at some times, are not systematically incurred by all food aid recipients over time. In general, food aid does improve nutrition.

Worldwide nuclear power reactor manufacturing capacity will exceed worldwide demand by a factor of two or more during the 1980s. Only in France and the Soviet bloc countries is it likely that the ambitious nuclear power programs formulated in the mid-1970s will be implemented. In all other developed countries and in most developing countries, further delays and cancellations of previously announced programs are all but certain.

The stalemate over the future of nuclear power is particularly deep in America. Administrative and personnel problems in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, slow progress on radioactive waste disposal by the Department of Energy, severe financial problems for most electric utilities, and drastic reductions in the rate of electricity demand growth combine to make continuation of the five-year-old moratorium on reactor orders inevitable. Many of the ninety plants under construction may never operate and some of the seventy in operation may shut down before the end of their economic life.

Contrary to widespread belief, further oil price increases may not speed up worldwide reactor sales. It is possible that the world is heading for a “worst” of all possible outcomes: a large number of small nuclear power programs that do little to meet real energy needs but substantially complicate the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation.

The New International Economic Order (N1EO) seeks fundamental change in international relations. World shipping has experienced substantial pressure for reforms associated with NIEO goals: controversy focuses around the operation of the liner conferences, the use of flags of convenience, which retain beneficial ownership in developed nations, and the demands of developing countries for a major share in the carriage of their imports and exports. UNCTAD, and in particular its Shipping Division headed by Adib al-Jadir, has become increasingly active in world shipping. The reforms urged through UNCTAD will have a significant impact on the fleets, maritime practices, and interests of the developed world. This study examines UNCTAD's aims in world shipping–the policies being urged, the factors under consideration, and the trends emerging from the operation of UNCTAD. It further examines developed states' attempts to shape, and their reactions to, UNCTAD policies, and the interests perceived to be at stake in the current debate on world shipping.

In early 1972 Canada participated in an international uranium cartel designed to control the world price and supply of uranium through a complex scheme of pricefixing and bid-rigging. This study focuses on Canada's role in the formation and operation of that cartel, the domestic political reaction when its existence was discovered, and the implications of this for Canadian-American relations. Domestic economic considerations were a major factor that led to a break with traditional Canadian foreign policy. Related to this are the close corporate connections between the Canadian and American uranium industry and the enormous impact of American domestic policies on Canada. The uranium case also offers support to the theory that transnational relations and other multinational processes threaten democratic control of foreign policy.

Eight generalizations are extracted from two partially competing perspectives (Johan Galtung's “feudal interaction” and Jorge Dominguez's “international fragmentation”) on center-periphery interaction patterns. Seven of these generalizations are tested by examining head of state, governmental and ministerial visits to and from the Arab world between 1946 and 1975. Neither perspective is fully supported or disconfirmed by the data. Dominguez's emphases on limited resources and local problems, however, which lead in turn to relatively high intra-subsystemic interaction between peripheral actors and changing center-periphery patterns, appear to provide a more accurate analytical base than does the static model, with its emphasis on high levels of asymmetry and concentration, advanced by Galtung. Further tests of the two perspectives will be necessary in order to assess fully the geographical scope and the type of interaction patterns covered by these diachronic findings.

The use of multinational institutional arrangements to control sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities has interested policymakers since the dawn of the nuclear age. Several such ventures have been tried during the past several decades, largely for economic, commercial, or technical reasons, and they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. More recently, with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, multinational arrangements have received increasing attention as a means of reinforcing international safeguards which, together with political commitments on peaceful use, have been the principal components of the nonproliferation regime.

The political acceptability and efficacy of multinational arrangements is related to the historic experience with multinational ventures, the changed political circumstances of the 1970s, and the probable requirements for constructive future cooperation. As part of a comprehensive regime covering the development of sensitive nuclear activities, multinational arrangements can reinforce the regime in a manner that is widely acceptable. A political effort to win support for such arrangements is thus worthwhile.