It has frequently been asserted that the financial problem of the United Nations is, in reality, a political problem. This proposition contains enough truth to serve us well, provided it is used not to dispose of the problem but to introduce serious consideration of it. Properly conceived, the political emphasis does not entail the denial of the meaningfulness and significance of the financial issue, but rather suggests the nature of the context within which that issue must be examined, and proposed solutions must be evaluated. Without an understanding of the political background of the fiscal difficulties of the United Nations and the political determinants of its future role in world affairs, one cannot deal intelligently with the problems and prospects of the Organization's treasury.

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice adopted by 9 votes to 5 on July 20, 1962, affirmed that the expenditures authorized for operations in the Congo (ONUC) by General Assembly resolutions from December 20, i960, to October 30, 1961, and the expenditures authorized for the operations of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East from November 26, 1956, to December 20, 1960, constitute “Expenses of the Organization” within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. Though the Court, for reasons discussed below, refrained from declaring it explicitly, the opinion had the effect of holding that Members of the UN were legally bound to pay the assessments made by the Assembly to defray the costs of the two operations. The Court arrived at this conclusion by a relatively simple process of reasoning: first, it found that the text of Article 17, paragraph 2, related to expenses incurred in carrying out the purposes of the Organization; second, it examined the expenditures referred to above, and found that they were incurred with that end in view; thirdly and finally, it examined arguments which had been advanced against its conclusion and found them without merit. Some of these arguments will be examined later.

The present critical stage of inter-American relations offers a timely occasion for an inquiring glance at the Organization of American States (OAS). For more than half a century—and particularly during the last two decades—the United States has increasingly adapted its policy toward Latin America to the principles and procedures of the Organization of American States, confident that such an approach would best serve our long-range objectives in the hemisphere. Yet the varying responses which the United States has gained from the regional agency when problems of high importance have been submitted to it constitute one of the most confusing aspects of our hemisphere relations. The last few years have provided a striking illustration of this point.

World War II taught Norway that she was dependent on international organization for her security. When it became evident to her that the UN, in which she had originally placed such high hopes, could not meet her needs on this score, she began exploring the possibilities of regional organization. After the failure of the negotiations for some kind of Scandinavian arrangement, or the decision not to enter into such an arrangement, forward-looking elements, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, turned their attention to the regional collective security organization which was ultimately established by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) treaty.

It is sometimes instructive, as Holmes long ago pointed out to Watson, to begin by asking a few questions about dogs that do not bark in the night. Suez and the Congo are not the only major crises which have disturbed the United Nations. Yet they are the only ones to which it has responded by creating a true United Nations force. Why?

There are many ways in which one could study what is frequently called the Atlantic Community. First, one could trace the history of proposals made in order to strengthen the bond between the United States and nations situated on the other side of the Atlantic. Such suggestions, whether they aimed at federal union or at a close alliance, came either from Britain or from the United States, were always centered on the “British-American connection,” and aimed at making the two great English-speaking peoples the magnet that would attract lesser breeds, the force whose strength and virtues would preserve law, order, and peace in the world. Although such blue-prints rarely left visible traces on official policy in the United States, they are significant, both because British policy since the war often appeared inspired by the hope, or the nostalgia, for a world of this hue, and because overtones of these earlier appeals may have crept into recent American tactics in support of Britain's application to the Common Market.

The North Atlantic Treaty has been in existence since April 4, 1949. Article 9 of this treaty gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the imposing headquarters on the edge of the Bois de Boulogne in Paris bear witness to its reality. In his chapter dealing with the nature of the Community, Stanley Hoffmann discusses the question of whether a true Atlantic Community exists outside the pages of the treaty. The present study will examine the existence of that Community insofar as two of its principal members are concerned: France and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The behavior of the Afro-Asian states on the Hungarian Question has been cited as an outstanding example of the discrepancy that exists between their moralistic pronouncements on international conduct and their true actions. It has also served to strengthen the view that they forma cohesive unit which is unduly solicitous of Soviet interests.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the perspectives which govern the opinions of French leaders toward the United Nations. Having identified these perspectives, we shall seek to characterize the differences between them in terms of their motivation, content, and outcome. Our objective is to qualify conventional stereotypes that have been more repeated than investigated, such as that “the French” are hostile to the UN because they are “nationalists”. While traditional nationalism is still a powerful political emotion in France, it is expressed in various ways among contemporary Frenchmen. The varieties of French nationalism today include—and the paradox is more apparent than real—both commitments to internationalism and loyalties to supranationalism.

At its founding one of the UN's most publicized advantages over its predecessor, the League of Nations, was the fact that it was a peace organization “with teeth.” This somewhat unattractive phrase referred to Chapter VII of the Charter and the possibility of military force being put at the disposal of the Security Council. In fact this provision of the Charter was one of the first victims of East-West disagreement, and, although the Military Staff Committee met regularly for many years and in the early years held voluminous discussions, the actual military arrangements foreseen in Chapter VII never became a reality. The assumption of the continuing unanimity of the great powers, which particularly affected this part of the Charter, proved to be illusory almost at once, while the idea that the Organization could not and should not take collective action against one of the great powers has continued, with the partial exception of Korea, to be respected. Thus it has become increasingly clear that the United Nations can neither deal with an aggression arising from a great-power conflict nor use the military resources of the great powers directly in dealing with other breaches of the peace, since such a use might all too easily project the great-power struggle onto the situation being dealt with. The development of new forms of peace-keeping machinery have in part been the response of the Organization to this dilemma.

The UN Secretariat has many international operations for which it must provide total or partial logistic support. Arrangements and provision must be made for about 500 conferences each year in various parts of the world. Support must be provided for the numerous offices of the Technical Assistance Board. The 35 information centers and the regional offices of the Economic and Social Council all place regular demands for support on the Secretariat. Support has been required for the many special political and peace-keeping missions—to mention a few, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, the Korean Reconstruction Agency, the UN Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, and visiting missions to trust territories.

The experience of participating in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in several different capacities, has acquainted me with the many management problems that faced the Organization in its first dozen years. The present article deals with some of these problems under four headings of unequal importance: UNESCO's functions, 2) the organization of its secretariat, 3) the relations of the Director-General with the legislative organs, and 4) personnel administration.

It would be difficult to imagine a more inappropriate moment for trying to assess the British role in the evolution of the Atlantic Community. Writing in May 1963, one is all too aware of the importance of the decisions that will still have to be taken to meet the situation that has arisen from the failure of Britain's application to join the Common Market. Both the protagonists of Britain's entry and the opponents of this move, however, drew closer together on at least one point as the long debate over the negotiations went on. Both sides agreed that the decision—one way or the other—would be a major turning point in Britain's history. Indeed, if we omit the crises of two world wars, it would be difficult to think of an adequate parallel. Even the bitterly contested repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840's— the event which is usually taken as signifying the triumph of industrial over agrarian Britain—was less far-reaching in its implications.

If, to misquote Harold Lasswell, one considers the study of politics to be the study of who gets what, when, and why, then this paper is a study of the politics of elections in the United Nations. Who gets what and when are easily discovered, since the results of elections and dates of elections are available in any United Nations Yearbook. The “why” is more difficult to determine. This paper is an attempt to analyze—by the use of empirical, numerical indices exclusively—why nations are elected to UN offices.

Of the many aspects of the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) that gave rise to controversy, some were unique and can reasonably be chalked up to novelty and inexperience. One, however, is as old as military history itself. This is the matter of political control of a force once it is in the field. Two levels are involved: first, control of the field operations by headquarters; second, control of the military force in the field by the civilian authority—in this case the representative of the Secretary-General.

Listed below is the membership of UN bodies for 1962. Unless otherwise noted, membership expires on December 31 of the year indicated in parentheses.

The General Assembly held its fourth special session, comprising the 1203rd–1205th plenary meetings, at UN Headquarters from May 14 through June 27, 1963. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) was elected President of the fourth special session by acclamation. At the same meeting Kuwait was admitted to membership.

When major plans for European or Atlantic integration are under discussion, European neutrals receive little attention. Much concern is expressed over the impact of the European Economic Community or of an Atlantic Community upon Latin America, Africa, or Asia, and considerable care is exercised to alleviate apprehension, to quiet fears, to subdue sharp reactions, and, finally, to prevent retaliatory action. But the situation of the small neutral European states is only mentioned in passing. In the last analysis, more consideration is shown for distant and often hostile neutralists than for neutral, but friendly, neighbors.