The spring of 2005 saw major set-backs for the Treaty of Rome of 29 October 2004, establishing what it calls ‘a Constitution for Europe’. On 29 May, the French rejected the Treaty in their referendum by 54,8% (turnout 70%). Then the Dutch rejected it on 1 June by an even more massive 61,7% (turnout 63%). In response to these refusals the member states agreed to a ‘reflection period’ and a suspension of the ratification deadline at the European Council of 16 and 17 June. In the subsequent 10 July Luxembourg referendum 56,2% of the electorate voted in favour (obligatory vote), a significant drop from polls in October 2004, but at least creating a simple majority of 13 member states to ratify the document. But the UK put its ratification on hold, followed by other countries.

On November 3, 2002, the Turkish elections brought an overwhelming victory for the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP), the first party since 1987 to secure a clear majority in Parliament. It triumphed on a ticket including Turkey's entry into the European Union. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing then grasped the occasion and his newfound status of Convention chairman to vent an old conviction (reported in Le Monde of 9 November) that Turkey's entry into the EU would be ‘the end of European Union’. It was a good thing that hardly anyone in the Convention took notice of this irrelevant and even irresponsible step. But in the eyes of the public a link between the Constitution and Turkey's accession had been established beyond doubt. It could only be undone by European leaders in power (first by Chirac) at the cost of heavy concessions to populist demands. France will have a separate referendum on Turkey and on other accessions thanks to a constitutional amendment (see Carcassonne's contribution to this issue). Other countries will follow no doubt.

The Danish ‘no’ after Maastricht. Key role of negotiations between political parties towards ‘national compromise’ with main ‘no’-party. Exceptions to be negotiated at Edinburgh. The Edinburgh Agreement as closing off alternative developments or options for Denmark. The legal status debated, but most probably of international agreement. Intensified parliamentary scrutiny as result. Particular circumstances made acceptance in a second referendum possible.

In importance for the Union's constitutional evolution, the October 2004 events at least equal the European Constitutional Convention, including the IGC. This is the idea behind the following tens of pages in this issue of EuConst devoted to their analysis. Eight authors have been involved in putting together this story, seven of whom are young researchers from different countries in the Union. Their participation allowed many national aspects of the drama to be brought out in a way which otherwise would have been impossible.

Between 11 March and 29 October 2004, between Madrid and Rome, the European Constitution has turned from an uncertain possibility into a certain (albeit not full) reality. The day of the Madrid train bombs killing 190 and wounding 1500 is as inseparable from the history of the Constitution as the date of its signature, 29 October. Those events of 11 March (and the ensuing government blunders) moved the Spanish people to end the reign of Aznar's Popular Party. This in turn unblocked the Constitution talks that had got gripped, among other things, due to Spanish intransigence in December.

In several ways the particular sequence or succession of events from 11 March to 29 October can also be seen as symbolic for this particular European Constitution. Let us select three angles: an historic, a formal and a substantive one.

‘The Cypriot Minister for Foreign Affairs, George Iacavou, asked in Luxembourg to maintain in the European Constitution project the quotation of the Greek historian Thucydides which had been crossed out in the last document of the Irish Presidency. According to AFP, Hellenists affirmed that the sentence (“our Constitution... is called a democracy because the power is in the hands not of a minority, but of the greatest number”) was badly translated and also that Thucydides was a disputed personality’.

Let us note that the translation was already modified by the Convention. The first version evoked ‘the whole people’, the ‘ultimate’, ‘the greatest number’. Until the last minute, the Preamble had been discussed. In the Convention, Robert Badinter, former president of the French constitutional Council, had already co-signed, on 3 June 2003, with the author of these lines and Pervenche Berès, a proposal for an amendment to the Preamble to remove the quotation of Thucydides. It did not seem suitable to us to place the Union under the auspices of the founder of realistic geopolitics, a kind of Kissinger of ancient Greece. Others say that they oppose this quotation because it refers to the power of the people, not that of States. The quotation finally disappeared during the Brussels summit on 17 and 18 June 2004. As we see, no word of the Preamble is left aside.

Meeting of constitutional form and matter. Matter in the sense of Machiavelli's ‘political life’, clashes between the establisment and the people. EU investiture struggle and its outcomes. Structural elements of the EU Constitution: authority, representation, political federalism.

Part One: Referenda required to amend Irish Constitution. Referenda on accession to EEC, the Single European Act, Maastricht and Amsterdam. Development by courts of rules for fairness of referendum campaigns. Referendum Acts and Referendum Commission.

Part Two: First Nice Referendum dominated by euro-anxiety, Irish neutrality and enlargement. Second referendum on same subject not unusual and acceptable according to domestic criteria. Concessions and clarifications. Effect on the Convention on the Future of Europe.

Part Three: implications for the Constitutional Treaty.

Italian governmental crisis at the origin of Rocco Buttiglione's nomination. Hearing before Civil Liberties committee and unprecedented rejection of Buttiglione. October events trigger changes in Italian governmental team. The EU: a Catholic conspiracy?

While the Union's powers and responsibilities are ever on the increase and co-operation deepens as the Union begins to take positions more easily in the areas of freedom, security, justice and defense, it is seeking to keep the Member States and the Union together via the duties of loyalty. These are spelled out in general terms in Article I-5, and in more specific terms in specific contexts, such as those of the Common Foreign and Security Policy [Article I-15(2)]. Article I-5 is entitled ‘Relations between the Union and the Member States’, but it is also central to the relations between the Member States themselves in terms, for example, of the exercise of their voting rights in the Council of Ministers. The Article consolidates provisions that are currently scattered over various Treaties but not without adding some novelties.

On 21 September 1792, at Danton's proposal, the French National Assembly declared that ‘there can be no constitution but one approved by the people’. In France, the idea of direct democracy dates back to the Revolution. However, due to the Terror and the practice under Napoleonic Empires, in which they were turned into plebiscites, referendums acquired a negative connotation. Under the Vth Republic, De Gaulle turned referendums into an instrument of personalisation and presidentialisation, and since his day, there have been few referendums staged. In 10 years of office, President Jacques Chirac only used it twice with much less success and political courage.

Origin of referendum discussion in the Convention. The national debate on referenda. The crucial role of the liberal party. Referendum bill private members initiative. Referendum Act an ad hoc consultative referendum. Referendum the first opportunity for a broad political debate on the EU. Complacency and disorganised arguments of the ‘yes’ campaign. First analyses of referendum.

Kovács's survival in the Barroso Commission through change of portfolio. Result of Hungarian and European party politics. Interconnected fates of various Commissioners.

While the Nice Treaty cast a shadow over the Convention's work on the institutions and led to the project's first failure in the Brussels Summit, the war in Iraq cast shadows over the common foreign and security agenda. On the one hand, it proved the extent to which Europe is divided over substantive positions and over the means to act, particularly the resort to war. On the other hand, there is an increased popular sense that Europe should play a role (reflected in Eurobarometer polls, including one especially commissioned by Giscard). Article I-40 of the Draft Constitution on defence reflects that ambition. It remains to be seen whether this facilitates Europe to unite when it comes to giving foreign policy teeth in the form of a real and effective common ‘defence’ policy.

As with most other provisions of the Constitution, Article I-40 in the main builds on and consolidates the texts as we already have them in the existing Treaties, but at the same time, it innovates.

Now that the EU Constitution has been adopted, one might be inclined to think that the debate on the position of human rights in the legal order of the European Union has come to an end. For more than 25 years academics and politicians have discussed the desirability of EC/EU accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and have argued for or against a separate bill of fundamental rights. That is all over now: Article I-7 of the Constitution provides for Union accession to the European Convention, whereas part II incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

It would seem, therefore, that a solid framework for the protection of human rights in the EU legal order has been put in place. The rest will be a matter of implementation: taking fundamental rights into account when drafting and executing European legislation; invoking these rights before the Court of Justice; lodging complaints with the European Court of Human Rights when the EU institutions, despite everything, failed to secure these rights. All very important, albeit that some may find the daily application of human rights not as sexy as the large constitutional questions of the past.

So is this the ‘end of history’ for human rights? Quite the opposite. The best is yet to come!

British successes and failures in Barroso Drama. Several reasons for Blair's support for nomination Barroso. Blair's personal choice for Peter Mandelson. Ambivalence in Mandelson's action during the affair. Pressure from London on MEPs.

Dutch government disoriented and confused. Confusion and surprise are normal. Confusion becomes visible. Gapap between authorities and people is part of political life. Citizenship aspects. Citizenship cannot be produced. Community of fate. Institutions and routines needed.

Fluctuating French media attention for Barroso's drama. Chirac's support for Manuel Barroso. Appointment of European Commission and French Constitution. French debate on candidacy Barrot and the assigned transport portfolio. Offer extreme right party to save Barroso's team. The unmentioned embezzlement.

There is considerable flexibility in the use of the term ‘social rights’. The list of such rights varies in international documents, and it is difficult to find a common denominator or ground for classification for what are called social rights. A further standard problem is that not all social rights have the legal nature of more traditional civil and political rights. Social rights entail claims that are neither necessarily individual nor necessarily enforceable in court, at least not in the sense that they will result in remedies available to identifiable rights holders. Hereinafter, social rights refer to rights that are related to social status, including status rights that are applicable to the economic sphere (rights related to work are often discussed as economic rights, i.e., rights in the economy). Such status rights might apply to all in a given circumstance (e.g., a social subsistence minimum that applies to all who are in need) or they might be specific. In the latter case, the social status is related to a condition that one cannot change voluntarily, at least not in the short run (e.g., motherhood, or being a child, an orphan, or handicapped).