In the standard English-language reference work, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards (New York and London, 1967), we find the following blunt statement on the subject of “orthodox Marxism's” theory of knowledge:

Its epistemology is naive representationism.

The use of the word “naive” will alert the reader to the unsurprising fact that the reference here is a definitely unfriendly one. More interesting is the way in which this characterization, based on an interpretation of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, has become generally accepted in English-speaking philosophical circles over the past forty years. The purpose of the present article is to explain the representationalist interpretation, challenge it in favour of an alternative reading of Lenin's text, and make some substantive comments on issues arising from the philosophical debate between the representationalist and anti-representationalist positions outlined.

Soixante-dix ans environ séparent le Discours véritable contre les chrétiens (c. 180) du Contre l'écrit de Celse intitulé Discours véritable (248). Origène ne tient pas compte de cette distance historique: il discute au présent. Or, la situation de la culture païenne n'est plus exactement la même qu'au siècle précédent. La dynastie des Sévères s'effondre dans le désordre. La pensée s'appauvrit jusqu'à devenir «un Sahara littéraire» selon l'expression tranchante de Ferdinand Lot. De leur côté, les chrétiens ont gagné du terrain et leur recrutement s'est modifié: désormais ils comptent dans leurs rangs des lettrés capables d'articuler la doctrine. Au siècle des apologètes succède celui des premiers théologiens. Cependant, bien que les interlocuteurs de Celse aient changé, païens et Chrétiens se situent dans la continuité de leur courant respectif. On pourrait résumer la situation en disant que le paganisme continue de s'effriter tandis que le christianisme se définit lentement.

In the Principles of Philosophy the first positive claim that Descartes makes after he has established his skeptical starting point is not the claim of the cogito. It is, rather, the claim that “we possess a free will.”

In the seventeenth century, the concept of natural law was linked with that of “innate ideas”. Natural laws were said to be ideas imprinted by nature or by God on men's minds and were the very foundation of religion and morality. Locke's attack on innate ideas in the first book of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is therefore considered to be an assault on natural law. Modern critics like Peter Laslett, W. von Leyden and Philip Abrams are of the opinion that Locke's critique of innate ideas in the Essay cannot be reconciled with the concept of natural law in the Two Treatises of Government.

G.E. Moore divided his well-known essay, “Is Existence a Predicate?” into two parts. The first has become famous as an early example of “ordinary language” analysis, while the second (a mere 2½ pages) has been universally neglected, for what appear to be several obvious reasons:

(1) Moore's arguments in Part I are forthright and seem decisive. He deploys grammar and logic to show how the sentence ‘Tame tigers exist’ differs from ‘Tame tigers growl’, and thus to answer convincingly the question posed by the essay's title. By contrast, the arguments of Part II are compressed, tentative and obscure. It seems neither an obvious nor a needed sequel to Part I.

Philosophers no longer argue whether Hume ever read Berkeley, yet some remain puzzled as to why so little of Berkeley appears in Hume's works. Professor Popkin has remarked that even “where Hume and Berkeley come closest to discussing the same subject or holding the same view, Hume neither uses Berkeley's terms nor refers to him.” An apparent exception to this generalization is Berkeley's doctrine of minima sensibilia, for both philosophers use this term to denote indivisible sensible points, and both invoke such points in order to show that sensible extension is not infinitely divisible. Yet it has been suggested that, although Berkeley and Hume employ the same terms, they nevertheless maintain different doctrines: Hume's minima are unextended, whereas Berkeley's are extended.

There have recently appeared some studies in which Aristotle's views on science are related to modern philosophical issues and distinctions, some articles in which a return to at least some of his ideas is suggested as a solution to certain modern problems, and also some advocacy of the essentialism or modal realism that is historically associated with the Aristotelian tradition.

Cette rupture est nécessaire si l'on veut que la sémiologie, ou étude des «signes» (au sens inclusif), dépasse le stade préparatoire où elle se cantonne jusqu'aujourd'hui. La sémiologie (la sémiotique) doit entrer dans ce qu'on pourrait appeler son troisième âge; après avoir été constituée d'abord par des réflexions isolées et sporadiques sur la nature des signes ; après avoir été, ensuite, ramenée à la linguistique, partie dévorante qui occulte de tout, – elle doit s'émanciper en une discipline autonome, fondée sur la distinction entre signes etsymboles.

Do we still have a Cartesian mind-body problem? Folk wisdom has it that Descartes is responsible for there being a mind-body problem. Nonetheless, the same folk wisdom has it that the mind-body problem is still with us. Discovering the culprit and his modus operandi has not apparently enabled us to neutralize his mischief. How can that be? Perhaps it is because the mind-body problem we have now is not the infamous one of Cartesian origins.

In the present paper I propose to examine St. Thomas Aquinas' third way of proving the existence of a God (henceforth TW), keeping in view and applying the proposals I have made elsewhere concerning the number andorder of the “Five Ways” and the role therein played by TW. I maintain that the first three ways take as starting-points the three types of act or actuality presented by Aristotle in Metaphysics 9.6: that the first way starts from imperfect actuality (motion), the second from secondary actuality (action or efficiency), and TW from primary actuality (being, or substantial actuality). The idea, of course, of a way of proving the existence of a God is that one proceeds from an effect, itself better known to us than its cause, to a knowledge of the existence of the cause. The problem is to develop a vision of the effect as an effect, i.e., a vision such as to reveal dependence on another, and so lead us in knowledge to the existence of that other.

Dans un célèbre ouvrage sur Contemplation et Vie contemplative selon Platon, A.J. Festugière donnait de la dialectique platonicienne une interprétation selon laquelle celle-ci constituait une véritable expérience mystique possédant presque tous les traits de la contemplation chrétienne. La dialectique platonicienne y était présentée, surtout dans son acte final, comme une sorte d'extase, une union d'ordre mystique, un contact de l'âme perdue dans son objet, contact qui suscite en elle un sentiment qui dépasse tout l'ordre normal de la connaissance. Le Bien ou l'Un en tant qu'objet dernier de l'ascension dialectique y était conçu comme quelque chose d'ineffable et d'indéfinissable.

When we critically investigate a moral theory, such as utilitarianism, we are interested not only in the moral judgments such a theory would yield, but also in the attitudes and actions characteristic of the moral practitioner, in this case a utilitarian. For moral theories must be practical. Such theories can be distinguished in part from each other on the basis of he practices and attitudes adopted by their adherents. So it is fair to ask of any moral theory two basic questions: (i) is the theory ‘practicable’ and (ii), if it is, does its practice seem moral? If (i) a moral theory is not practicable because, say, its practice frustrates its intention, then that theory as it stands is not acceptable as a moral theory. If (ii) it is practicable but its characteristic practices seem immoral (e.g. the theory's practice involves routine lying and cheating), then at best the theory stands in need of some defence by its advocates. They may either explain away the appearance of immorality by showing that contrary to first impressions the practices are not opposed to our untutored moral views, or that our untutored moral views are more questionable than the theory's practices (e.g. our everyday practices are inconsistent with each other).

When we discuss Kant's views on immortality we are walking in the by-ways of Kantian exegesis. Kant's views on immortality are interesting in themselves, but even within the Kantian framework, they do not affect other topics of importance. It is true that Kant felt that the possibility of immortality was necessary for certain moral manoeuvres to be possible, but he thought that the existence of God was even more essential, so that particular battle is lost regardless. On the other hand, some at least of Kant's views are shared by other people, and if he is wrong, not just over points of detail, but in a thoroughgoing way, that might be worth pointing out, and notjust as a matter of exegesis. And, I shall try to show, Kant is not only wrong, but necessarily wrong. Not only is his version of immortality impossible, but any version resembling his is also impossible. I shall discuss the topic under three main headings: first, I shall mention the views which led Kant to his doctrine of immortality; secondly, I shall try to bring out some of the important points which his doctrine involves; and, finally, I shall indulge briefly in what I hope will be the - by then - fairly superfluous task of showing why such a doctrine won't, after all do.

In acting freely and being held responsible, (Dialogue, 1973), I said it seemed to me that people who took widely divergent approaches to the freedom controversy nevertheless scarcely doubted the principle that only for actions freely done can a person be held responsible; and I presented a line of argument against that principle.

In the last few years a broad debate has taken place in books and journals about the time of action. Many different views have been propounded, and many an ingenious argument has been devised. I submit that those views are insightful but that the arguments have been misplaced. The views are at bottom compatible, for they differ in what they call ‘action’. I propose that our conception of action is so enveloped in conventions that there is no factual issue, per se, about the time and place of human action. There are actually several layers of conventionality involved in our timing and placing of actions. The crucial philosophical issues pertain to the clarification of those conventional layers. Among these issues are: (i) What are the conventions involved in timing and locating actions? (ii) What is the rationale for those conventions? (iii) Is that rationale sufficient to show the usefulness of those conventions? (iv) Can and should those conventions be improved upon?

Aucune théorie n'est probablement en mesure de rendre compte systématiquement des usages que philosophes et savants ont fait et font du mot « concept», car ces usages sont divers et certains d'entre eux incohérents. Eliminons d'emblée certaines interprétations, qui, d'ailleurs, comme c'est le cas pour 1'interprétation de Hegel, entrent en conflit avec le principe de non-contradiction. On pourra alors introduire un certain ordre dans cette diversité, à condition de suivre les deux principes suivants. 1°) On assignera au concept un niveau déterminé, qui dépend de son mode de communication. 2°) Caractéres, experience et acquisition du concept sont, à leur tour, relatifs à son niveau particulier.

Que la théorie de la « double vérité » n'a jamais été soutenue par les aristotéliciens radicaux du moyen âge est une certitude déjà acquise par les historiens. Le terme même d' « averroïstes » par lequel on les identifiait a été sérieusement mis en cause. Pourtant, il est évident que les maîtres és arts de Paris, dans la deuxième moitié du XIIIe siécle, ont éprouvé des difficultés considérables à mettre en harmonie les vérités de foi et les conclusions du raisonnement philosophique. Comment se posait ce conflit et quelle voie de réconciliation ont-ils cherchée ? Deux ouvrages récents nous donnent l'occasion de reprendre ce problème qui a fait déjà couler beaucoup d'encre dans l'historiographie du XXe siècle. Il s'agit de la monographie monumentale de M. Van Steenberghen sur Siger de Brabant et l'étude fondamentale de M.R. Hissette sur la condamnation de 1277.

In the preceding article John Hunter attempts to show that my criticisms of his position on freedom and responsibility are defective.

Hunter believes that (what he calls) my first criticism is directed against his explanation of why so many people have come to believe in the freedom principle (i.e. the principle that freedom is necessary for moral responsibility). But at no point in my paper do I even consider the merit of that explanation. What Hunter calls my first criticism is in fact merely a preliminary point I make before attacking his arguments against the freedom principle itself. The preliminary point is that in evaluating Hunter's arguments one must bear the following in mind: in some of the examples of unfreedom he provides it is doubtful that the actions are unfree at all; they are at best borderline cases of unfree acts.

As the sixteenth Century drew to a close, the human race teetered at the brink of an unprecedented intellectual revolution. The Aristotelean conception of a small, spherical, Earth-centered cosmos ceased to confine the imagination of an increasing number of thinkers; the recently proposed Copernican system, problematic though it was, sketched a provocative alternative with some real explanatory advantages (e.g., its uniform explanation of the existence, amount, and timing of retrograde motions); and distinct intellectual currents converged in the growing search for a new dynamics that would encompass at once all motion, superlunary and sublunary. In the event, the cosmology, the planetary astronomy, and the dynamics finally came together in Newton's uniquely coherent synthesis, and by the dawn of the eighteenth century we had exchanged the dubious comfort of Aristotle's enveloping egg for the more chilling contemplation of a spatially infinite universe.

The recent literature has seriously challenged, and in my view defeated, the traditional representationalist interpretation of Descartes. One contributor to it, John Yolton, has recently extended its arguments to argue that the traditional representationalist interpretation of Locke must be relinquished as well, that Locke, following the Cartesian path of Arnauld, held a semiotic theory of ideas which “de-ontologized” them and construed them as signs or cues in the direct perception of physical objects. The Cartesian support for this view, especially in La Dioptrique, has been questioned by R.F. McRae, who argues that “if Locke accepts Descartes' theory of vision, then Descartes' conception of sensations as signs provides no support for the direct realist interpretation of Locke.” My aim here is not to resolve the representationalism issue, but to show the irrelevance to it of the kinds of questions the Yolton-McRae exchange raises concerning sense perception. I shall try to show that there stems from Descartes a single account of those questions the essentials of which are embedded in theories falling on both sides of the representationalism issue. That single account involves a theory of judgment and vision, especially of distance, which in the case of Malebranche and Berkeley, even involves the same confusions.