Although there are numerous studies of political parties the political science of parties remains underdeveloped. Even if the recent attempts at redefinition are not without interest, most situate themselves outside the mainstream of political theory and do not bear sufficiently on the problematical aspects of power and of government. To develop a true political science of parties one has to be able to respond to three questions which seem central to a political scientist's concern with parties: who governs in the parties? do the parties really govern? how do the governmental or non-governmental actions of parties affect the society and the support which they obtain there? From these three questions emerge the notions of the leadership power (or internal power), governmental power, and societal power (electoral or non-electoral) of political parties. After a definition of government based on a cybernetic model and a logical definition of power are presented, the notions of leadership power, governmental power, and societal power are successively analysed for the purpose of making them operational. The last part of the article deals with the interdependence of these three powers. It aims at outlining a political theory of parties by drawing together a number of propositions which have hitherto appeared unrelated.

After briefly pointing out the weakness of participation at the core of the Regional Committees for Economic Expansion (CREE), the author analyses in depth the notion of participation as it has existed in France since the administrative reform of March 14, 1964, within the Commissions of Regional Economic Development (CODER).

Having touched on the place occupied by and the role played by these organizations throughout the process of elaboration, execution, and control of the plan at the regional districts level, the author then turns to an examination of the composition and function of these consultative processes.

As far as the composition of the CODER is concerned, the article deals with three main features: the tripartite nature of the commissions; the imbalance of forces particularly to the detriment of the trade unions; and the major reforms capable of improving the representativeness of the commission.

Regarding the functioning of the CODERs, the author, having described the vast range of duties which are devolved on them by the texts, puts into perspective the extreme weakness of their “powers” in contrast to the unquestionable authority of the regional prefect. Thus, the CODERs are described as bodies directly under prefectorial control, veritable registry offices deeply divided at their centre, without real expertise and without great impact on public opinion.

At the end of the study the author recalls the abortive attempt at regional reform on April 27, 1969, and concludes that it will be necessary to set to work on a far-reaching reform in order to get France on the road towards real democratization of the process of regional planning.

There are two types of budgetary theory, those based on economic rationality and those based on political rationality. In the lineage of the first of these theory types there appeared a few years ago a new management approach and a new decision-making approach, with a view to rationalizing budgetary choices. The article discusses these two approaches as they have been applied in the United States, Canada, and Quebec. The author shows in conclusion that the PPB system is not the miracle solution that it is often considered to be and that it poses a major problem of knowing who ought to define the needs and objectives of a society.

The author explores the socio-political implications of the rule of the incompatibility of ministerial functions with the member's mandate in political systems of the parliamentary type. Taking as a hypothesis recourse to the aforesaid norm of the system, he tries to highlight the sociological factors that shape the decision-making capacity of the system's authorities as well as the sources of legitimation of their value-allocating functions.

At the conceptual level the model rests on the identification of five variables: the incompatibility rule (A); strengthening of the executive (B); technological rationality (C); decision-making capacity (D); and sociological legitimacy (E). He explores, in another connection, different linkages between these variables, accenting particularly the relations A → D and A → E.

From the methodological point of view, the present analysis relies on both inductive and deductive reasoning. Resting, in effect, on an observation of the French case which reduces incidents to their historical-political essentials and which separates out certain general socio-political aspects of the incompatibility rule, the author permits himself some generalizations expressed in terms of provisional hypotheses, the verification of which, it should be emphasized, would require “longitudinal” historical-political studies and comparative analyses of decision-making.

In conclusion, the author states that the advance in schematization which this study represents is limited to the formulation of a “pre-model” whose essential purpose is to make available to those who have become interested in the sociological analysis of the components of this problem the variables which seem to permit the ultimate reconstitution of the observed phenomenon: the exploration of the specific way in which the designated variables are related to one another, the identification of the rules covering their interaction, and evaluation of the intensity of factors which affect them constitute the principal levels of development of this theoretical framework.

It is the contention of Robert Paul Wolff that we live under governments which have no right to govern us. Most of us of course believe that our governments have legitimate authority. We believe that by far the greater part of what our governments require of us they have the authority to require. Wolff insists that it does not follow from our belief that most, or at least many, governments rightfully govern, that in fact any government rightfully governs. He is right of course; it does not follow, unless our beliefs are true. And we might be mistaken. The question is, are we?