In this work, the author has sought to examine the political role of Ilya Ehrenburg in the strategy of détente pursued by Khruschchev from 1958 to 1962. The approach taken by the Soviet intellectual in support of the initiatives of his leader is put in its true perspective: a struggle between the conservatives and the liberals who, in the USSR as in the midst of the international communist movement, seek to thwart the efforts of the Soviet Party's first secretary. The opposing tactics to the latter are outlined: encouragement is shown to those who, in Moscow as among the other communist parties, subscribe to the plans of the Kremlin's chief. Finally, an attempted explanation for the failure of Ehrenburg's initiatives in favour of the policies of Khrushchev is outlined.

The object of this article is to inquire into the heuristic capacity of Easton's model of analysis. If one accepts that from an epistemological point of view there is an articulation between historically situated social practice and the formulation of concepts which attempt to represent and explain a particular situation, one is then led to question whether a theory produced in this way is capable of comprehending a different social reality which corresponds to other parameters of time and space and which is therefore characterized by a totally different problematic.

After having set out the hypotheses and the logic inherent in the Eastonian model, the authors apply these to a stateless society—that of the Adioukrou. They then proceed to suggest the limitations of the definition of the “political” contained in this model which is based on a specific definition of the division of labour. Without denying the existence of the political in stateless societies, the authors argue that the hypothesis of functional differentiation cannot be applied in all cases and therefore cannot be taken for granted; that one cannot identify the boundaries of the “political” in such societies and finally that one cannot speak of the specialization of functions within different systems in any transferable or automatic sense. In a society based on lineages such as that of the Adioukrou where the organization of production is based on the village community and where there is absence of the appropriation of the means of production on a private basis, it is impossible to identify the specificity of the “political” as opposed to other areas of social interactions.

Arend Lijphart has launched a stimulating line of inquiry by calling attention to certain affinities between consociational democracy and federalism (above, pages 499–515), but in my opinion the analysis can become still more interesting if we introduce a third element to the comparison. I refer to the rapidly burgeoning literature of the past five years around the phenomena that have been variously and rather tentatively labelled as “neo-corporatism,” “societal corporatism” or “liberal corporatism.” The purpose of this brief note is not to evaluate nor even to summarize that literature, but to draw attention to certain points of contact between the patterns that it describes and the consociational and federal models discussed above. In making this tripartite comparison we may be led to examine more carefully the significance of alternative sites or arenas for making policy and resolving conflicts, and the different patterns and strategies of bargaining appropriate to different sites.

Growth and Repression, the Ambiguous Logic of the Dependent State: The Case of Brazil

The often intuitive association between the army and foreign capitalists alters the analysis of the condition of dependency and the nature of the dependent State. We intend to shed light on the importance of the Brazilian State's autonomy, in the face of foreign domination and local capitalists. This autonomy is strengthened by the fundamental shift noticed between the economic decision-making system and the method of political control. The link between political domination and economic decisions is found in the State; it lies in the association between the army and the civil technocracy. Our study shows that this association is based on a distribution of power within the state, that it is characterized by conflict, and thus that it requires bargaining. The difficulties encountered by the government, led by General Geisel (197479), reflect the contradictions of that association.

Our purpose here is not to improve a typology and to advance subtle distinctions that would allow us to measure the present gap between the Brazilian regime and a democratic system, or the slight divergence that distinguishes it from a totalitarian government. Such an exercise appears to be of limited interest. The objectives of this study are to determine the nature of the Brazilian State—by a careful study of its political structure—and to identify social changes resulting from dependent dēvelopment.

Actors and Strategies in the Economic Integration Process in Latin America

This article examines two forms of economic integration in Latin America: the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Andean Pact. Although inspired by the work of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and, theoretically, having as the principal actors in the integration process both the industrial bourgeoisie and the State, these two forms of integration have had different results.

LAFTA was created in the early 1960's at a time when the most developed countries of the region began policies of import substitution of essential goods. The analysts of ECLA expected that the dynamism of the industrial bourgeoisie would lead the integration process. The state would only subsidize the “deficiencies” of private enterprise, and would intervene only at the level of joint planning. But for the industrial bourgeoisie, it was not the appropriate time to begin creating integrated economies, either at the national or regional levels. Their primary concern was to develop the connections with the bourgeoisie of the western industrial countries.

The Andean Pact was created at the end of the I960's among countries in which the industrial bourgeoisie was weak or virtually nonexistent. The leadership of the integration process thus devolved upon the State. The new dynamism of integration had three actors: the state, multinational corporations, and the industrial bourgeoisie. Integration should be conceived not only as a means of amalgamating the economies of the members, but also as a mechanism to strengthen the bargaining position of the main actors vis-a-vis the multinational corporations. Integration, in short, is conceived as an instrument for the renegotiation of dependency.