The story of Orestes in Pindar's Pythian XI presents two problems. First, there is the manner of its introduction; as Wilamowitz says, ‘ganz ausserlich ist die Verbindung mit dem Mythos.’ After praising the victory of the Theban Thrasydaeus in the Pythian Games Pindar moves with astonishing abruptness to the story of Agamemnon's death and the vengeance of Orestes. At first sight nothing could be more superficial than the way in which Pindar passes to the myth. Thrasydaeus has glorified his home

⋯ν ⋯φνεαῖς ⋯ραισι πυλ⋯δ

νικ⋯ν ξ⋯νου Λ⋯κωνος 'ο;ρ⋯στα,

τ⋯ν δ⋯ φονευομ⋯νου πατρ⋯ς κτλ.

The metaphor is derived from archery. The epithet πτερόεɩς is appropriate to arrows [πτερόεντες ỏịστοί E 171, ỉờν ἰβλ⋯τα πτερόεντα Δ 117, ἰοì πτερόεντες π 773, ἰ⋯ πτερόεντα ϒ 68]. Just as ἰ⋯ πτερόεντα means ‘feathered arrows,’ so ἔπεα πτερόεντα means ‘feathered words.’ The early Greeks, when they formed a picture of words in their minds, thought of them as missiles—not as birds. Whence ‘to utter’ words is ἱέναɩ or ⋯ϕɩέναɩ. Missiles so light are more readily imagined as arrows than as spears or stones.

H. Jacobsohn, a pupil of Leo, in a Göttingen dissertation of 1904, ‘Quaestiones Plautinae’ declared that Plautus allowed Hiatus and Syllaba Anceps at two places in the line (these places are now called loci Jacobsohniani):—

(i) at the fourth arsis of the Iambic Senarius (and the corresponding part of the Trochaic Septenarius),

(ii) at the second arsis of a Trochaic Septenarius.

I begin with a paraphrase of Plato Laws X 887de, which has suggested the arguments to be developed in this brief article. ‘The Athenian’ speaks to the following effect:

‘How can one admonish in all patience those who deny the existence of gods ? For no sufficient reason they disbelieve the myths which, in infancy, they heard from nurses and mothers in sportive or in serious vein. They disbelieve also those myths which, at sacrifices, from boyhood onwards, they heard recounted in prayers and saw represented in spectacles. They reject the testimony of their own parents, nay, of all Greeks and barbarians, who by continual prayer and worship show clearly their unanimous belief in the existence of gods. Despising all these things, they lay on us the burden of refuting by reasoned argument their perverse opinions.’

In this paper I am merely analysing the meaning of Phaedo 99–107 without discussing either its historical significance or its value as a contribution to the logic of science. The paper attempts in fact to be little more than a paraphrase of the Greek, which aims only at accuracy of statement, but I am adding in the third section a note on the relation of this passage to the discussion of method in Republic VI, mainly in order to minimize its relevance. The first section of the paper deals with the linguistic analysis of the text, the second, very sketchily, with the general doctrine.

In the ontology of the Philebus (23C–30E) νο⋯σ is the αἰτία τ⋯ς συμμ⋯ξεωσ, the cause (called also τ⋯ δημιουργο⋯ν and τ⋯ ποιο⋯ν) that combines π⋯ρας with ἃπειρον into the mixture called γ⋯νεσισ εἰς οὐσ⋯αν or γεγενημ⋯νη οὐσ⋯α: correspondingly in the Timaeus the Demiurge, ⋯ ἃριστος τ⋯ν αἰτι⋯ν (29A), brings order into unordered chaos by ‘Forms and Numbers’ (διεσχηματ⋯σατο εἴδεσι κα⋯ ⋯ριθμοῖς 53B). In the Philebus the Universe has a Soul, discriminated from the νο⋯ς that causes it (30B, where it is argued that we cannot imagine that the αἰτ⋯α, while it provides our human bodies with a soul, does not ‘devise that which is fairest and most precious’ in the body of the Universe: οὐ γ⋯ρ που δοκο⋯μ⋯ν γε … ⋯ν το⋯τοις δ' οὐκ ἃρα μεμηχαν⋯σθαι τ⋯ν τ⋯ν καλλ⋯στων κα⋯ τιμιωτ⋯των φ' σιν): correspondingly in the Timaeus the Demiurge devises (⋯μηχαν⋯σατο 34c) a soul of the world, as well as its body.

Two papyri ascribe this poem to Sappho (P. Oxy. 1232 and P. Oxy. 2076); Athenaeus (XI. 4600) attributes v. 10 to her; Philostratos (Imag. II. i, p. 62) attributes v. 30 to her. In three of these places the poem is assigned to her Second Book. Perhaps it is true that hardly any other poem of Sappho is so often ascribed to her by antiquity. This admittedly proves no more than that the poem was certainly handed down in the Sappho-book in antiquity: it does not necessarily prove its authenticity. But at least it settles the burden of proof on those who would deny that Sappho wrote it. Now it has been thought that certain arguments can be employed to justify the overthrow of ancient testimonies. If, however, these arguments should proveto be fallacious or insufficient, the poem will automatically be reascribed to Sappho.

Parisinus suppl. gr. 256 was written, to judge from the hand, not long after 1300. As far as the end of book VI the writer copied both text and scholia from a descendant of M. At that point another MS. came into his hands. This was no other than that ancestor of J which, as we saw on p. 87, had received valuable readings from the source ω. From this MS. the scribe now corrected what he had already written, copied the two remaining books, and added the two Lives before the text and the Epistula Dionysii ad Ammaeum after it. (That he went on to copy Demosthenes‘ Philippics and other works, and bound them up with the Thucydides, is not our concern.) From 1—for so, after Dain (see p. 86 n.), I shall style our MS.—was copied the MS. from which, after it had been perfunctorily corrected from another source, was copied X (p. 91).

The problem suggested by this passage cannot be properly appreciated unless it is shown first of all that the treatment of poetry and art in the Laws fundamentally agrees with, though of course in some respects it provides a welcome supplement to, the attitude set forth in the Republic and elsewhere by Plato. The demand that music and poetry should ‘imitate’ the good; and that this ‘imitation’ should have meaning and accuracy, and be free from mere emotionalism (655–9, 667 sqq.) directly recalls the doctrine of the Republic (e.g. 395, 401) and other dialogues on the two kinds of imitation, which I have explained in the Classical Quarterly XXII p. 16, XXVI p. 161; the reason for the demand is the same—the imitation of evil has the same effect on character as the companionship of evil men. As for the effect of this ruling on comedy, the Republic (396e where παιδιᾶς χάριν leaves a loop-hole, 606c) is perhaps not over-clear. But the Laws explains that the comic art is to some extent valuable; its pictures of the ludicrous serve as a warning, and also help to make goodness more intelligible by setting it in relief; hence comedy may be performed for the edification of citizens by slaves or hired aliens (816) under certain restrictions such as that a piece shall not have too long a run (England on 8i6e 9) and that no ridicule of free men is to be permitted (935–6). On tragedy the two dialogues are in full agreement; it must become once more a hymn (Rep. 607a), using for a good purpose those forms of dramatic representation which are allowed to the poet in Rep. 396, and avoiding the mournful and complaining language (and music) of profane tragedy, which merely harrows the feelings and which cannot be used without blasphemy at a festival of the gods (Rep. 383bc, 605–6, Laws 800, 817).

Towards the conclusion of his interesting remarks (C.Q. XXX, 1–3) on the meaning of the Homeric phrase, τῇ δ' ἄπτερος ἔπλετο μ⋯θος, Professor J. A. K. Thomson writes, ‘When a classical author uses the word ἄπτερος it means “wingless” or “featherless” and nothing else,’ and he accordingly rejects Headlam's interpretation of ἄπτερος φ⋯τις at Aesch. Ag. 288 together with the same scholar's proposal to read at P. V. 707 ἄπτερος for the unmetrical αἰπνἰδιος (Headlam did actually propose either ἄπτερος or ⋯πτ⋯ρως but preferred the former.) It may be true that the phrase, ⋯πτ⋯ρῳ τάχει, which Headlam adduced in his note on the Agam. passage in support of his rendering, is not by itself convincing, but there are other considerations which Professor Thomson has, I imagine, overlooked. What follows is not an attempt to demonstrate that ἄπτερος does mean ‘wing-swift’ in Aeschylus, but only to suggest that there is evidence to show that the word could bear that meaning in classical Greek authors, and that Headlam's interpretation and emendation should therefore not be rejected out of hand.

Thetext of the de Caelo was the subject of an interesting article in the Rivista Storia Antica, N.S. IX, by Dr. R. Rubrichi; he showed that where the manuscriptsdiverge, we ought to bring in the evidence of Simplicius, and that when we look closely into the sense, the commentator's reading is in most cases decidedly preferable; he also established a fact which is familiar from editions of the othér physical treatises, namely that there is some specially close affinity between the text of E and that used by Simplicius.

The mistranslation by Mr. J. D. Duff of nox ubi sidera condit as ‘where night hides the stars’ is also the interpretation of many commentators from Sulpitius in the last decade of the fifteenth century to Lejay in the last decade of the nineteenth. Lucan is clearly speaking of East and West in 15, of South in 16, and of North in 17–18. How can night be said to hide the stars in the West? Burman saw the difficulty and expressed himself thus: ‘…dubito, an recte dicatur, nox condere sidera, id est, Stellas, quae sole cadente prodeunt, et se spectanda praebent, obscurare et occulere: neque nunc occurrit alius ex veteribus locus, unde ita locutos fuisse Poetas appareat. Nox enim adveniens prodit sidera, praecipitans uero, aurora adveniente, potest recte dici condere, et quasi auferre ex oculis hominum sidera.’ Burman then was tempted to understand sidera as the sun, but could not parallel this use of the plural, although he admitted the use of sidera solis. He cited Ouid. Met. 14, 172–3 caelumque et sidera solis / respicio, as did Haskins, who took the same view with hesitation. Ezra de Clerq van Jever in his Specimen Selectarum Observationum, which he published at Leiden in 1772, definitely understood sidera as the sun, though he could parallel only sidus in the singular from Ouid. A.A. 1, 723–4 aequoris unda / debet et a radiis sideris esse niger. But, it may be said, these Ovidian passages are such that no ambiguity is possible, and are not quite relevant to Lucan's phrase.

One of the most interesting recent attempts to interpret the peculiarities of Plotinus's philosophy is that of Bréhier in his ‘La Philosophie de Plotin’(Bibl. de la Revue des Cours et Conférences, Boivin, Paris, 1928). His thesis, contained in the last four chapters of the work, is that Plotinus, instead of being simply the continuator of the Greek rationalist tradition, is the founder of modern European Idealism, or, perhaps more accurately, Pantheism. ‘Avec Plotin nous saisissons done le premier chatnon d'une tradition religieuse qui n'est pas moins puissante au fond en Occident que la tradition chretienne …’. He is the spiritual ancestor of Spinoza and Hegel. It is interesting in passing to compare this view with that of Dean Inge, for whom Plotinus is the spiritual begetter of S. Thomas Aquinas. The divergences of modern interpreters of the Plotinian metaphysic are often both amusing and suggestive.

It has frequently been observed that the Prometheus Vinctus shows certain Sophoclean characteristics of rhythm. In order to vary the rhythm of his iambics and to avoid monotony, Sophocles often knits consecutive trimeters closely together by placing at the end of one line some word which looks forward to the next line, and so precludes the reader from stopping for the natural pause after the sixth foot. Sometimes he uses in this way subordinating words which introduce a dependent clause in the next line (Antig. 311); sometimes proclitics (O.C. 495) or quasi-proclitics (O.R. 267). (Sometimes, too, he even allows elision at the end of the trimeter, but this peculiarly Sophoclean device does not concern us now.)

I purchased in 1902 from the sale by Sotheby of 2347 manuscripts and rare books the property of Henry White, of 30, Queensgate, a manuscript of Ovid's Heroides, no. 1629 in the catalogue, the examination of which has led me to some conclusions. An account of it may be of interest. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. E. A. Lowe, our foremost palaeographist, who has most kindly examined my manuscript with great care and fixed its date and origin. This manuscript, which I call O, written on vellum in fine large characters somewhere in northern Italy, belongs to the middle of the fourteenth century. It contains 48 pages, measuring 10 inches by 7 inches, averaging 35 or 36 lines in the page. The initial illuminated letter of the first epistle shows a female figure dressed in a vermilion coloured robe with blue cuffs, representing apparently Penelope, on a blue ground with gold stars, and with borders illuminated with lake vermilion and burnished gold. The manuscript resembles in style two figured in the Palaeographical Society's facsimiles Vol. III., plate 221, Brit. Mus. Add. 31,032 early s. xiv, and plate 227 Brit. Mus. Add. 27,428 s. xiv. Dr. Lowe writes: ‘There can be very little doubt as to the origin of the manuscript. It is north Italian. The curious errors of spelling make one think of the province of Venice. It is quite likely that it was written in the Veneto, and then migrated to the province of Lombardia. The fly-leaves contain the name of the proud owners of your manuscript in the fifteenth century. John and Peter and Anthony and Simon and Francis de Nailate owned the book. Some of them went to the school of Master Baltrami of Lucino. As the word Milan (‘civitas Mediolani’) occurs in the back fly-leaf, it seems highly probable that this Lucino is the place between Milan and Como.’ Examples of the writings on the fly-leaves are:

Iste liber Ouidi est nostrorum uidelicet Petri < et > Antonii filiorum domini Johannis de Nailate pergentium ad scolas Bertrami de Lucino, qui est bonus doctor.

In the tragic senarius the divisions of the sense normally coincide with the main divisions of the metrical structure. Punctuation is most frequently found at the end of the line, or at the penthemimeral or hephthemimeral caesura. There are few traces of any desire to produce a persistent clash (as in the Vergilian hexameter) between verse structure and sentence structure. Thus at Med. 446–50 and 709–13 five consecutive lines, at Med. 364–71 eight consecutive lines, are more or less self-contained in sense. But this principle, while valid in some degree for all three tragedians, is not equally valid for all. Sophocles, as is well known, is far suppler in his iambic technique than Aeschylus and Euripides, and far more prone to write sentences which over-run the main metrical divisions.

The early handbooks of rhetoric compiled by Tisias and Corax and their successors seem to have been directed entirely at successful speaking in courts of law. This was the art that Strepsiades set out to learn in the Philosopher's Thinking-shop; this, Isocrates complains, was the only object of technical writers on rhetoric before his time; and Aristotle, when he wrote the chapter that stands first in hisRhetoric, made just the same complaint: τ⋯ς αὐτ⋯ς oὔσμς μεθ⋯δoυ περι τ⋯ δημηγoρικτ⋯ και δικανικ⋯ και καλλιoνoς και πoλιτικωτ⋯ραςτ⋯ς δημηγoρικ⋯ς πραγματειας oὔςηρ ἤ oὔσης ἤ τ⋯ς περι τ⋯ ςυναλλ⋯γματα, πει μ⋯ν ⋯κεινης oὐδ⋯ν λ⋯γoυγι, περι δ⋯ικ⋯ξεσθαι π⋯ντες πειρ⋯νται τεχνoλoγειν. The art as the Sophists practised it was by no means so limited in its application: many of them were accustomed to playing the parts of statesmen and diplomats as well as of educators; and the most notorious field for their powers of oratory was of course the lecture or ⋯πιδειξις. But the systems of rhetoric that they devised and taught did not cover their own practice; and forensic oratory, as well as seeming the most commonly necessary kind at that time, was also, it must be said, the easiest to reduce to rule. Gorgias, it is true, professed to teach a rhetoric of more extended application, by means of which his pupils would be able to produce conviction in any public assembly;* but we must conclude that this wider field was at least very imperfectly treated in all the technical systems of the time. Plato shortly describes the position thus:μ⋯λιστα μ⋯ν πως περι τ⋯ς δικας λ⋯γεται τε και γρ⋯φεται τ⋯χνῇ, λ⋯γεται δ⋯ και περι δημηγoριας ‧ ⋯π ι πλ⋯o≠ δ⋯ oκ⋯κoα.