The debate about the idea of “varieties of capitalism,” which was formalized by Peter Hall and David Soskice in their 2001 book on the subject, has attracted the work of business historians, as well as of political scientists, and economists.

This issue brings together five articles on the modern petroleum industry. Two cover the growth of the industry in the early twentieth century: Michael Adamson's study of the development of California's coastal oil region by independent oilman Ralph Lloyd; and the study by Lisa Bud-Frierman, Andrew Godley, and Judith Wale of the British entrepreneur Weetman Pearson's operations in Mexico. Two articles treat the post–World War II period: Nathan Citano looks at the budding interests of U.S. oilmen in the Middle East and Daniele Pozzi traces the transformation of the Italian company ENI into an international oil firm. Finally, Keetie Sluyterman examines the ways in which Royal Dutch Shell handled environmental issues from its inception in 1907 to the present. The issue also contains a survey of recent historiography on the oil industry in Latin America by Marcelo Bucheli and a review essay by James Bamberg on a recent four-volume history of Royal Dutch Shell.

Ethnographic methods are applied to this investigation of the links between language and business culture found in letters exchanged in the 1880s, 1900s, 1930s, and 1940s among members of a long-lived family-owned business. The letters are contained in three sets of correspondence between three different generations of the Bates family, who were merchants, shipowners, and private bankers based in Liverpool. The aim is to develop a different perspective from which to consider communicating processes, business culture, social mobility, and the socialization of managers. The study invites consideration of the appropriateness of accepted behavioral assumptions attributed to economic actors and the significance of judgment and instinct in decision-making.

Although corporate pyramids are currently commonplace world-wide and although there have been “noteworthy pyramiders” in American business history, this controversial form of corporate organization is now a rarity in the United States. The conventional wisdom is that corporate pyramids disappeared in the U.S. when New Deal policymakers began taxing dividends paid to corporate shareholders. This version of events is more fable than truth. The introduction of the intercorporate dividend tax did not foster a rapid dismantling of corporate pyramids. Instead, pyramidal arrangements were already rare in the U.S., other than in the utilities sector, and the demise of utility pyramids was prompted by the Public Util- ities Holding Company Act of 1935 rather than by tax reform.

Little is known about the logic of lending transactions and the development of credit markets in Mexico, or the rest of Latin America, prior to banks. We know even less about what role financial intermediaries played in these pre-banking markets, or who these intermediaries were. This article analyzes the intermediary role notaries played in the long-term credit market in Yucatan, in southeastern Mexico, in the nineteenth-century. Using a unique dataset of mortgages from the notarial records in the Yucatan state archive, the article shows that, in the absence of banks, notaries facilitated access to credit, and that, in the institutional and political context of Yucatan, both entrepreneurship and monopoly were being fostered.

How does economic organization affect economic performance? This analysis of the historical transformation of the U.S. economy from the business model of the “old economy” to that of the “new economy” demonstrates that the Japanese challenge of the 1980s was an important catalyst for the shift. Anchored by the “Chandlerian” corporation, the old model delivered economic growth that was much more equitable and stable than the new one. Furthermore, the business model that underpinned the Japanese challenge represented a superior version of the old U.S. prototype. The fi nancialization of corporate decision-making under the new paradigm has been the prime source of inequity and instability in U.S. economic performance over the past three decades. As manifested in outsized executive pay and massive stock buybacks, the fi nancialization of the U.S. corporation threatens long-term economic growth.

The intricate interplay among environmental pressure groups, oil companies, and governments is revealed from the perspective of the Anglo-Dutch company Royal Dutch Shell. An examination of three environmental issues demonstrates the company's awareness of such problems and describes its efforts to contain potential damage to the degree permitted by existing technological and economic constraints. The industry view is that government measures should create a level playing field and should be effective and economically feasible. While pressure groups are skilled at calling attention to environmental problems, industry highlights the tradeoffs between different societal aims that are entailed in tackling these problems. Governments are left to fi nd the best ways to weigh conflicting interests.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the banking systems of England and New England were very different. England possessed a small number of large-scale clearing banks that had established extensive branch networks and dominated the domestic market. In contrast, New England banking was characterized by a large number of small-scale institutions. Yet, a century earlier, there were striking similarities between the two systems. An analysis of their evolution over the course of the nineteenth century provides an international and comparative perspective on the continuing debate over banking institutions, lending patterns, and economic growth.

This examination of the foundations of German and American corporate governance highlights the role of money-centered banks, both as board members in large corporations and as intermediaries on the stock exchange. German banks, by acting as surrogate regulators, became institutional stabilizers, and German regulators encouraged banks to participate in corporate boards in order to overcome agency problems in firms and to control speculation. American investment banks, prior to 1914, often managed to overcome regulatory obstacles, which enabled them to wield more power over corporations than their legendary German counterparts. American banks had more opportunities to intervene in the event of panics, bankruptcies, foreign investment, and corporate consolidation. In contrast to Germany, the United States increasingly imposed regulations that circumscribed the supervisory role of banks as board members.

The ways in which business–government relations influenced postwar liberalism in the American encounter with the Middle East are examined through the use of group biography. The linked careers of five internationalist oilmen who helped to formulate Harry S. Truman's domestic and foreign policies are tracked during and after World War II. Partly through the efforts of these influential men, the Middle East's vast oil resources became an important component of controversies about the direction of the New Deal. One conclusion to emerge from the study is that instead of simply studying liberal ideals in order to understand the American impulse to reform the world, historians also need to consider how global factors intruded into domestic reform debates.

The automobile industry was a leader in Germany's economic recovery after World War II. In the 1950s and 1960s, carmakers found a ready market for their products as mass motorization created a manufacturing backlog. But, by the 1970s, rapid changes in sales and the arrival of new competitors in the German market marked a transition from a seller's to a buyer's market. Additionally, the energy crisis intensified existing consumer reluctance to spend and altered buying preferences. German car manufacturers adjusted to the changing market conditions after 1973 by adopting different strategies. In order to generate economic success, they developed new marketing-management instruments that supported a fundamental change in the business paradigm, leading them to shift from their earlier emphasis on production to a stronger focus on consumers.

This article examines how Danish cement factories and building contractors, in particular F. L. Smidth & Co. A/S and its business partner Højgaard & Schultz A/S, used forced and slave labor in Estonia, the Polish General Government, and Serbia as they worked for the German authorities during the Second World War. The article presents new evidence on the use of forced and slave labor inside the European “New Order” and emphasizes the willingness of the companies to expand and engage in morally questionable behavior. The findings illuminate the close connection between political and economic collaboration and contribute to the discussion about the relationship between business and politics during dictatorship, war, and occupation.

In 1910, Louis Brandeis claimed that scientific management could save the railroads a million dollars a day and avoid a rate increase. While Brandeis's claims are well known, historians have neglected the influence of scientific management on the railroads. In 1904, Harrington Emerson introduced repair scheduling techniques in the locomotive shops of the Santa Fe. Scheduling revolutionized repair, and–esponding in part to the regulatory pressures Brandeis helped create–by 1925 most major railroads employed it. In the 1920s, the carriers imported a second new management technique–the “progressive” system that focused on material flows, and introduced batch production techniques to car and locomotive repair. Collectively these methods prevented transportation bottlenecks, raised labor productivity, and reduced capital requirements.

The organization of economic activities differs among countries and over time. Differences between nations have been highlighted in academic discussions about national business systems and the varieties of capitalism. This group of articles about the Dutch business system contributes to these debates by offering new empirical research from the perspective of a small, open economy and highlighting changes that have occurred during the second half of the twentieth century. While they discuss developments in the Netherlands, the articles also explore general themes, including corporate governance, cartels, and the organization of multinational companies. While the articles show that business systems are in constant flux, comparisons between the Dutch and U.S. systems seem to suggest that each moves at a different pace. A particularly striking aspect of the Dutch stories is the large impact of developments abroad.

The entrepreneurial activity of Enrico Mattei, who headed the Italian state oil company AGIP (later ENI) from 1945 to 1962, laid the groundwork for the company's growth during the 1950s and 1960s. Mattei relied on a group of knowledgeable specialists, who were equipped with a complex set of capabilities that enabled them to oversee and perform operational tasks. The task of adapting that set of capabilities began in the latter half of the 1950s, when the firm underwent a transition from its main business of producing natural gas, which it had developed immediately after World War II, to prospecting for oil abroad.

The management scholar Henry Mintzberg has situated company strategies on a continuum that ranges from those that are the result of deliberate internal decisions, on one extreme, to those that emerge largely as a response to external forces, on the other. This framework is applied to the strategies of the Canadian aluminum producer Alcan, in Europe, from its origins as a spin-off from Alcoa, in 1928, until its acquisition by Rio Tinto, in 2007. Throughout this period, the company gradually moved from emergent to more deliberate strategies, although external forces continued to influence its decisions. The increasing centralization of Alcan's organizational structure paralleled its shift toward reliance on deliberate strategies.

The introduction of comparative product testing in Germany reflected the rise of a mass consumer society within a rapidly changing market economy. The first proposal to establish a federally supported institute for product testing was made in 1957. Proponents wished to reduce the asymmetries of power and information between producers and consumers. Producers' initial opposition was overcome once federal legislation was passed and they recognized that the institute's work gave them an opportunity to use the test results in their corporate marketing and advertising strategies. By integrating state-regulated consumer protection into the social-market economy, the Stiftung Warentest, Germany's independent product-testing foundation, became an expression of both the emerging modern consumer society and the German corporatist model.

British overseas investment was a powerful force behind rapid global integration before World War I. Close to half of the total was in the form of foreign direct investment. Weetman Pearson was among the most successful of Britain's overseas-based entrepreneurs of the period. By 1919, the Pearson group of companies had become one of Britain's most valuable industrial enterprises, having diversified from international contracting into the Mexican oil industry. The Pearson group highlights the technical competence of British entrepreneurs in managing large, complex infrastructure projects, capable of navigating their way through various political systems, and adept at turning to whichever organizational form best suited their business interests. These characteristics were far removed from the now outdated stereotype of the incompetent late Victorian entrepreneur.

The safety of workers and the costs to employers and the economy as a whole became a serious problem in industrializing nations. Workplace safety in the Ontario manufacturing industry deteriorated at the end of the nineteenth century. In response, the province legislated to regulate safety standards and factory inspection. However, this strategy failed to reduce accident rates. As in the United States, it was the enactment of workers' compensation legislation that generated the economic incentives for Ontario's employers to invest in safety. Yet in contrast to the United States, where safety was predominantly organized inside firms, employers in Ontario developed a comprehensive institutional framework to organize a range of safety actions.

Cartels were critical to the shaping of twentieth-century market structures. Although laws against cartels began to be passed in the 1950s, the attitude toward these collusive organizations remained constant over most of the century. Enforcement did not begin until well into the 1990s. Dutch policy within the European framework underwent a series of adjustments, and changes in the Dutch business system indicate a shift toward a more liberal market economy, which was accompanied by an increasingly negative view of cartels.