In Europe the zones of Soviet and non-Soviet dominant influence have, for the time being, been stabilized. Moves and counter moves have become tactical. Despite recurrent impressions to the contrary—which may, in part, be intended by our opponent—there is in Europe hardly an immediate crisis requiring immediate counteraction. Such a crisis, and such a requirement, exist, however, in Eastern Asia; and our successes in stopping the Soviet advance in Western Europe will prove illusory if we fail to contain it in the Far East.

Attempts to explain world politics in terms of the clashes of sharply defined national interests have an air of unreality. This is because of the unequal interest of groups of the population in any particular course of official action. The little known and obscure, but historically important episode with which this article deals, describes the impact of one influential private group on foreign policy, even after the President of the United States had made an official determination of policy. It also throws light on the way in which a private group can operate through and with a foreign government, whose interests are parallel to its own, to change the direction of American policy. Similarly it illustrates how a foreign government can mould its relations with the United States (or with most countries) by developing a policy with a special appeal to particularly influential groups in that country.

Both India and Pakistan have made long strides toward stability since winning their freedom from British rule in 1947. What are the prospects for stability in the immediate future, and for their exerting a steadying influence throughout Southeast Asia?

Despite the disorganization and bitterness that accompanied the partition of India, the two young Dominion Governments have thwarted severe early threats to their internal security and have restrained their respective extremists from precipitating a war on the sub-continent. They have each proceeded with political reorganization of the largest populations extant—since the disintegration of China—in non-Communist Asia. Other Asian nations have tentatively accepted the leadership of India in such international issues as Indonesia. In an Asia hard-pressed to adjust to new conditions, the future roles of India and Pakistan may have critical importance.

This is the age of revolutions. No longer are they the domain of the theorizer or the peripheral plotter. They have moved into the center of the average man's daily thought. They are on everybody's mind and in every newspaper's headline.

No continent is exempted. The whole of Europe is in upheaval. Her political parties are aligned in the name of, or in opposition to, revolution. China's four decades of civil war, India's final attainment of independence, the awakening nationalism of the Near East and South Eastern Asia spell not only the end of historical empires, but also call into action socio-revolutionary forces that break the frame of established society. Even those areas that are not engulfed by revolution are confronted with its threat. Fascism and National Socialism, though they proved in the test of history to be mere pseudo-revolts, were nourished by grievances of modern society that are not overcome by military defeat and—as long as they remain unanswered—still represent a challenge to our democratic world.

In the past fifteen years Canada has emerged from the position of a somewhat obstreperous exponent of isolationism and Canadian nationalism to become a leading middle power. This rapid rise to international importance has brought in its train many significant developments in Canada. Few are more interesting than the process by which Canadian foreign policy is presently being made, for its examination throws some light on the substance of Canadian foreign policy and provides the student of comparative politics with an important example of the planning of foreign policy under a Cabinet form of government. It also shows some of the problems and possibilities of a rapidly developed governmental organization.

These two books are the only products so far of a policy which has given certain scholars untrammeled access to the files and personnel of the Department of State, and other branches of the government. The policy is highly individual, selective and personal. Its object is not to produce “official” histories, but to bring out reasonably adult studies of our wartime diplomatic program many years before the routine publication and long-term historical analysis of official documents can be accomplished. One great advantage of such studies is that they permit an evaluation of oral in the light of documentary evidence, and a reading of documents in the light of conversation, during the lifetime of those who witnessed and shared in the process of decision. The purpose of the program is to inform, and perhaps to form opinion. As Professor Langer makes clear in his introduction, his book had its origin in Secretary Hull's desire to meet the violent public criticism of his Vichy policy, criticism which he felt was based on inadequate information, and hence mistaken judgments.

P. M. S. Blackett, Nobel Laureate in Physics for 1948, is a scientist of distinction and outstanding ability. He is therefore capable, as all good scientists should be, of careful and objective reasoning concerning matters that do not impinge too closely upon his faiths and implicit beliefs. Unfortunately, the subject matter of his book, Fear, War, and the Bomb, suggests that Blackett has allowed his pronounced political sympathies to warp his observations and his reasoning. They have apparently led him to suppress large numbers of pertinent facts, to ignore many crucial technical and political possibilities, and to depreciate the honesty and good faith of his government and of ours to an absurd degree.

Publication of Politics Among Nations is another important milestone in the development of systematic studies of international political phenomena into an established and recognized branch of higher learning.

Comparison of this impressive treatise with any work published before 1914 reveals in dramatic fashion how much ground has already been covered. Before World War I, as Grayson Kirk has described, the study of international relations was largely carried on in the sterile atmosphere of international law and conventionalized diplomatic history. The crusade for the League of Nations opened up a new field and gave great impetus to the study of world organization. This newcomer practically stole the show during the 1920's. But the course of world events did not fulfill the bright hopes fostered by schemes for disarmament, outlawry of war, collective security, judicial settlement of disputes, and codification of international law. Teachers and writers, however, continued to play the same old records, which sounded more and more unconvincing as the dictators prepared the stage for another world war.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs has made available almost all of that correspondence between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. which culminated in the open break between Tito and Moscow and between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the sister parties associated in the Communist Information Bureau.

The letters are most revealing. Not only do they give us a picture of the dispute, much clearer than we could glean from previous accusations and counter-accusations; their tone and material also provide a valuable insight into the workings of international communism. Here we have an instance of a “live” dispute within the highest circles of international communism rather than a case of resurrected quarrels from the past. There is no doubt as to the authenticity of the documents concerned. For once we have in our grasp material of first class importance and relevance.

THE student of international relations knows from sad experience what it means to starve in the midst of plenty. His vast sprawling field is the subject of almost endless writing and comment. Memoirs, documents, autobiographies, newspapers, government hand-outs, propaganda publications, and the like pour over his desk in a dismaying stream which grows greater year by year, defying him to master it. If he seeks to preserve his sanity by arbitrarily limiting his interests and investigations to certain geographic areas, he is acutely conscious of the inter-relationship between what happens in his chosen field and developments outside in the terra incognita. If he selects certain topical aspects of his field, such as the study of population, or raw materials, or commercial policy for emphasis, he is quickly enmeshed in the same web of frustrations. He cannot master the entire field and he cannot safely limit himself to a narrow specialization.