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Mindful Practices: On the Neurosciences in the Twentieth Century
- Michael Hagner, Cornelius Borck
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- 18 December 2002, pp. 507-510
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Representations of Mind: C. S. Sherrington and Scientific Opinion, c.1930–1950
- Roger Smith
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- 18 December 2002, pp. 511-539
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Argument
Recent writers in the brain sciences and the philosophy of mind contrast modern biological theories of consciousness with a mind-body dualism supposedly dominant half-a-century ago which they regard as scientifically sterile. Reference to C. S. Sherrington often signals the rejected dualism. This paper re-examines Sherrington’s highly qualified position and links it to the arguments of British scientists for whom he was a figurehead in the 1930s and 1940s. I interpret the mind-body literature as ancillary to debates about cultural values. From this perspective, dualism represents a defense of a threatened conservative culture. Dismissal of scientists’ supposed “dualism” does little to illuminate the tension in their thought between defense of values traditionally associated with mind and hope for an integrated mind-body science. This leads to comments on Sherrington’s own concept of integration. The conclusion relates these points to the new research in the brain sciences evident by the end of the 1940s.
Cultivating the Cortex in German Neuroanatomy
- Michael Hagner
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- 18 December 2002, pp. 541-563
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The cerebral localization of mental functions is one of the centerpieces of modern brain research. Though the localization paradigm in its cultural and social interwovenness has been characterized as successful in the last third of the nineteenth century by a variety of historians of the neurosciences, there is also general agreement that localization came under threat around 1900. Besides the so-called holistic protest against the localization of mental functions, the neuroanatomical approach itself was challenged by experimental psychology, psychiatric nosology, and psychoanalysis. This story underestimates the fact that anatomically-based localization remained powerful in response to these multiple challenges. This meant a neuroanatomical revision of tools, concepts, and practices. But this meant also a shift in the cultivation of the cortex from a more philosophical agenda to rather concrete political claims. More specifically, the idea of the cortex as the noblest part of man was supplemented by suggestions concerning its “Höherzüchtung.” I will analyze this re-orientation and radicalization in two steps. First, I briefly discuss the anatomical and philosophical account of Theodor Meynert and then turn to Paul Flechsig who in the late nineteenth century inscribed the ability to create culture and civilization into the cortex. Second, I focus on the neuroanatomists Oskar and Cécile Vogt, who began their careers around 1900 and expanded the cultivation of the cortex. Even before World War I, they proclaimed a “cerebral hygiene.” Consequently, the Vogts linked their innovative neuroanatomical researches with the rising field of genetics, racial hygiene, and eugenics. In the early Weimar Republic, the Vogts openly supported socialist ideas and were engaged in establishing an Institute for Brain Research in Soviet Moscow, where Lenin’s brain was analyzed. By the end of the Weimar Republic, the rhetoric of the Vogts was bluntly authoritarian. Based on a few anatomical examinations of so-called elite brains and the brains of criminals, they made concrete suggestions for eugenics and the breeding of “one-sidedly gifted leaders.” Given the remarkable popularity of the Vogts around 1930, their program is an important example of the hubris of predicting and guiding future developments on the basis of scientific authority. It can be regarded as an ironic nemesis that the Vogts – never sympathizing with the political aims of the National Socialists – were forced to finish their careers as influential Kaiser Wilhelm scientists in Nazi-Germany.
Der Mensch wird immer mehr ein Hirntier werden. (Vogt 1912, 309)
Electricity as a Medium of Psychic Life: Electrotechnological Adventures into Psychodiagnosis in Weimar Germany
- Cornelius Borck
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- 18 December 2002, pp. 565-590
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When electricity became a commodity in 1900, it furnished Germany with new attractions and revolutionized everyday life with all kinds of tools and gadgets; it also opened up a new space for investigating psycho-physical interaction, reviving ideas of a close linkage between psychic life and electricity. The paper traces the emergence of this electro-psychological framework beyond “electroencephalography,” the recording of electrical brain waves, to “diagnoscopy,” personality profiling by electric phrenology.
Diagnoscopy opens a window onto the scientific and public cultures of electricity and psychical processes in Weimar Germany. It garnered enormous attention in the press and was quickly taken up by several institutions for vocational guidance, because it offered a rapid and technological alternative to laborious psychological testing or “subjective” interviewing. Academic psychology and leading figures in brain research reacted with horror; forging counter measures which finally resulted in this technique being denounced as quackery. A few years later, the press celebrated electroencephalography as a mind-reading device, whereas the neuroscientists remained initially skeptical of its significance and the very possibility of an “electroencephalogram” (EEG) before they adapted electroencephalography as a tool for representing various neuro-psychiatric conditions in patterns of recorded signals.
The blending of psychophysiology and electrical engineering marks the formation of an electric epistemology in scientific as well as public understanding of the psyche. The transformations of electrodiagnosis from diagnoscopy to the EEG are indicative of a cultural shift in which electricity changed its role from being the power source for experimental apparatuses to becoming a medium of psychic processes.
From Logical Neurons to Poetic Embodiments of Mind: Warren S. McCulloch’s Project in Neuroscience
- Lily E. Kay
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- 18 December 2002, pp. 591-614
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After more than half a century of eclipse, the mind (in contradistinction to brain and behavior) emerged in the 1950s as a legitimate object of experimental and quantitative research in natural science. This paper argues that the neural nets project of Warren S. McCulloch, in frequent collaboration with Walter Pitts, spearheaded this cognitivist turn in the 1940s. Viewing the project as a spiritual and poetic quest for the transcendental logos, as well as a culturally situated epistemology, the paper focuses on McCulloch’s and Pitts’ efforts of logical modeling of the mind and on the social conditions that shaped that mission.
From McCulloch’s “experimental epistemology,” the mind–purposes and ideas–emerged out of the regularities of neuronal interactions, or nets. That science of mind thus became a science of signals based on binary logic with clearly defined units of perception and precise rules of formation and transformation for representing mental states. Aimed at bridging the gulf between body and mind (matter and form) and the technical gulf between things man-made and things begotten, neural nets also laid the foundation for the field of artificial intelligence.
Thus this paper also situates McCulloch’s work within a larger historical trend, when cybernetics, information theory, systems theories, and electronic computers were coalescing into a new science of communication and control with enormous potential for industrial automation and military power in the Cold War era. McCulloch’s modeling the mind as a system of command and control contributed to the actualization of this potential.
We build our castles in the air,
And from the air they tumble down,
Unless we carry them up there
Until they crack the pate they crown.
And we must lug them everywhere,
From garden walk to crowded town;
We build our castles in the air,
And from the air they tumble down.
And lucky, if when sere and brown,
Before our eyes too lofty stare,
We scape with life and pate, though bare,
On which to plant an honest frown.
We build our castles in the air,
And from the air they tumble down.
Warren S. McCulloch
Of McCulloch’s literary work only two thin volumes, One Word After Another (1945) and The Natural Fit (1959), have been published. Most of his poetic output was unpublished and is deposited at the American Philosophical Society (hereafter APS) in the McCulloch Papers, BM 139. The poem, originally published in The Natural Fit, is quoted after McCulloch 1989, vol. 3, 917. For commentary on his poetry, see Vasalis 1989.
The Tortoise and the Love-Machine: Grey Walter and the Politics of Electroencephalography
- Rhodri Hayward
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- 18 December 2002, pp. 615-641
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Argument
The life of the pioneer electroencephalographer, William Grey Walter, initially appears to be a paradigmatic example of the process of network building and delegation identified by Michel Callon and Bruno Latour. In his professional career, Walter continually repositioned himself, moving from an unhappy beginning as an expert in the apparently useless and suspect technology of the EEG, to become a self-styled crucial mediator in subjects as diverse as medical diagnosis, forensic detection, marriage counseling, and international diplomacy. This position was achieved moreover through the construction and co-option of human and mechanical accomplices – laboratory assistants, electrical tortoises, and mechanical analyzers – which sustained his research and propagated his arguments. However in contrast to Callon and Latour’s atomistic account of scientific power and agency, this paper will extend their analysis to explore the impact of network building and delegation on domestic life, human desire, and personal identity. Walter’s engagement with the complexities of love and the human brain demonstrates how the transformative power of scientific rhetoric extends simultaneously into both the organization of the world and the subjectivity of the individual.
What would be the use of a neuroscience which cannot tell us anything about love?
Programs of the Brain (Young 1978, 143)
In the early 1950s the neurophysiologist and electroencephalographer, William Grey Walter, began to speculate on the future evolution of the human brain. Rejecting the vision of disembodied nervous systems and dome-headed descendants proposed by the populist authors of pulp science fiction, Walter instead imagined a series of linked transformations that would encompass our neural organization, technology, and society. He argued that our future evolution would be an indirect process, in which the development of new mechanisms of information storage and communication would allow the brain to shake off its mundane operations and embark instead on a process of mental growth through play and speculation. As Walter wrote:
The exteriorization of tedious or controversial reasoning will no doubt have as profound an effect upon the brain and society as the introduction of skilled and respectful servants has on a humble household. … But the future of the brain is more intriguing than a mere holiday from drudgery, for it is only when the servants of thought have done their work and retired unobtrusively to their quarters that the master brain can discover its own place and settle down to its proper work. (Walter 1953, 194; 1961, 234)
Techniques of the Brain and the Paradox of Emotions, 1880–1930
- Otniel E. Dror
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- 18 December 2002, pp. 643-660
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This essay studies the convergence of brain research with the physiology of emotions during the early twentieth century. It argues that the brain entered the laboratory of emotions not as an object of knowledge, but as a technique for producing emotions, in spite of the laboratory. The new brain-generated emotion signaled an epistemic break in the nature of studied emotion. It restructured the relationships between physiological and psychological forms of knowledge. It embodied the historical and political concerns of physiologists with pain. And it excluded the affectively experiencing subject from the study of “emotion.” The essay also suggests that the brain-generated emotion was an object suspended in time and abstracted from history. Its unique a-temporal and de-contextualized characteristic transformed emotion into a product of a laboratory whose mode of production mimicked the modern factory. The constitutive elements that were assembled in creating the brain as emotion-generator were instrumental for the important studies of James Papez, Paul MacLean, and for the modern concept of Limbic System.
The time has come [to]…begin the vivisection of the human heart according to scientific methods.
Angelo Mosso, 1896
Our Traumatic Neurosis and Its Brain
- Allan Young
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- 18 December 2002, pp. 661-683
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During the nineteenth century, physicians either discovered or invented a variety of clinical autobiography called “traumatic memory.” Freud produced two versions of this memory, the final version in the 1920s. A revolutionary nosology (DSM-III), adopted in 1980, promised to extirpate Freud and the concept of neurosis from American psychiatry. However, it made a tacit exception for Freud’s concept of traumatic neurosis, renaming it “posttraumatic stress disorder.” The following decades have been a period of intense clinical and scientific interest in this disorder. An influential research program has investigated traumatic neurosis and its brain through variations in cortisol excretion. I describe the history of this program and examine its distinctive knowledge product: its running narrative of its achievements. The narrative’s structure is analyzed and found to resemble a crossword puzzle constructed from heterogeneous kinds of inference, recalling The Interpretation of Dreams. My conclusion is that, far from extirpating Freud’s neurosis, biological research has secured a place for it in today’s post-Freudian psychiatry.