As a contribution to scholarly discussion of Lincoln's place in the American political tradition, this article examines his conception of constitutionalism. Controversy has focused recently on whether Lincoln acted in accordance with the purposes and ideas of the framers, or whether as a wartime president he rejected the constitutionalism of the Founding in favor of a pragmatic, instrumentalist style of leadership that in effect created an organic and unwritten constitution. It has also been suggested that Lincoln's conception of fundamental law can be described as a theory of constitutional aspiration. The article rejects the latter two points of view and argues that Lincoln adhered to the written Constitution of the framers — its forms, procedures, principles, and spirit — and was guided by it in political action aimed at achieving the ideals asserted in the Declaration of Independence. Prudent and practical in his statesmanship, Lincoln possessed in himself and inculcated in the people, constitutionalist conviction that regarded the preservation of republican self-government as the nation's defining and paramount purpose.

Most studies of presidential power assume that legitimacy is derived from the Constitution. This essay argues that presidents can become authors of their own legitimacy, whether understood in normative or behavioral terms. Specifically, the thesis is that presidential assertions of power, cloaked in an antipower rhetoric which formally honors the dominant values of the culture, have created an American state that has served as an extraconstitutional source of presidential legitimacy. It is widely believed that American constitutionalism undermined the state by destroying sovereignty. Lincoln's interpretation and use of the war power, however, denned a supreme national authority located in the presidency. In addition, his Gettysburg Address provided a paradigmatic metaphor for concealing presidential power rhetorically. Subsequent presidents have taken advantage of both effects by attempting to assert power as revolutionary principle. Linguistically, these concealments are reflected in tropes which constitute legitimizing defenses for exercise of extraordinary power.

Liberal constitutionalism embodies an aspiration to public moral justification. The practice of liberal politics, on this view, is bound up with an ongoing effort to justify our political arrangements to one another, an effort that must not be collapsed into the mere affirmation of community standards or conventions. This ideal of public justification lends support to judicial review, an institution that helps make constitutional government a publicly principled enterprise. But it also suggests the value of drawing the “political” branches into the interpretive project: the Supreme Court is not the final interpreter of our Constitution's liberal public morality. The “political” branches of the national government, and citizens themselves play a crucial role in the interpretive process. Viewed in this way, the theory and practice of constitutionalism embody ideals of virtue, citizenship, and community that add up to positive rejoinders to liberalism's communitarian and republican critics.

This article examines the nature and impact of liberation theology in Latin America and considers prospects for the future. Liberation theology's fundamental ideas are explored, and the reasons for its emergence and appeal are considered in detail. As a system of ideas, liberation theology first appears during a period of great social change, ecclesiological debate, and political upheaval. The convergence of these elements helps explain the theology's appeal within the churches, makes sense of its characteristically activist identification with the poor, and helps account for the popular appeal of the new organizational structures it has inspired. These convergences also suggest possible constraints and the long-term political impact of this theology. Throughout the article I argue that analysis of impacts must go beyond the ideas of liberation theology to ask how and why such ideas are received and acted upon in concrete settings.

This is a friendly critique of the Liberation Theology being elaborated in Latin America. The preferential option for the poor constricts its attention to economic disadvantage, and ascribes virtually all impoverishment to purposeful oppression. The poor are, simply in virtue of their deprivation, said to be so morally exalted that the gospel has for them no call to conversion. Theirs is a salvation without further ado. Yet their salvation turns out to be predominantly, if not exclusively, economic and political. A predilection for the Exodus displaces the death and resurrection ofJesus as the dominant paradigm for liberation. It is maladapted to a Christian vision of liberation, which must aim at communion with the enemy, not mere triumph. By claiming justice as its goal and fulfillment, liberation theology seems to suffer from a loss of Christian nerve. Looking to the socialist state as the sure guarantor of justice, it seems politically naive, and barren of the Christian hope that both exploiter and victim must be transformed into more than just persons (because prepared to return good for evil) well before the society around them has become a fit home even for justice.

Most policy and normative problems with nuclear weaponry arise in the context of extended deterrence; that is, deterrence of attacks on friends or allies of a nuclear power. This article reviews the history and contradictions of post-World War II Western extended deterrent strategy, considers the sources of differences and similarities in the perspectives of the American and West German Catholic bishops on these matters, presents a logical schema of types of deterrent situations, discusses some systematic historical evidence that suggests the utility of nuclear weapons for many of these situations is often exaggerated, and, after reviewing alternative strategies, suggests a role for a very limited “countercombatant” nuclear strategy.