Twenty years ago, on 11 June 1977, the plenipotentiaries of over a hundred States and several national liberation movements signed the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. This Conference had been convened by the government of Switzerland, the depositary State of the Geneva Conventions. After four sessions held between 1973 and 1977, themselves preceded by several years of preparatory work, the Conference drew up two Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the protection of the victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) and of noninternational armed conflicts (Protocol II).

The world now has a population of 5 billion, as against 1 billion in 1863 when the Red Cross was founded and the codification of the law of armed conflicts was initiated. For almost a century, the Red Cross concerned itself successively with soldiers wounded in action, victims of naval warfare, prisoners of war and civilians abandoned in wartime to the arbitrariness of foreign rule.

By adopting on 8 June 1977 the two Protocols additional to the 1949 Conventions, the States meeting in Geneva brought to a successful conclusion four years of arduous negotiations. The Protocols took four years, the Conventions only four months. Why such a huge difference?

In 1949, once the initial period of instinctive rejection of anything related to war had passed, a natural consensus emerged regarding the main evils which needed to be banned by law. Besides, the delicate subject of the rules governing the conduct of hostilities — the law of The Hague, as it is called, also part of humanitarian law — was left out of the discussions. It was also a time when the political map of the world was fairly monolithic, in the sense that the North still dominated the South, and East-West tensions had not yet escalated.

The Review has invited several persons who took part in the codification process to comment on the 1977 Additional Protocols and their history, including some stumbling blocks which had to be overcome. We have also asked the fateful question: How relevant are the Protocols today?

My views concerning the negotiation of the 1977 Protocols were set forth some 13 years ago in my contribution to the book published in honor of Jean Pictet, and I do not want to repeat them here. But perhaps, from the perspective of the intervening years, there may be a few things I could usefully add.

The adoption of the 1977 Protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims was an event of great historic significance. In 1977 the States were convinced that developments in weaponry had made it necessary to adopt new rules of conduct in armed conflicts: methods of using conventional weapons were being perfected and the resulting casualty rates were approaching those of weapons mass destruction, affecting everyone without exception and also damaging the environment, and thus threatening the survival of entire nations. This fact persuaded the States to agree upon new rules of conduct in armed conflict.

Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is a product of the mid-1970s. It reflects the then-prevailing Zeitgeist: the confrontational mentality of the Cold War; the defiance of the West by a suddenly assertive and temporarily united “Third World”; the tendencies on the part of an entrenched majority in international organizations and forums to show no tolerance for the dissenting voices of a large and influential minority; and the cynical sacrifice of good sense (and good law) on the altar of political expediency.

The 1977 Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, adopted after a complex process of preparatory work and negotiations in various fora, have not been formally applicable in many armed conflicts. Yet it would not be appropriate to say that they have not stood the test of reality. One of the most important effects of these instruments on State practice has been to generate a large number of experts on the subject in all regions of the world, sharing knowledge on the interpretation of relevant rules and facing the challenge of their implementation.

It is not without reservations that I am responding to the invitation from the Review for ‘veterans’ of the Diplomatic Conference on the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts (hereafter the Diplomatic Conference) to commemorate the signing 20 years ago of the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions. On 8 June 1977, all of us who contributed in one way or another to the drafting of those texts felt a sense of relief at having finally achieved our task. We also felt a kind of exhilaration at the thought that we had successfully completed an important undertaking that would benefit war victims. The two Protocols represented a major leap forward in the law of armed conflict. It should not be forgotten that practically two-thirds of the international community have now ratified these instruments. Yet compliance with them regrettably remains far from satisfactory. I need hardly recite the tragic litany of conflicts over the past 20 years that bear out this deficiency. The case best known to me is that of the “Yugoslav wars” (1991–1995). They constitute the clearest example of the yawning gap between the law itself and the degree to which it is implemented. What is even more worrying is that all of this is taking place in a world where the demise of “totalitarianism” has left the world with what is, for all practical purposes, a single centre of power. This centre comprises those States which, since the International Peace Conference held in 1899 in The Hague, have been inspired by their democratic traditions and their attachment to human rights and the rule of law to play a leading role in developing, affirming and reaffirming what today constitutes international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. I therefore believe that this divergence between the letter of the law and the conduct of those responsible for implementing it results from a lack of determination on the part of governments to “ensure respect” for that law throughout the world. I am in no doubt whatsoever that they have sufficiently efficacious means at their disposal to do so. What is missing, unfortunately, is the political will.

At the close of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law (Geneva, 1974–1977), the representatives of the States party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions adopted, on 8 June 1977, two Protocols additional to those Conventions. Following a preparatory period including intense negotiations that lasted for nearly ten years, the new treaties were accepted, despite considerable obstacles, by the plenipotentiaries without a vote and without opposition. Though the solutions adopted for particularly controversial problems could not always suit everyone concerned, the diplomats, legal advisers and military experts who had taken part nevertheless had every reason to return to their capitals with a feeling of satisfaction.

Francisco Suárez, “the prince of modern jurists”, was accused by some of being a great anti-monarchist, even the first regicide, because he was the first “convinced and avowed republican”.

He incorporated Platonist, Aristotelian, Augustinian and Thomist ontology, metaphysics and theodicy within a legal framework; in urisprudence, he introduced the world of ideas into the material world; his discourse on law is valid for his own day and for all time. In dealing with abstract questions, he developed a philosophy of law that is applicable to concrete situations.

The august solemnity of Latin confers on the terms jus ad helium and jus in bello the misleading appearance of being centuries old. In fact, these expressions were only coined at the time of the League of Nations and were rarely used in doctrine or practice until after the Second World War, in the late 1940s to be precise. This article seeks to chart their emergence.

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,