There is no unanimity in the international community about the legality of NATO's use of force in Kosovo in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. NATO has acted without Security Council authorization and its arguments for a humanitarian intervention are legally inconsistent. It has set a dangerous precedent. This editorial analyses the legal framework and complexities of the Kosovo crisis and its repercussions on the concept of ‘justified use of force’.

A variety of legal problems exist with the UN weapons inspection régime applicable to Iraq. These problems hinder the assurance that Iraq can be disarmed of the ability to produce biological or chemical weapons. Given this fact, the stalemate produced by the mid-December 1998 air strikes against that country might be best resolved by a reconfigured inspection program which aims at addressing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction efforts in the context of global security policy regarding such weaponry, with due account taken of the desires of Iraq's neighbors and the importance of reintegrating that nation into the world community.

The world comes to the international lawyer in forms less perfect than the ordered categories of law. The lawyer stands at a point of making a difference through devising arrangements, managing complex transactions, striking conventions, predicting outcomes, and wringing out settlements even if no clear legal recipe exists. This situation seems familiar in the contemporary global framework, but it is more general and, in this study, the author uses a historical case to illustrate it. The author shows how international lawyers make sense of wide cultural and historical contexts and negotiate their different implications in bringing about a new international legal personality, complex dispute settlement, and peaceful governance even without the benefit of a clear set of available legal procedures.

Tsar de Russie, […] Tu peux venir quand tu voudras: le lac repose silencieux et tu peux dormir dans l'archipel de Finlande en toute securité [mais] tu ne pourras jamais retrouver l'anneau magique qui fait aimer: l'océan s'est refermé à jamais sur lui.

This decision of the House of Lords is significant because it is the first decision of a major court of an important country refusing to grant a former head of state immunity from adjudication in the context of alleged gross violations of human rights. It is shown that state immunity, diplomatic immunity and head of state immunity are to be distinguished and the rules pertaining to head of state immunity are explained. Whereas the author agrees with the result of Lords' decision, he disagrees with the reasoning because the majority circumvented the immunity question by artificially qualifying the alleged human rights violations of General Pinochet as private acts.

Little is known about the work of the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland. Once the existence of dormant Holocaust era bank accounts was publicly acknowledged by the Swiss banks in 1997, the problem required resolution. This Tribunal was therefore created to establish ownership of the dormant accounts. The Claims Resolution Tribunal operates very much behind closed doors and its decisions have not been open to academic scrutiny and are unlikely to be available until the entire process is completed. Whilst justice may never be done for those carrying the monstrous legacy of the Holocaust, it is important to examine whether the Claims Resolution Tribunal is in fact righting the wrong done in respect of those who have struggled with the Swiss banks for many years to claim what is rightfully theirs. This article seeks to do this by scrutinising the inner workings of the Claims Resolution Tribunal and the various steps which a claimant must go through before his claim, is, if at all, accepted as valid. The experience of the Claims Resolution Tribunal in relation to Holocaust accounts and its role in the context of the various Holocaust era processes currently in the international arena is also examined in order to appraise its effectiveness as a means of belatedly doing justice.

On 8 July 1991, Qatar filed an application instituting proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two states relating to sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two states.

On 27 February 1998, the International Court of Justice rejected the preliminary objections of the US and of the UK in the cases concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie. The arguments made to the Court, and its decisions on jurisdiction and admissibility, are examined with a view to ascertaining the issues facing the Court, as well as the possible outcomes, if the cases reach the merits stage. The disputes over the Montreal Convention are considered, but particular attention is paid to the legal effects and, more widely, the legality of the relevant Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 748 and 883). The underlying question to be considered is whether there are any indications in the judgments that the Court is moving towards review of those resolutions.

No single political issue has engaged the ICJ more than that of South West Africa (Namibia). Over a period ranging from 1949 through 1971, recourse was had to the Court, both in its advisory and contentious capacities, on various aspects of the problem. Even today, after Namibia attained independence, the Court's jurisprudence and the saga of UN-Court relations in this matter continue to intrigue. This is because the questions raised have continuing relevance to many issues bearing on international law and international relations.

Much has been, and will be, written on the approach of the Court and of individual judges to a panoply of international legal questions raised in the course of the judicial proceedings. But, in fact, the long tale also offers researchers an enticing fountain of material on the role of law and adjudication in international relations, on the interaction between the UN judicial and political fora and, more broadly, between law and politics. This article focuses mainly on these latter, relatively neglected, aspects because it is with respect to these that the benefit of hindsight offers the ability to reassess and revise some of the earlier assumptions and to note some interesting paradoxes not readily discernible at the time. Perhaps revision of some of the axiomatic propositions long perpetuated in the field will offer better guidance to those seeking to enhance the role of international adjudication in world affairs.

The accused is charged with both individual criminal responsibility and superior criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws or customs of war. All crimes were allegedly committed at the Sušica camp in the municipality of Vlasenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. Given the inability of Bosnia and Herzegovina to execute the arrest warrant and the non-co-operation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, an international arrest warrant was issued to all states, pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The accused remains at large.

On 10 February 1999, H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden visited the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to sign an Agreement with the United Nations on the enforcement of sentences of the ICTY. The Agreement with Sweden differs from the previously concluded agreements with Italy, Finland and Norway in that it is limited to convicted persons with strong ties to Sweden.

Thus far, witnesses have played a crucial role in most proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It can be expected that this will also be the case in the proceedings before the future International Criminal Court. The author of the note focuses on the position of witnesses and compares the rules, practices, and experiences of the Tribunal with the Rome Statute in this respect. In particular, the support and protection of witnesses and the role of the Victims and Witnesses Units of the respective courts will be discussed.

Despite the clear prohibition of rape by international law, no conventional or other international instrument defines this international crime or explains its relation to the international crime of genocide. This article reviews the recent precedent-setting judgments of the international criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda which have sought to define rape in international law using different approaches. It also analyses the recent Akayesu Judgment of the Rwanda Tribunal. This is the first decision of an international tribunal to consider the question of whether rape can constitute genocide.