Roughly speaking partial degrees are equivalence classes of partial objects under a certain notion of relative recursiveness. To make this notion precise we have to state explicitly (1) what these partial objects are; (2) how to define a suitable reduction procedure. For example, when the type of these objects is restricted to one, we may include all possible partial functions from natural numbers to natural numbers as basic objects and the reduction procedure could be enumeration, weak Turing, or Turing reducibility as expounded in Sasso [4]. As we climb up the ladder of types, we see that the usual definitions of relative recursiveness, equivalent in the context of type-1 total objects and functions, may be extended to partial objects and functions in quite different ways. First such generalization was initiated by Kleene [2]. He considers partial functions with total objects as arguments. However his theory suffers the lack of transitivity, i.e. we may not obtain a recursive function when we substitute a recursive function into a recursive function. Although Kleene's theory provides a nice background for the study of total higher type objects, it would be unsatisfactory when partial higher type objects are being investigated. In this paper we choose the hierarchy of hereditarily consistent objects over ω as our universe of discourse so that Sasso's objects are exactly those at the type-1 level. Following Kleene's fashion we define relative recursiveness via schemes and indices. Yet in our theory, substitution will preserve recursiveness, which makes a degree theory of partial higher type objects possible. The final result will be a natural extension of Sasso's Turing reducibility. Due to the abstract nature of these objects we do not know much about their behaviour except at the very low types. Here we pay our attention mainly to type-2 objects. In §2 we formulate basic notions and give an outline of our recursion theory of partial higher type objects. In §3 we introduce the definitions of singular degrees and ω-consistent degrees which are two important classes of type-2 objects that we are most interested in.

Let Γ be a collection of relations on the reals and let M be a set of reals. We call M a perfect set basis for Γ if every set in Γ with parameters from M which is not totally included in M contains a perfect subset with code in M. A simple elementary proof is given of the following result (assuming mild regularity conditions on Γ and M): If M is a perfect set basis for Γ, the field of every wellordering in Γ is contained in M. An immediate corollary is Mansfield's Theorem that the existence of a Σ21 wellordering of the reals implies that every real is constructible. Other applications and extensions of the main result are also given.

We shall describe Boolean extensions of models of set theory with the axiom of choice in which cardinals are collapsed by mappings definable from parameters in the ground model. In particular, starting from the constructible universe, we get Boolean extensions in which constructible cardinals are collapsed by ordinal definable sets.

Let be a transitive model of set theory with the axiom of choice. Definability of sets in the generic extensions of is closely related to the automorphisms of the corresponding Boolean algebra. In particular, if G is an -generic ultrafilter on a rigid complete Boolean algebra C, then every set in [G] is definable from parameters in . Hence if B is a complete Boolean algebra containing a set of forcing conditions to collapse some cardinals in , it suffices to construct a rigid complete Boolean algebra C, in which B is completely embedded. If G is as above, then [G] satisfies “every set is -definable” and the inner model [G ∩ B] contains the collapsing mapping determined by B. To complete the result, it is necessary to give some conditions under which every cardinal from [G ∩ B] remains a cardinal in [G].

The absolutness is granted for every cardinal at least as large as the saturation of C. To keep the upper cardinals absolute, it often suffices to construct C with the same saturation as B. It was shown in [6] that this is always possible, namely, that every Boolean algebra can be completely embedded in a rigid complete Boolean algebra with the same saturation.

In [1, §14E], a sequent calculus formulation (L.-formulation) of type assignment (theory of functionality) is given for a system based either on a system of combinators with strong reduction or on a system of λη-calculus provided that the rule for subject conversion (which says that if X has type α and X cnv Y then Y has type α) is postulated for the system. This sequent calculus formulation does not work for a system based on the λβ-calculus. In [2] I introduced a sequent calculus formulation for a system without the rule of subject conversion based on any of the three systems mentioned above. Further, in [2, §5] I pointed out that if proper inclusions of the form of the statement that λx·x is a function from α to β are postulated, then functions are identified with their restrictions in the λη-calculus but not in the λβ-calculus, and that therefore there is some interest in having a sequent calculus formulation of type assignment with the rule of subject conversion for systems based on the λβ-calculus. In this paper, such a system is presented, the elimination theorem (Gentzen's Hauptsatz) is proved for it, and it is proved equivalent to the natural deduction formulation of [1, §14D].

I shall assume familiarity with the λβ-calculus, and shall use (with minor modifications) the notational conventions of [1]. Hence, the theory of type assignment (theory of functionality) will be based on an atomic constant F such that if α and β are types then Fαβ represents roughly the type of functions from α to β (more exactly it represents the type of functions whose domain includes α and under which the image of α is included in β).

Since A. Robinson introduced the classes of existentially complete and generic models, conditions which were interesting for elementary classes were considered for these classes. In [6] H. Simmons showed that with the natural definitions there are prime and saturated existentially complete models and these are very similar to their elementary counterparts which were introduced by Vaught [2, 2.3]. As Example 6 will show, there is a limit to the similarity—there are theories which have exactly two existentially complete models.

In [6] H. Simmons considers the following list of properties, shows that each property implies the next one and asks whether any of them implies the previous one:

1.1. T is ℵ0-categorical.

1.2. T has an ℵ0-categorical model companion.

1.3. ∣E∣ = 1.

1.4. ∣E∣ < .

1.5. T has a countable ∃-saturated model.

1.6. T has a ∃-prime model.

1.7. Each universal formula is implied by a ∃-atomic existential formula.

[The reader is referred to [1], [3], [4] and [6] for the definitions and background.

We only mention that T is always a countable theory. All the models under discussion are countable. Thus E is the class of countable existentially complete models and F and G, respectively, are the classes of countable finite and infinite generic models. For every class C,∣C∣ is the number of (countable) models in C.]

An analogue of a theorem of Sierpinski about the classical operation () provides the motivation for studying κ-Suslin logic, an extension of Lκ+ω which is closed under a propositional connective based on (). This theorem is used to obtain a complete axiomatization for κ-Suslin logic and an upper bound on the κ-Suslin accessible ordinals (for κ = ω these results are due to Ellentuck [E]). It also yields a weak completeness theorem which we use to generalize a result of Barwise and Kunen [B-K] and show that the least ordinal not H(κ+) recursive is the least ordinal not κ-Suslin accessible.

We assume familiarity with lectures 3, 4 and 10 of Keisler's Model theory for infinitary logic [Ke]. We use standard notation and terminology including the following.

Lκ+ω is the logic closed under negation, finite quantification, and conjunction and disjunction over sets of formulas of cardinality at most κ. For κ singular, conjunctions and disjunctions over sets of cardinality κ can be replaced by conjunctions and disjunctions over sets of cardinality less than κ so that we can (and will in §2) assume the formation rules of Lκ+ω allow conjunctions and disjunctions only over sets of cardinality strictly less than κ whenever κ is singular.

We study the measure independent character of Gödel speed-up theorems, in particular, we strengthen Arbib's necessary condition for the occurrence of a Gödel speed-up [2, p. 13] to an equivalence result and generalize Di Paola's speed-up theorem [4]. We also characterize undecidable theories as precisely those theories which possess consistent measure independent Gödel speed-ups and show that a theory τ2 is a measure independent Gödel speed-up of a theory τ1 if and only if the set of undecidable sentences of τ1 which are provable in τ2 is not recursively enumerable.

Let NBG be von Neumann-Bemays-Gödel set theory without the axiom of choice and let NBGA be the modification which allows atoms. In this paper we consider some of the well-known class or global forms of the wellordering theorem, the axiom of choice, and maximal principles which are known to be equivalent in NBG and show they are not equivalent in NBGA.

Martin [12] has shown that the determinacy of analytic games is a consequence of the existence of sharps. Our main result is the converse of this:

Theorem. If analytic games are determined, then x2 exists for all reals x.

This theorem answers question 80 of Friedman [5]. We actually obtain a somewhat sharper result; see Theorem 4.1. Martin had previously deduced the existence of sharps from 3 − Π11-determinacy (where α − Π11 is the αth level of the difference hierarchy based on − Π11 see [1]). Martin has also shown that the existence of sharps implies < ω2 − Π11-determinacy.

Our method also produces the following:

Theorem. If all analytic, non-Borel sets of reals are Borel isomorphic, then x* exists for all reals x.

The converse to this theorem had been previously proven by Steel [7], [18].

We owe a debt of gratitude to Ramez Sami and John Steel, some of whose ideas form basic components in the proofs of our results.

For the various notation, definitions and theorems which we will assume throughout this paper, the reader should consult [3, §§5, 17], [8], [13] and [14, Chapter 16].

Throughout this paper we will concern ourselves only with methods for obtaining 0# (rather than x# for all reals x). By relativizing our arguments to each real x, one can produce x2.

The Rice-Shapiro Theorem [4] says that the index set of a class of recursively enumerable (r.e.) sets is r.e. if and only if consists of all sets which extend an element of a canonically enumerable sequence of finite sets. If an index of a difference of r.e. (d.r.e.) sets is defined to be the pair of indices of the r.e. sets of which it is the difference, then the following generalization due to Hay [3] is obtained: The index set of a class of d.r.e. sets is d.r.e. if and only if is empty or consists of all sets which extend a single fixed finite set. In that paper Hay also classifies index sets of classes consisting of d.r.e. sets which extend one of a finite collection of finite sets. These sets turn out to be finite Boolean combinations of r.e. sets. The question then arises “What about the classification of the index set of a class consisting of d.r.e. sets which extend an element of a canonically enumerable sequence of finite sets?” The results in this paper come from an attempt to answer this question.

Since classes of sets which are Boolean combinations of r.e. sets form a hierarchy (the finite Ershov hierarchy, see Ershov [1]) with the r.e. and d.r.e. sets respectively levels 1 and 2 of this hierarchy, we may define index sets of classes of level n sets. If is a class of level n sets which extend some element of a canonically enumerable sequence of finite sets and if we let co-, then we extend the original classification question to the classification of the index sets of the classes and co-.

Now if the sequence of finite sets enumerates only finitely many sets or if only finitely many of the finite sets are minimal under inclusion, then it is a routine computation to verify that the index sets of and co- are in the finite Ershov hierarchy. Thus we are interested in the case in which infinitely many of the sequence of finite sets are minimal under inclusion. However if the infinite sequence is fairly simple, for instance{0}, {1}, {2}, … then the r.e. index set of co- is Σ20-complete as well as the index sets of and co- for all levels n > 2. Since the finite Ershov hierarchy does not exhaust ⊿20 there is a lot of “room” between these two extreme cases.

This paper concerns certain relationships between the ordering of degrees of unsolvability and the jump operation. It is shown that every minimal degree a < 0′ satisfies a″ = 0″. To restate this result in more suggestive language and compare it with related results, we shall use notation based on the now standard terminology of “high” and “low” degrees. Let Hn be the class of degrees a < 0′ such that a(n) = 0(n+1), and let Ln be the class of degrees a ≤ 0′ such that an = 0n. (Observe that Hi ⊆ Lj and Li ⊆ Lj, whenever i ≤ j, and Hi ∩ Lj = ∅ for all i andj.) The result mentioned above may now be restated in the form that every minimal degree a ≤ 0′ is in L2. This extends an earlier result of S. B. Cooper ([1], see also [4]) that no minimal degree a < 0′ is in H1. In the other direction, Sasso, Epstein, and Cooper ([10], [15]) have shown that there is a minimal degree a < 0′ which is not in L1. Also, C.E.M. Yates [14, Corollary 11.14], showed the existence of a minimal degree a < 0′ in L1. Thus each minimal degree a < 0′ lies in exactly one of the two classes L1L2 – L1 and each of the classes contains minimal degrees.

Our results are not restricted to the degrees below 0′. We show in fact that every minimal degree a satisfies a″ = (a ∪ 0′)′. To restate this result and discuss extensions of it, we extend the “high-low” classification of degrees from the degrees below 0′ to degrees in general. There are a number of fairly plausible ways of doing this, but we choose the one way we know of doing so which leads to interesting results. Let GHn be the class of degrees a such that a(n) = (a ∪ 0′)(n), and let GLn be the class of degrees a such that a(n) = (a ∪ 0′)(n−1).

In this paper we shall outline a purely model theoretic method for obtaining independence results for Peano's first order axioms (P). The method is of interest in that it provides for the first time elementary combinatorial statements about the natural numbers which are not provable in P. We give several examples of such statements.

Central to this exposition will be the notion of an indicator. Indicators were introduced by L. Kirby and the author in [3] although they had occurred implicitly in earlier papers, for example Friedman [1]. The main result on indicators which we shall need (Lemma 1) was proved by Laurie Kirby and the author in the summer of 1976 but it was not until early in the following year that the author realised that this lemma could be used to give independence results.

The first combinatorial independence results obtained were essentially statements about certain finite games and consequently were not immediately meaningful (see Example 2). This shortcoming was remedied by Leo Harrington who, upon hearing an incorrect version of our results, noticed a beautifully simply independent combinatorial statement. We outline this result in Example 3. An alternative, more detailed, proof may be found in [5].

Clearly Laurie Kirby and Leo Harrington have made a very significant contribution to this paper and we wish to express our sincere thanks to them.