The introduction of segregation laws for municipal streetcars is examined. The economics of private and public segregation is analyzed first, taking note of the particular features of the streetcar industry, followed by a discussion of the contemporary debates on streetcar segregation laws in a number of southern cities. The evidence presented suggests that segregation laws were binding constraints and not simply the codification of customary practice. Furthermore, the streetcar companies were not the initiators of segregation and sometimes actively resisted it. These findings are related to several major interpretations of the origins of segregation.

Between 1236 and 1240 the king's estate steward Walter de Burgo improved the productivity of about forty royal manors by systematically increasing agricultural investment to levels four to five times the medieval average. On estates where he managed the inland directly, de Burgo improved the quality of the draft animals and spent large sums on marling, smother crops, and on the purchase of foreign seed. Within four years he raised the net value of these manors 70 percent, thus demonstrating the direct link which could exist between investment levels and productivity in medieval agriculture.

This paper describes the geographical pattern of wages in Britain between 1760 and 1914. It then draws out some of the implications of the wages pattern and considers, in particular, the implications for the “growth pole” debate on the likely effect of industrialization upon regional income inequalities. The market forces responsible for creating and maintaining these differentials are then described, followed by a final section which discsusses the significance of changing regional wage differentials to the standar-of-living debate. It concludes that from a regional perspective the overall effects of industrialization upon living standards are indisputably favorable.

We examine bargaining between the Northwest Company and the Hudson's Bay Company using recent models of bargaining under incomplete information. Two previously undisturbed bodies of correspondence are analyzed: letters between the two companies and letters between the Hudson's Bay Company and its London committee. Through merger the companies achieved a joint maximum, but the lengthy and costly bargaining process dissipated much of the potential gain through depletion of animal stocks. Achievement of a joint maximum was hindered by incomplete information, commitment to a strategy which led to bargaining breakdowns, delineation of each party's rights under law, and environmental changes.

In Lancashire cotton spinning in the heyday of laissez-faire capitalism the labor market did not operate as an auction market. Evidence on piece-rate flexibility, length of tenure, and seniority is consistent with Okun's contract approach. Both workers and firms incurred initial set-up costs. Workers wanted to protect their initial investments in training, and firms, faced with a labor supply that varied in reliability and regularity, had a desire to cover initial hiring and tryout costs. The need to maintain long-term attachments had implications for wage and employment adjustment and the age structure of the labor force.

The hypothesis that a region's or nation's laggard industrial development can be explained by its relatively more expensive supplies of coal and iron ore is challenged here. A simple model, based on location theory, is developed. Using this model, I demonstrate the conditions under which this hypothesis holds. A case study of Quebec and Ontario industry suggests that the differential resource cost hypothesis seriously lacks explanatory power.

Although coal companies may have tried to exploit a local-store monopoly, company-store prices in nonunion areas were appreciably limited by competition from other stores and mines in the same labor market. Company stores persisted in part by lowering transactions costs. Prices at company stores were generally similar to those at nearby independent stores, and higher wages may have compensated for higher store prices at isolated mines. Conditions varied, however, with labor-market tightness. Miners were generally not in debt to the store, nor paid entirely in scrip. Scrip was an advance on payday, when miners received cash.