There has been considerable interest in recent years in the question of issue linkages in international negotiations. What is significant about discussions of linkages in the present era is the stress put on making trade-offs explicit among issues. Most of the highly publicized cases of proposed issue linkages appear to have been motivated by attempts of individual countries or groups of countries to extend their dominant bargaining or veto power in one particular issue area into other areas so as to achieve maximum advantage from their whole array of international interactions. The existence of an additional rationale for linkage that relies upon mutual interest has important implications. Drawing on the economic theory of exchange, the use of issue linkages to facilitate the completion of a greater number of mutually beneficial agreements among nations is considered.

In recent years efforts to account for changing patterns of alliance relationships have incorporated a growing number of insights and propositions derived from the analysis of “global interdependence.” These efforts have been complicated, on the one hand, by a lack of precision in providing operational definitions of the independent variables and, at a more fundamental level, by considerable ambiguity with respect to those types of changes which may be best explained in terms of these variables.

An analysis of Washington-Bonn relations reveals a reasonably coherent pattern of changes with regard to four specific aspects of the relationship: 1) the nature of the alliance agenda; 2) the structure of the relationship (i.e. the characteristic distribution of influence between alliance partners); 3) the operative procedural norms which regulate bilateral bargaining and negotiation; and 4) the institutional arrangements which have evolved for the coordination of alliance policy.

Increasingly, technological decisions are entering into the political arena. They alter the environment in which policy must operate. It is claimed that British foreign policy since the Second World War has been dominated by unrealizable goals. Britain has been preoccupied by the debate about her world-role, a debate which was in itself the product of anachronistic values and assumptions. The Concorde project was the manifestation of a desire to maintain Britain's position as a leading aeronautical power. The aircraft industry faithfully reflects the pattern of government interests and influence. But Concorde was also intended to emphasize what the British government felt to be changing relationships with the United States and Europe. However, in “modernized” states, the boundaries between foreign and domestic policies are increasingly blurred. Although this phenomenon may result in interdependence at an international level, the formation of transnational links can restrict the power of sovereign states. It can also inhibit the domestic process of democratic control. While international burden-sharing may place unforeseen pressures on the structures of government, the momentum for technological development is often so strong that it becomes impossible to resist. While visible technology can be a potent instrument of prestige, it must also respond to needs at a market level in order to be successful. Concorde has conspicuously failed to do this.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is the major technical assistance fund in the UN family of institutions. By purchasing goods and services, it affects developed and developing states alike. As well as distributing assistance, UNDP attempts to stimulate follow-up investment and procures goods and services from member states. UNDP project expenditures are correlated with public and private follow-up investment, but the relationship is rather weak. On the procurement side, developed states receive subcontracts, equipment orders, and fellowship students in direct relationship to their contributions to UNDP, and developing states attract employment possibilities for their nationals as UNDP experts in direct relationship to their contributions. Developed states receive the largest returns from UNDP procurement. Providing multilateral assistance is UNDP's primary activity, but the purchase of equipment, the generation of investment opportunities, and the employment of experts provide economic incentives for both developing and developed states.

An analysis of UN coverage in sample years between 1948 and 1975 by five representative black U.S. newspapers as compared with the New York Times and, to a lesser extent, the Chicago Tribune shows that UN coverage by the black press since 1961 has declined, as it has for the white press, but that the decline in black press coverage is not only less sharp but has also been somewhat reversed in recent years. Patterns of coverage differ: greater priority is accorded in the black press to Africa and Asia and more emphasis is placed on personalities, especially on black Americans at the United Nations. Comparisons of black press coverage with UN “busyness” and with the differentials of support for the UN that have been manifested over the years in both black and white public opinion reveal no clear correlations.

In a recent article in this journal Paul Jabber presents a cogent analysis of many of the potential conflicts that may face OPEC over the coming years and concludes that a collapse of the cartel is extremely unlikely, even under conditions of severe political dispute among OPEC members. I share Jabber's view that a collapse of the cartel is not probable in the medium-term future. I believe, however, that Jabber has not sufficiently recognized the divergencies as well as the similarities in the economic interests of the oil countries, and that, as a result, his analysis significantly overstates the likelihood that the real level of oil prices, i.e., the nominal price adjusted for the depreciating purchasing power of currencies, is likely to average near if not above the levels initially established with the first full-fledged flexing of OPEC's muscles in 1973–74. After the 1973–74 increases, the real price of oil fell substantially through 1978, although of course nowhere near preembargo levels. Thus Jabber's prediction was that a significant increase in real oil prices will occur over the coming decade.