This article outlines some of the propositions on organizational growth and goal structure contained in the literature on organization theory. A number of hypotheses are derived from this body of material and these are tested against the International Labor Organization experience.1

Scholars of international politics have recently offered the concepts of transnationalism and interdependence as alternatives to the state-centric paradigm for studying the impact of advancing technology on modern world politics.1 While these concepts in themselves are not new and may, to some extent, share the normative biases of earlier theoretical challenges to the state-centric model (e.g., regional integration theory),2 they should be examined separately because of the undeniable increase of transnational economic and social activities in the present system.

This paper falls into two main parts. In Part I an attempt is made to develop a simple framework which can be used for analyzing the role of sanctions, with special reference to international sanctions.1 In Part II this framework is used to investigate the status of the United Nations as a sanctioning body and, in particular, the relationship between the UN and Southern Africa where Rhodesia has been subjected to international economic sanctions since 1965 and South Africa has been under threat of similar measures since the early 1960s.2

The primary purpose of this study1 is to relate a large number of variables, pertaining to the national attributes of the members of the United Nations, to the voting patterns of these members in the 23rd (1968) and 24th (1969) sessions of the General Assembly. This effort may be viewed as a continuation of an earlier one entitled “Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly,”2 based on 1961 and 1963 data.3