I found preparing this presidential address a much greater challenge than I had anticipated. After much deliberation, I decided to explore the historical roots of what we are doing now. The History of Economics Society, like other learned societies, holds an annual conference in different cities; members present papers which are discussed; and the Society sponsors a specialist journal—The Journal of the History of Economic Thought. Why? Where did this tradition begin? I turned to several historians of science—I. Bernard Cohen, Thomas S. Kuhn, Richard Yeo, and Ian Hacking—for some background.

John Rae, Scottish by birth, and a Canadian-Hawaiian (i.e. of the Kingdom of Hawaii) by residence, lived in Canada for about twelve years before the publication of his only work of significance in economies' and for nine years before he started writing it (James 1965,). He titled his book Statement of Some New Principles on the Subject of Political Economy, Exposing the Fallacies of the System of Free Trade and of Some Other Doctrines Maintained in the “Wealth of Nations” (1834) (obviously not a very memorable or popular title). The book was first conceived as an appendix to a statistical study of an aspect of the Canadian economy but, as sometimes happens, took a life of its own, in which references to Canada became merely illustrative and less frequent than to England, France or even China.

Walter Bagehot is an excellent example of the mid-Victorian polymath. He was a banker, journalist, editor, biographer, literary critic, economist and political analyst. The educated reader of today remembers him as the author of The English Constitution, which, though published in 1867, remains one of the best introductions to the workings of the Westminster political system. Economists, on the other hand, vaguely recall him as the monetary commentator who wrote Lombard Street (1873b) and edited The Economist (1861–1877). Only a few historians of economic thought cite Bagehot for his participation in the English Methodenstreit. He played a significant role in this largely forgotten Victorian debate between the historical and orthodox economists. He was one of the first orthodox economists to respond to the historicist challenge, and, in doing so, he articulated a highly controversial relativist interpretation of the orthodox doctrines. Specifically, in response to the historicist claims that recent evidence gathered from custom-bound societies falsified the orthodox

Oddly enough, my first clear recollection of an encounter with an economic proposition dates from the age of six or seven, when my father (who died suddenly from the pneumonia when I was eight) casually remarked that the Colman Mustard Company derived most of its profits from the residue people left on their plates. Unfortunately at the time I did not appreciate the analytical subtlety of this observation. Nor, I suspect, did my father, who probably only wanted to particularize the familiar maxim: waste not, want not. Nevertheless, the point evidently stayed in my mind, though I cannot claim it as the origin of my subsequent fascination with economics. The evolution of my attitudes to economics will tie considered later. First, however, let me briefly sketch some relevant features of my personal and socio-economic background, which may shed some light on my subsequent intellectual activities.

Utilitarianism as conceived of in the present article is the philosophical movement that is roughly characterized by three main features: (1) during his lifetime a person maximizes his utility, which depends on his pleasure and his pain; (2) an individual's behavior should be based on a good education and guided by effective legislation; (3) society's ultimate purpose is the maximization of the aggregate happiness of all people.

At one level or another, economic processes make it possible for diverse individuals to coordinate their activities. Although microeconomists have long recognized this insight, and purport to explain it with their tools, macroeconomists often seem to lose sight of the centrality of coordination when they focus on the movements of, and relationships among, aggregate variables. One problem with emphasizing aggregates is that, in reality, economic coordination ultimately takes place at the microeconomic level, which poses the issue of microfoundations. However, recognizing that micro issues are the fundamental ones does not deny a role for distinctly macroeconomic analysis. Macroeconomic analysis should show how movements in markets for goods that are pervasive (i.e., affect some very large number of microeconomic markets simultaneously), help or harm the coordination processes taking place in those individual markets and thus influence the determination of aggregate measures such as total income and employment.

Austrian economics is arousing increasing interest, not to say enthusiasm, these days. No doubt this is in part due to the collapse of the planned economies of the Soviet type, which has lent credibility to the claims of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek regarding the impossibility of rational economic calculation under socialism-claims which were disputed by the mainstream neoclassical economists of a generation ago. The phenomenon also reflects a relatively long-standing dissatisfaction with neoclassical economics. For many years it was the radical critics of capitalism who felt most keenly the attractions of alternative approaches in economics. Now, increasingly, champions of the market are coming to believe that neoclassical theory does not offer a deep and firm enough basis for asserting the virtues of the market system, and the counterproductive effects of government intervention therein.

Allin Cottrell's criticisms of my paper fall into three general categories: criticisms of the paper I did not write, criticisms of the paper I claimed to write, and criticisms of the paper he thinks I was really writing. Let me try to address each of these categories, emphasizing the more substantive points he raises about the paper I claimed to write.

In the last decade or so, intellectual historians have tried to alter and enhance our understanding of the Scottish Enlightenment by situating the classic writings in the context of contemporary political debates and intellectual traditions. Two main approaches have emerged to date, tied to the themes of natural jurisprudence and civic humanism respectively. While both have much to offer to historians of economic thought, the present paper seeks to evaluate only the latter. It focuses in particular on civic humanist interpretations of the economic theories of David Hume and Adam Smith.

Friedrich A. Hayek's work spans over more than forty years and encompasses a number of social disciplines. That work has a single goal, however: the justification of a liberal social order. Apart from the justification of the liberal order, two other elements of his work in particular draw the attention of many economists: his definition of the economic problem as being one of coordination, and his effort to explain certain social phenomena as the result of a spontaneous order.